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Abstract
This dissertation develops and evaluates a structural theory of protest onset, applied to
the Russian case. Russian stability has become a pressing international political concern, as
Putin has annexed the Crimea, fomented one war, in Ukraine, and become a major player in
another, in Syria. In December 2011, thousands of Russians gathered in Moscow, Saint
Petersburg, and other cities for the largest set of protests since the fall of the USSR. Waves of
protest have reappeared sporadically since. Each time, events create islands of dissent, spread
widely, but unevenly, throughout the country—in a picture reminiscent of the pre-collapse Soviet
Union.
The dissertation argues that only an integrated theoretical framework can adequately
explain protest onset variation. Such a framework must include three leading positions: social
mobilization capacity, grievances, and political opportunity structure. It must include an additional
element as well: state capacity, which is only weakly present in the theoretical canon of Social
Movement Studies. The project requires novel sub-national data to test the integrated framework.
Independent variable data derives from the Russian Federal Statistics Service. Dependent
variable data derives from activist-curated web collections.
According to statistical results, structural factors do, in fact, systematically explain
variation in Russian protest from 2007 to 2013. A time series negative binomial regression model
reports that protests are most likely in federal subjects featuring highly urbanized populations,
ii

high unemployment, and low social spending. These structural factors provide a probabilistic
explanation of Russian protest variation over the time horizon. A paired case study, focused on
Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk Krai, evaluates quantitative results and offers model specification
suggestions. Conclusions indicate that targeted public spending serves as a tool with which the
Russian state can coopt public obedience; local governments can employ revenues as a tool to
maintain social order. These finding generate novel international political implications, particularly
connected with commodity price fluctuation and wars in Ukraine and Syria.
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Executive Summary
Major Findings
1) Structural factors provide a probabilistic explanation of relative protest frequency, across
Russian federal subjects, from 2007-2013.
2) State capacity to coopt, through targeted public spending, and grievances best explain
protest frequency variance.
3) Social mobilization capacity (other than total population and urban population
percentage), political opportunity structure, state capacity to coerce, by force, and state
capacity to cooperate, by generating loyalty to the ruling United Russia party, do not
explain protest frequency variance.
4) Russian federal subjects characterized by large, urban populations, scant public
spending, and high unemployment are the most likely to host protest events; low public
spending per capita and high unemployment are the most robust drivers.
5) A paired case study of Siberian federal subjects validates statistical findings.

Major Contributions
1) The project represents the first ever systematic exploration of Russian protest onset.
2) Theory work identifies, and corrects, major problems plaguing research programs in
Social Movement Studies and contentious political studies.
3) Independent variable work contributes to the cottage industry of state capacity
operationalization.
4) Dependent variable work enhances an existing sub-national Russian protest database.
1

5) An overview of event data, driven by news worthiness theory, offers a cautionary tale to
scholars using newspaper data in general, and automated event databases in particular.
6) Use of activist data offers an alternative to traditional dependent variable sources.

Limitations
1) The project adds to an existing database, rather than creating a new one.
2) A more systematic critique of extant event data sources would require additional time and
resources.
3) The project integrates existing theories, rather than creating true theoretical novelty.

2

Motivation
This dissertation project argues that Russian protests are of interest to non-academic and
academic audiences alike. For observers outside of academia, Russian protests demanded
international attention in December, 2011, when tens of thousands filled squares and streets from
Saint Petersburg to Vladivostok, the Baltic Sea to the Bering Strait. Disputed Duma elections
marked the start of a consistent wave. In February 2012, the words Bolotnaya Square obtained a
new, defiant symbolic meaning. Standard bearers Pussy Riot toured late-night studios and
college campuses, laughing with David Letterman and winning supporters. After a few relatively
quiet years, the phenomenon reappeared in 2017. Alexei Navalny—persona non grata and literal
he-who-shall-not-be-named of Russian state television—organized country-wide anti-corruption
protests. Each time, events created islands of dissent, spread widely, but unevenly, throughout
the country—in a picture reminiscent of pre-collapse Soviet Union.
Understanding why Russian protests occur, why they occur in some regions more
frequently than others, is an important target for social inquiry. The phenomenon holds
importance—even urgency— for a number of groups: the current Russian government, the
United States and NATO, liberal civil society groups, and investors. The United States treats
social unrest in Russia as a potential path towards political or ideological change. The now
famous feud between Vladimir Putin and Hillary Clinton began when Clinton, as secretary of
state, allegedly stoked protests around the 2011 election. Over the past decade, the Kremlin has
built insurance against an Arab-spring like movement carried out by activists. For example, the
Ministry for Internal Affairs held a 40,000-troop exercise against a simulation of the Maidan
protests, during which troops operated water cannons and tear gas while under attack from
stones and Molotov cocktails. Liberal civil society groups monitor protests as a potential site for
human rights abuses. Investors monitor protests as a threat to earnings and market sentiment. In
short, numerous stakeholders watch Russian protest patterns with a wary eye.
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This dissertation project is an attempt to generate useful knowledge, to broaden
understanding of an urgently important phenomenon. Until now, the academic space has
remained nearly entirely empty, populated by descriptive studies (Robertson 2013; Lankina 2015;
Lankina and Voznaya 2015).
I argue that only an integrated theoretical framework can adequately explain protest
onset variation. Such a framework must include each of the three dominant positions: social
mobilization capacity, grievances, and political opportunity structure. It must include an additional
element as well: state capacity, which is only weakly present in the theoretical canon of Social
Movement Studies. My integrated position, titled the Idea of the State, an allusion to Barry
Buzan’s work on state capacity, predicts high levels of protest in the following structural
conditions: where social mobilization capacity is high, or grievances are high, or political
opportunity structures are open, or state capacity is weak; it predicts low levels of protest under
inverted conditions. Each element is, alone, a probabilistically sufficient factor, but not a
necessary one. An explanation that focuses on any one element only would potentially suffer
from omitted variable bias—a major problem plaguing the field. Theoretical motivation thus arises
from an opportunity to test leading theories, and at the same time, to challenge the prevailing
state of the field in Social Movement Studies. For academic audiences, modern Russian protest
offers an arena in which to test and improve theoretical tools.

A Geography of Micro Events
Only a disaggregated approach can produce explanations valued by non-academic and
academic audiences. Protest onset is an important phenomenon regardless of size, regardless of
location. Events that brought the world’s attention to Russia were large, with tens of thousands
marching in major metropolitan centers. This project is not an attempt to gain an understanding of
mass protest only, however, but rather protest onset in general. It explores where and when
citizens challenge the contours of society; it explores the dynamic social contract of modern
Russia.
4

Disaggregation facilitates an explanation of protest onset that appeals to observers
concerned with small and large events alike. Even small protest can be considered “dress
rehearsals” that incrementally contribute to future mass mobilization (Wolchik 2012), and even
spark major upheaval in the short term, as in Tunisia and Syria (Noueihed and Warren 2012).
Initial cleavages and coalitions can reappear, magnified, when the curtain rises. This project
takes methodological inspiration from recent work that eschews monolithic treatment of social
unrest. Only a sub-nationally-defined dependent variable exposes the streams and strains
characterizing the modern Russian socio-political environment.
Theoretical testing likewise requires a dependent variable defined at the sub-national
level. Causal mechanisms driving grievances, mobilization resources, political opportunities and
the state’s capacity to discourage activists—all operate primarily at the local level.
Operationalizations compiled at the national level are misleading analytic abstractions, often
created for the sake of expediency and data availability. Indeed, scholars have created decades
of specious findings by collapsing numerous dissimilar sub-national polities into a single figure. In
the parallel, high-profile field of civil war studies, corrective sub-national studies have exposed
flawed conclusions regarding socio-political grievances, and ethnic divisions (Buhaug, Cederman,
and Gleditsch 2014). As Welzel and Inglehart (2008) have argued, emergent environmental
effects may interact with local conditions to drive outcomes. An evaluation of “socio-tropic”
effects is relevant only once proximate drivers are understood. Such work falls outside of this
project’s scope.
The project generates novel sub-national dependent variable data. It significantly adds to
an existing event database. Since 2007, a team of Russian sociologists have maintained a virtual
chronicle of protest—housed on the website namarsh.ru. The team gathers dispatches from
regional print and web journalists. Dispatches cover protest events triggered by any type of
grievance, from environmental degradation, to wage conditions, to political corruption. The
website is funded by opposition politician and chess grandmaster Gary Kasparov. Tomila Lankina
5

and Alisa Voznaya created a dataset from namarsh.ru reports, hand-coding the timing and
location of protests. This project enhances existing data, coding an additional year of event
reports to create a dependent variable dataset that covers the time period 2007-2013.
Activist-based data offer a valuable alternative to mainstream event data sources, most
of which are based on newspaper articles. News worthiness theory expects proximate, surprising,
large-scale, violent events to make the news (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Barranco and Wisler
1999). In modern Russia—a sprawling land mass characterized by illiberal press—the theory
predicts biased coverage. Significant risks are compounded by mundane pitfalls of automated
miscoding and foreign language translation accessibility. A brief vetting exercise reveals that
major newspaper-based data sources are indeed poor—extremely poor. Where GDELT’s failure
is overreporting, SPEED’s failure is dramatic underreporting, both sources exhibiting hundreds of
errors.
The enhanced Lankina and Voznaya dataset reveals unexplained variation across
Russia. In recent years, the county has experienced thousands of protest events, occurring
unevenly across federal subjects. An initial look at the data reveals concentration in the two
federal cities. Over 1,400 protests occurred in Moscow, and over 500 in Saint Petersburg.
Despite such high frequencies, the data further show that the majority of Russia’s 4,500 protests
occur outside the two major cities (more than 70% of the total figure). Frequency varies widely
across the eighty three federal subjects. The histogram displayed in Figure 2 below offers a quick
look at variation. Twenty regions experienced over fifty events from 2007-2013. Seventeen
regions experienced between twenty five and fifty events. Nineteen regions experienced from ten
to twenty five. And twenty seven regions experienced ten events or less.
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The Troubled State of the Art
The project identifies and addresses two major problems rife in Social Movement
Studies. A historical literature review exposes the insufficiency of the dominant political process
model and problematic operationalization practices.
First, state capacity is largely absent from Social Movement Studies. Recent consensus
on the elements of the political process model fails to adequately represent the statist position,
originated by Tilly (1976), that the state as actor shapes protest potential. In an overview,
McAdam (1996) identified the constituent elements of the dominant model, across numerous
articulations. McAdams identified a list of four dimensions: relative openness of formal political
institutions; stability of elite alignments within a polity; presence of allies, among elected officials
and among civil society groups; and finally, state capacity and propensity for repression. Only the
fourth dimension describes the state as actor. Tilly and other contentious politics scholars
demonstrate that repressive capacity is but one element of a much more complex whole.
Second, when scholars do operationalize state capacity, two additional problems
emerge. Twin pitfalls of observational equivalence and over-aggregation threaten construct
validity. The use of GDP in civil war studies offers a clear example. Two oft-cited studies
identified a common link between GDP and onset frequency, then proceeded to produce
divergent conclusions. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) encouraged governments to highlight job
creation as a path to peace. Fearon and Laitin (2003) would divert resources to government
military command and control structures instead. But, here, the policy recommendations derive
from an identical evidence base. The GDP per capita operationalization transforms state capacity
into an undifferentiated monolith. Theorists recognize numerous interrelated but distinct
dimensions or elements of state capacity. All are elided when operationalizations fail to follow
Levi’s (1988) call to disaggregate the state.
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Not in Circumstances They Choose
In a sense, the project features two competitions: the first, between structural and agentbased explanations, and the second, within the structural methodological realm, a tournament of
variables, a search for the most compelling explanation offered by decades of scholarly work.
Contenders include the subcomponents of the integrated Idea of the State framework: state
capacity, and the major strains of Social Movement Studies: political opportunity structure,
resource mobilization theory, and grievance.
The project argues that structural factors shape the relative likelihood of Russian protest,
throwing a challenge to agent-based explanations such as New Social Movement Theory (NSM).
The school of thought encompasses several strains of academic work first appearing in the
1980’s and 1990’s. New social movement theorists describe their work as ‘new’ in reference to
classical Marxism, eschewing the monolithic theory’s economic reductionism and class-based
understanding of identity. The school is loosely connected (Buechler 1995), held together by a
focus on temporary and fluid catalyzing factors. Some scholars emphasize the ephemeral nature
of networks undergirding social action (Melucci 1989); others sketch a similar story of sociallyconstructed grievances and ideology, amorphous and unmoored to objective conditions (Laraña,
Johnston, and Gusfield 1994). The key methodological standpoint cuts against the structuralist
analytical gamble. Contributors are united by a methodological approach that places explanation
with quickly-changing context-specific factors. The project places explanation, instead, on
relatively-stable, structural factors that shape the relative likelihood of Russian protest.
The project further argues that a dimensional understanding of state capacity is an
essential component of any comprehensive understanding of protest onset. Most commonly, a
state’s capacity is considered high when would-be activists are deterred through force or the
threat of force (McAdam 1996). Coercion is only one aspect of the state, however. Softer and
more abstract forms of power are just as effective as boots and truncheons. States coopt their
populations through measures aimed to ameliorate suffering, such as social spending programs
8

and access to social services. States can also develop cooperative power that engenders
feelings of loyalty. Fjelde and de Soysa’s (2009) tri-part taxonomy nicely captures the
dimensions of capacity that shape variations in protest onset. A theory of state capacity expects
high levels of protest where state capacity is weak along dimensions of coercion, cooptation, and
cooperation.

An Academic Desert
To date, only one limited explanation of Russian protest onset exists. This attempt falls
away as flimsy and not compelling upon examination. Lankina (2015), an international relations
specialist at the London School of Economics, evoked political opportunity structure to explain
variation in onset frequency. Instead of Eisinger’s original objective local political indicators,
Lankina relied on a subjective index of regional democracy: an index compiled by the Moscow
Carnegie Center and the Independent Institute of Social Policy. The index is based on expert
opinions. Lankina’s evidence amounts to selectively highlighting a small group of regions
exhibiting the expected relationship between political opportunity structure and social protest
onset.
Moreover, very few explanations of protest onset exist at all. The few structural studies—
focusing on any country—that operate at the subnational level do not comprehensively test
theoretical drivers. For example, focusing on India, Wilkinson (2004) evaluated the forward
effects of politically motivated transfer rates, ethnic composition of police and federal
administration, and corruption. He did not find a significant relationship between onset and any of
his measures. Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) conducted a more recent study of social unrest in
Indian federal states. The authors mimic the initial, invalid operationalization of GDP and report
negative results. Gillezeau (2014) analyzed the relationship of federal spending at the state level
and both the onset and severity of racially motivated protests in the United States. Recently, Arce
and Mangonnet (2013) conducted a sub-national study of political opportunity structure and
protest onset in Argentina. The state of the field, then, sees a small group of scholars studying
9

protest onset at the correct geographic level, all of whom apply an incomplete set of theoretical
drivers.

Statistical Findings
After identifying and correcting major flaws in theory, independent variable
operationalization, and dependent variable operationalization, the project produces statistical
analysis. Random effects, time series negative binomial regression models test a set of nine
hypotheses, derived from the Idea of the State integrated framework, in addition to three
hypotheses from Russian Studies.


Coercive state capacity (crime rates) is a mitigating factor—Rejected



Cooptational capacity (social spending) is a mitigating factor—Accepted



Cooperative capacity (United Russia vote share) is a mitigating factor—Rejected



Social mobilization capacity (urban population) is a driving factor—Accepted



Social mobilization capacity (educated population) is a driving factor—Rejected



Social mobilization capacity (transport infrastructure) is a driving factor—Rejected



Grievances (unemployment) are a driving factor—Accepted



Grievances (morbidity rates) are a driving factor—Rejected



Open political opportunity structure (Carnegie Index) is a driving factor—Rejected



Natural resource wealth (lack of federal transfers) is a driving factor—Rejected
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Public employment (public employment share) is a mitigating factor—Rejected



Generous federal support (federal transfers) is a driving factor—Rejected
In summary, more generously supported federal subjects, with small, dispersed

populations experienced relatively low levels of protest onset. Where unemployment is low and
the populace benefits from social spending, low levels are similarly expected. Empirical testing
provided supportive evidence for only three of the 12 hypotheses. Switching to a fixed effects
negative binomial regression model—one that draws more heavily on within region variation—
both population measures lost significance. For this reason, and due to the crude nature of
population-based operationalizations, cooptational capacity and grievance offer the best
statistical explanations of protest onset frequency in modern Russia. At least in this context, other
drivers do not appear as important as initially theorized.

Policy Implications
Empirical results suggest that cooptational state capacity, measured at the sub-national
level, conditions the frequency of protest in Russia from 2007-2013. Population measures and
unemployment also shaped protest frequency. Only cooptational capacity, however, is completely
within leaders’ control. The finding regarding state capacity to coopt is particularly interesting due
to its magnitude. Ceteris paribus, a one thousand ruble increase in social cultural spending per
capita results in a 3% decrease in expected onset potential. Such a strong relationship is not
seen with the other significant independent variables. A one thousand ruble increase is relatively
small, less than 3% of most Russian federal subjects’ current spending levels.
As local governments allocate more funds to socio-cultural projects—to public health and
education, to unemployment assistance, or to public park maintenance—the frequency of protest
declines. It appears, then, that targeted public spending serves as a tool with which the state can
11

coopt public obedience; Russian local governments can employ revenue as a tool to maintain
social order. These findings begin to outline the shape of the social contract across the Russian
Federation. Moreover, these findings bring to light implications of international politics, particularly
implications of commodity price fluctuation and ongoing wars in Ukraine and Syria. Oil and gas
shocks would affect state revenue at both the central and local levels. Sanctions threaten
revenue by jeopardizing the country’s general economic outlook. Further still, Putin’s costly
military engagements could limit local governments’ capacity to coopt.

Case Study and Moving Forward
Case study evidence supports the major empirical findings. The project produces a most
common systems design case study. Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk coincide along all
independent variables except one. Novosibirsk exhibits lower cooptational capacity than its
Siberian neighbor, as well as higher protest frequency. An in-depth analysis of protest
environments evaluates the validity of statistical relationships and suggests model improvements.
Analysis also explores interaction effects between cooptational capacity and grievances, the two
most robust drivers.
It appears that the sub-national Krasnoyarsk state was more inclined to employ
cooptation capacity than its counterpart in Novosibirsk. And it appears that cooptational actions
did, in fact, dissuade protestors from organizing demonstrations of dissent. This is not to say that
Novosibirsk’s government completely refused to employ cooptation. Rather, in all years under
analysis the northern-most region reported more incidents of “buying-off” protesters, despite
reported fewer protests, fewer opportunities for such a response. In 2007, out of 8 quality of life
movements, Krasnoyarsk demonstrated cooptational tactics in response to 4 of them.
Novosibirsk, faced with 8 movements, responded with cooptation only in response to striking
grain workers. In 2008, Krasnoyarsk leveraged cooptational state capacity to “buy off” autoowners, alumni factory workers and displaced airline workers, or 3 of 5 protest movements. In the
same year, Novosibirsk reached an agreement with just one group, striking municipal bus drivers,
12

when faced with 8 quality of life movements. In 2009 and 2010, Krasnoyarsk’s protest
environment was tranquil. Only four groups organized quality of life demands. The local state
responded each time, three times with cooptation, and once with effective repression. Over the
two years, 12 separate movements demanded assistance in Novosibirsk. Government responded
twice, once to pay tractor factory workers threatening an official visit from Putin, and once to
reverse a cut to subsidized transportation. The difference in cooptational capacity appears to
drive differing protest outcomes in the two regions. Against this backdrop, unemployment proved
a steady driver of unrest—particularly when not met with cooptational response.
Disaggregated statistical analysis represents one potential way forward. I am convinced
that a quality-of-life/ideology dichotomy would improve the search for structural drivers of protest.
The next step in the dialectic that is social scientific research—from hypothesis, to testing, and
back again—would evaluate the notion that quality of life protests are structurally predictable,
while ideologically-driven protests are not. Even this more disaggregated approach would face
difficulties, however. The in-depth look at two Siberian provinces revealed consistent connections
between quality-of-life protests and ideological protests. Categorical boundaries collapsed as
striking workers joined political activists, and the mundane became political.

13

I - Introduction
The Rise of Russian Protest
In December 2011, thousands of Russians gathered in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and
other cities for the largest set of protests since the fall of the USSR. Days earlier, the country held
legislative elections across voting regions for seats in the State Duma. The ruling United Russia,
led by Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev, won nearly 53% of seats over rival Communist,
Liberal Democratic and Just Russia parties. United Russia’s victory, despite dropping in
magnitude from 70% in the previous election, triggered wide-spread accusations of vote-fixing.
Tens of thousands of people gathered in protest across the country. Activists convened the
largest gathering near the Kremlin in Moscow to focus country-wide demands for new elections.
Police estimates placed attendance at 25,000 people, while protestors claimed over 100,000, and
news agencies in the United States and Europe reported a midpoint around 50,000. No matter
the exact number, the event was, as The New York Times reported, “too large to be edited out of
the evening news”(Barry 2011).
Protests against 2011 Duma elections marked the beginning of two concurrent trends, a
rise in protest activity, and a rise in international attention. In February, in the following year, tens
of thousands of protesters again took to the streets across Russia, with the largest demonstration
in Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square. Large-scale protests continued in response to the disputed
electoral results, and in anticipation of Putin’s presidential campaign, announced after an
interlude as prime minister.

14

The election itself again mobilized activists, who cited irregularities despite Putin’s claim
that he had “won a clean victory” (Herszenhorn 2012). The wave of protest beginning in 2011
st

included the now famous arrest of Pussy Riot. On February 21 2012, five members of the punk
rock band/art collective donned masks and staged a performance at the Christ the Savior
Cathedral in Moscow, during mass. The group’s “Punk Rock Prayer” denounced Putin’s
relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church, repeating in verse the protest movement’s call of
“Russia Without Putin” (Россия без Путина). Three members of the group spent over a year in
prison on charges of destabilizing social order, before release under an amnesty law passed in
the run-up to the Sochi Winter Olympics. Over the course of the group’s trial the members
actively sought to connect Russia’s dissident movement with transnational justice and democracy
movements. As Masha Gessen describes in a biography, the group’s name demonstrates their
strategy in microcosm. The vulgarity is an attempt to catch observers’ attention. And the usage of
English is an attempt to appeal to a broad audience—even when displayed in Russian media the
band’s name appear in roman script (Gessen 2014). The strategy worked. HBO aired a
documentary account of their story in 2014, and Russian protests have continued to garner
widespread attention in the international press.
Thanks in part to this English-language campaign, Russian protests have become a
pressing international political concern, and as such, a pressing target for social inquiry. Recent
events have focused the attention of Putin’s regime and the international community, as well as
academic audiences working in the contentious politics tradition. Around the world, numerous
actors would benefit from understanding the causal mechanisms underlying protest onset.
This project is the first ever systematic exploration of protest onset in modern Russia.
Large-scale events, those appearing in international headlines, are one element of a much larger
phenomenon. For every action in Saint Petersburg or Moscow many more take place in provincial
cities spanning the roughly 6,200-mile land mass. From 2007 to 2013, over 4,000 protest events
occurred, nearly two-thirds outside of the twin capitals—according to my updated Lankina and
15

Voznaya dataset, discussed below. A glimpse at the data reveals significant variation in relative
onset frequency. Of the eighty three federal subjects, some featured hundreds of events, others
around fifty, and still others reported fewer than ten or none at all. What explains this variation?
What drives some regions to become protest hubs? Theoretical tools offer a way forward.
Scholars have argued that social mobilization capacity (e.g., Urdal 2006; Wallace and Weiss
2013), grievances (e.g., Walton and Ragin 1990; Porta 2008), or political opportunity structure
(e.g., Arce and Mangonnet, 2013; Voznaya, 2015) explain protest onset variation. Each individual
approach, however, provides merely a partial, inadequate explanation.
This project argues that only an integrated theoretical framework can adequately explain
protest onset variation. Such a framework must include each of the three dominant positions. It
must include an additional element as well: state capacity, which is only weakly present in the
theoretical canon of Social Movement Studies. My integrated position, titled the Idea of the State,
an allusion to Barry Buzan’s work on state capacity, predicts high levels of protest in the following
structural conditions: where social mobilization capacity is high, or grievances are high, or political
opportunity structures are open, or state capacity is weak. It predicts low levels of protest under
inverted conditions. As this chapter demonstrates, each element is, alone, a sufficient factor, but
1

not a necessary one . An explanation that focuses on one element alone would potentially suffer
from omitted variable bias—a major problem plaguing the field, as outlined in Chapter 3.
Theoretical motivation thus arises from an opportunity to test leading theories, and at the same
time, to challenge the prevailing state of the field in Social Movement Studies. For academic
audiences, modern Russian protest offers an arena in which to test and improve theory.
The Idea of the State framework generates a set of falsifiable hypotheses, required to
evaluate the effect of each sufficient but unnecessary driver. Due to the relatively early stage of

1

The Idea of the State is based on a probabilistic understanding of causality. I here use the terminology
sufficient and necessary in Douglas Dion’s (1998) sense: each element is not deterministically, but
“probabilistically, sufficient,” increasing the relative likelihood of onset.
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Russian protest research, hypothesis testing also evaluates the broader structuralist position: do
there, in fact, exist systematic drivers of protest onset in modern Russia? Statistical models in
Chapter 5 will evaluate the following:
H*: Structural conditions systematically shape relative protest onset across Russian federal
subjects.
H1: State capacity is negatively correlated with protest onset.
H2: Social mobilization capacity is positively correlated with protest onset.
H3: Grievances are positively correlated with protest onset.
H4: Open political opportunity structures are positively correlated with protest onset.
The first several chapters establish preconditions for hypothesis testing. Chapter 2 builds
theoretical tools, presents the Idea of the State as a synthesis of existing work in Social
Movement Studies. Time and again, over decades of research, scholars return to the three
leading theoretical positions. Time and again, purportedly comprehensive protest models undertheorize the role of the state. My framework solves this problem by importing a rich, multidimensional understanding of state capacity from contentious politics. In addition to coercion,
state capacity to coopt, and state capacity to cooperate mitigate protest onset frequency (Fjelde
and de Soysa 2014). Hypothesis H1 expands accordingly, to include:
H1a: State capacity to coerce is negatively correlated with protest onset.
H1b: State capacity to coopt is negatively correlated with protest onset.
H1c: State capacity to cooperate is negatively correlated with protest onset.
Chapter 3 operationalizes these three dimensions, in addition to social mobilization
capacity, grievances, and political opportunity structure. Detailed analysis of existing
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operationalization produces a cautionary tale. I avoid common pitfalls by measuring independent
variables at the subnational level. As the final building block, Chapter 4 builds a dependent
variable database, containing event data—the when and the where of protest onset. Comparative
analysis leads me to eschew sources based on newspapers and traditional media, in favor of
activist-curated web collections. Chapter 5 conducts statistical testing, before Chapter 6 subjects
hypotheses to qualitative testing. Here, this introductory chapter provides motivation and
delineates the phenomenon under investigation. In order to demonstrate the importance of the
dependent variable, I will produce evidence that Russian protest events represent an area of
concern for many actors. Protest event onset attracts scant scholarly attention (Lankina and
Voznaya, 2015). For this reason, I will provide a lengthy, robust statement of motivation. I will first
discuss the Russian government’s approach to recent events, an approach that includes a foray
into predictive analytics. Next, I will demonstrate a similar level of concern from a variety of
international actors: the United States, liberal civil society organizations and investors. By
including perspectives from this array of actors, I indicate the broad appeal of a project dedicated
to explaining the onset of Russian protest events.
With motivation firmly established I then briefly demonstrate the superiority of an
integrated approach over prevalent individual explanations. Three theoretical traditions offer tools
for understanding social protest onset in Russia. Two recent scholarly papers have even
addressed the topic explicitly (Lankina and Voznaya 2015; Lankina 2015). However, extant
academic work does not provide an adequate explanation of the phenomenon. The academic
terrain, relating to Russian protest onset— and protest onset in general, as discussed in Chapter
3 and Chapter 4—is relatively bare. The few studies attempting to explain protest onset are shot
through with serious problems regarding theory, independent variable operationalization, and
dependent variable operationalization. I conclude the chapter with a road map for the rest of the
dissertation, moving through the problem areas in chapters 2, 3, and 4, offering my solutions
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along the way. With corrected fundamental elements in place, chapters 5 and 6 provide statistical
and case study analysis.

Motivation
The onset of protest events in Russia is relevant to the country’s current governing
regime. Putin and his allies are concerned with the causes of protests, historical and future.
Evidence of regime preference is notoriously difficult to obtain, however. Country leaders often
conceal true preferences behind rhetoric aimed at mollifying domestic audiences or international
rivals. International relations scholars long ago called attention the “other minds problem,” the
impossibility of accessing the thoughts of government leaders (Butterfield 1951; Jervis 1978).
Words spoken at official events are carefully polished and may offer little evidence of true
preference. Putin’s speeches are especially poor sources of evidence, given his reputation as a
dishonest spokesman. For example, in April 2015 during a public question and answer session,
the leader forcefully denied involvement in the ongoing Ukrainian crisis: “let me be clear, I will say
this clearly: There are no Russian troops in Ukraine” (Demirjian 2015). During the early phases of
the conflict heavily armed men seized control of local government buildings, wearing unmarked
uniforms similar to those worn by Russian troops. Since the initial attacks, various news agencies
have established the presence of military vehicles only owned by the Russian army, Russianmade weapons systems, and videos of Russian units, including self-published social media
footage from soldiers’ personal accounts (Ostrovsky 2015). Given the difficulty of capturing
preference, and given Putin’s particular tendency to dissimulate, actions best demonstrate the
Russian regime’s preferences.
The Kremlin’s fluid response to recent protests shows a regime desperate to quell unrest.
At first, in December 2011, the government employed what Lilia Shevtsova describes as it’s
“usual harsh tactics,” beating and arresting hundreds of participants as it had throughout the
1990’s and 2000’s. State-led repression, however, failed to discourage protestors. Worried about
inciting further dissident support, the regime shifted to a “soft-kill” strategy of cooptation and
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conciliation (Shevtsova 2012). Superficial legislative changes were the first element of the
strategy. In March 2012 Medvedev proposed a law that would make it easier for parties to
register for legislative elections. As a second element, the prime minister mobilized parallel
protests each time dissidents organized. The parallel groups even echoed calls for clean
elections. State-supported protestors attempted to discredit pro-democracy activists as Western
puppets funded by foreign agents to incite revolution in Russia. Furthermore, the regime recruited
pro-government groups from rural areas to intimidate urban protestors. Despite these strategic
actions violent repression and arrests remained low (Shevtsova 2012). The soft-kill strategy
further involved a curtailment of freedom of expression, especially the form of social media.
According to Reporters Without Borders, a French non-profit dedicated to informational freedom,
the Federal Security Service frequently acted to block accounts on VKontake. Moreover,
thousands of Twitter accounts were flooded with pro-government slogans tied to opposition
hashtags in order to dampen the site’s utility. Initially, the regime responded with force. When
force appeared to strengthen dissident support, the regime quickly changed tactics.
The eruption of revolutionary protests close to home, in Ukraine, marked the end of
Russia’s soft-kill strategy. As Viktor Yanukovych fled protestors, the Russian government shifted
back to harsh punishment. Instead of acting indirectly, through proxy groups, or acting
conciliatorily, through legislative measures, the regime sent a harsh message to would-be
dissidents. In February 2014, a group of protestors dubbed the ‘Bolotnaya Eight’ were sentenced
to a combined total of 20 years in prison for participating in protests on the eve of Putin’s third
inauguration. The farcical nature of the trial is clear from 22 year old Yaroslav Belousov’s fate—
he received an eighteen-month sentence for throwing a lemon, reported as an ‘unidentified yellow
object’ which caused an officer ‘excruciating pain’ (Amnesty International 2014). Furthermore, the
regime increased the legal measures of punishment. In Putin’s third term fines for participating in
un-sanctioned protests have more than tripled (Ibid.). Although the Kremlin has moved away from
the soft-kill strategy, it has maintained a commitment to social media control. Since 2012,
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Russia’s Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass
Media (Roskomnadzor) has frequently blocked access to websites and social media networks
(Shevtsova 2012). Since initial protests, the Russian regime’s actions reflect learning from
domestic and international experiences. With experience, the regime forged a counter-protest
strategy that has fluctuated from leniency to severe repression, with constant control over social
media.
Putin’s government further demonstrated its concern over protest activity by creating a
set of preventive programs. The Kremlin-affiliated Center for Research in Legitimacy and Political
Protest recently announced the launch of a predictive analytical tool. The group’s program is titled
th

Laplace’s Demon, a reference to the work of 19 century French mathematician Pierre-Simon
Laplace. In his Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, Laplace posited the existence of an
intelligence so vast as to comprehend all causal forces at play in the natural world. For this being,
or demon in subsequent interpretation, “the future, as the past, would be present in its eyes”
(1812). For such a being, all uncertainty in planning would disappear. Members of the Center for
Research in Legitimacy and Political Protest claim to offer the government just such a powerful
tool, by aggregating social media posts across Russia. In a press release the Center’s chairman,
Yevgeny Venediktov stressed the importance of the tool, of “software that would monitor social
networks and warn in advance of protest onset in the country” (Maus 2015). The Kremlin’s
preparations are not confined to the virtual realm, however. Interior Ministry troops held a 40,000
troop exercise against a simulation of the Maidan protests. During the exercise troops operated
water cannons and tear gas while under attack from stones and Molotov cocktails. A domestic
stability unit remains on call, ready to put training into action (Parfitt 2015).
Thus, evidence suggests that Russian leadership considers protest a dangerous
phenomenon, one that must be carefully managed and, if possible, prevented. This concern is
the reasonable product of learning from the Arab Spring revolutions. Like former leaders in Egypt,
Syria and Libya, Putin heads a long-standing government that is, by some measures (Freedom
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House, Polity IV, for example) authoritarian or anocratic. In the Middle East, protest movements
eventually forced leaders to relinquish political control. And relinquishing political control meant
not only loss of assets, but also loss of freedom, or even loss of life. Popular protests raise the
threat of weakening Putin’s grip on power, the threat of replicating the fate of Hosni Mubarak or
Muammar Qadhafi. Russia’s current rulers want to avoid a variation on the theme “authoritarians
come to a bad end” (Shevtsova 2012). In August 2011 current chair of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko emphasized the
importance of security in the wake of the Arab Spring. Leader’s agreed that social networks such
as Twitter and Facebook played a crucial role in Egypt, Syria, and Libya. After the meeting,
members of the security cooperative launched a joint cyber defense program. In the following
years the CSTO has continued to share results and strategies of cyber monitoring and control,
(Kucera 2011). Putin his allies across the Post-Soviet space have begun to perceive popular
mobilization as an existential threat.
Outside of Putin’s support structure, a wide range of international actors would benefit
from an increased understanding of Russian protest event onset. Three sets of actors serve to
demonstrate the breadth of interested parties. First, actors within the United States military and
diplomatic communities exhibit interest, indirect or direct. The military has recently identified
Russia as a security priority. And as academic work has demonstrated, domestic political
configurations influence foreign policy positions (Katzenstein 1977; Solingen 1994, 2007). In this
way the American military is indirectly interested in protest onset. The diplomatic corps’ interest is
direct. The State Department has recently exhibited an ideological drive to protect freedom of
individuals engaged in protest, as well as protecting democracy around the world. Members of a
second group, liberal international civil society, serve their mission by monitoring the emergence
of, and response to, protests under authoritarian regimes. And finally, investors both within and
outside of Russia see in protest events, large and small, a source of financial risk.
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Russia has recently risen in security importance for the United States. In the 2015 U.S.
National Military Strategy, a document produced by the armed forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
identified Russia as a critical security concern. According to the document, Putin’s regime offered
the potential for significant cooperation, especially in the realms of counter-narcotics and counterterrorism. Any contribution is outweighed, according to the document, by Russian unpredictability.
Russia frequently violates signed agreements. In addition to annexing Crimea, the country
recently violated the UN Charter, the Helsinki Accords and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty. The military authors conclude that the ongoing tension in Crimea has increased
the chances of interstate war between the two countries (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2015). Recent
intervention in the Syria further heightens the strategic importance of Russia. Marine General
Joseph Dunford highlighted this concern during his nomination speech for chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Dunford stated that “ Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security,”
and moreover that the country under Putin, “could pose an existential threat to the United States”
(Lamothe 2015). Threats from Russia are heightened by the country’s stockpile of nuclear
weapons. According to the last biannual exchange of data recorded under the New START
Treaty, data gathered and published by the American State Department, Russia holds over
1,6000 warheads across intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles
and bombers. Including non-deployed weapons raises the total to over 8,000 warheads (2015).
Because Russia is a foreign policy concern, the American military must pay close
attention to domestic Russian politics. So-called second image theories of international relations
have long established the connection between domestic political developments and foreign
policy. Scholars called for a theoretical synthesis between the two political levels in a 1977
special issue of International Organization. Peter Katzenstein organized a series of articles under
the thesis that effective analysis of the international political system must “start at home” (1977).
The link between foreign and domestic politics holds even for major actors in the international
system. As one high-profile example, Jeffry Frieden (1988) demonstrated that American interwar
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actions in the 1920s and 1930s are explicable only with reference to domestic socio-economic
and political groups. More recently Etel Solingen’s work on military aggression (1994) and nuclear
proliferation (2007) connected domestic and international politics. Her argument holds that, for
costly actions such as making war or developing nuclear weapons, any state requires a domestic
coalition to support the expense. According to this strain of international relations’ thought, the
United States military community should be indirectly concerned with Russian protests as a
potential catalyst for change in foreign security policy. The October Revolution of 1917, which
upended Tsarist rule and spread communism throughout the globe, guarantees policy makers
never forget the importance of domestic Russian political movements.
It is not surprising that the United States has, in fact, demonstrated concern with Russian
protest events. Actors within the United States’ diplomatic community took an active interest in
the 2011 election protests and the continuing wave of events. Diplomats’ concern reflects a
tension between two goals. First, the United States diplomatic community is committed to
democracy and human rights. This ideological commitment was on display in 2011. Former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized the Putin regime at a speech before the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), claiming that “Russian voters deserve a full
investigation of electoral fraud and manipulation …regardless of where you live, citizenship
requires holding your government accountable” (Pessin 2011). Clinton further claimed that a
commitment to free elections “is part of who we are…it’s our values” (Ibid.). Again, academic
work in international relations suggests a more nuanced reason for the United States to monitor
domestic political unrest. Simply put, a shift in the dominant Russian ideology would alter world
politics. In his 1999 book, Fred Halliday argued that revolution brings new ideologies to the
international level. For example, the Cold War itself can be seen as a clash between the ideals of
the Bolshevik Revolution and the West. If the communists had not overthrown tsarist rule, the
subsequent trajectory of international politics would have been dramatically different (1999). By
supporting pro-democracy protests, the State Department could facilitate the emergence of a like24

minded, cooperative partner; by supporting certain protest elements in Russia, American
diplomats could eventually influence foreign policy. But supporting unrest conflicts with the
diplomatic community’s second goal vis-à-vis Russia. The United States has reason to value
stability in the country. Successful regime change or prolonged unrest could undermine attempts
to strengthen diplomatic connections. As Obama declared at the United Nations in September
2015: “We need a strong Russia that can work with us to strengthen the international system as a
whole” (Epatko 2015). For both its ideological and more pragmatic diplomatic goals, the United
States has reason to monitor Russian protest events.
International civil society organizations represent the second group of interested
observers. Liberal organizations dedicated to freedom and human rights have an inherent interest
in protests and associated state repression. These groups pursue a normative agenda, to protect
and spread liberty and equality around the world. Such virtues find expression in democratic
governance, freedom of speech, and civil rights—or John Locke’s life, liberty, and property.
Protest events appear on the liberal agenda for two reasons. First, protestors often mobilize in
reaction to curtailment of liberty or civil rights. And secondly, regimes’ repressive responses
further exacerbate grievances: violent responses threaten bodily harm, and non-violent control
mechanisms restrict freedom of speech and assembly. Liberal concern is heightened in an
authoritarian or hybrid regime like Russia, where protestors cast their grievances in Lockean
language. Not surprisingly, high-profile organizations have dedicated resources to monitoring
Russian protest. Amnesty International, for example, tracks human rights violations around the
world. The group published an analysis of Russian unrest, including the events in Bolotnaya
Square (2014). A second group, Freedom House tracks civil freedom, which the Putin regime has
curtailed in an effort to diffuse protest activity. The organization has chronicled, “a long list of
[restrictions] that collectively testify to the shrinking of freedoms in Russia” (2015). And as a third
example, Human Rights Watch highlighted Putin’s regime as particularly alarming in their 2014
World Report. President Rachel Denber identified several problematic issue areas, including a
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crackdown on freedom of expression, both in the virtual and physical realms. Denber’s group
published an additional special report on human rights violations surrounding the 2014 Sochi
Winter Olympics and protests against the Crimean occupation. Concerned with physical safety,
and freedom from arbitrary governance, liberal groups serve their mission by closely monitoring
Russian protests.
In addition to members of the United States government and liberal organizations, a third
set of actors, investors, are concerned with social unrest in Russia. Within the country, the 2011
protests themselves triggered dips in the MICEX ruble-denominated index. Russian stocks listed
on international exchanges similarly declined during this period (Gutterman 2011). Protests
turned market sentiment for two related reasons. First is the fear of hours lost due to social
unrest. Large-scale protest events can lead to work stoppages, lost production, and therefore lost
revenue. Labor protests and strikes explicitly shut down production as a bargaining tool.
However, non-labor protests can similarly force shutdowns ( Robertson 2007). Protest events can
thus damage economic activity directly. Investors are also indirectly affected by protest events, by
the uncertainty associated with unrest. For example, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov
warned that negative investor sentiment led to significant capital flight during the wave of protests
beginning in December 2011. Political risk analysis firms, such as the Eurasia Group, analyze the
relationship between politics and market outcomes. The effect of the Kremlin’s information control
measures is a clear example. Political changes have damaged IT firms’ commercial viability in
Russia despite a cheap domestic labor market. In 2014 Google closed its engineering office in
Moscow, in response to a law requiring all firms to store Russian residents’ personal data on
servers that are physically located within the country (Luhn 2014). Adobe Systems canceled
Russian operations in September of 2014 for similar reasons(Boyle 2014).
Protest events in Russia are a phenomenon of interest for a wide range of actors, within
and beyond the country’s borders. Putin’s regime, members of the United States government,
international civil society groups, and investors would all benefit form an understanding of protest
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onset, from an understanding of when and where protests are likely to occur. Social scientists are
positioned to provide just such an explanation. Charles Ragin laid out criteria by which events or
phenomena should be deemed worthy of social scientific inquiry: the rule of “double generality.” A
phenomenon may first be deemed general if it affects many people directly or indirectly. The
actors mentioned above are directly or indirectly affected by protests—in addition, of course, to
participants on both sides of police barricades. A phenomenon secondly qualifies as general if it
occurs frequently. Spending time and energy exploring the causes of a one-off or once-in- ageneration event offers little generalizable knowledge. As I shall demonstrate below, such
protests occur frequently. Thus, social scientists ought to consider Russian protest onset a
phenomenon worthy of inquiry. This dissertation project will attempt to generate useful
knowledge, to broaden understanding of this important phenomenon.

The Dependent Variable
For the project, I will borrow a dependent variable definition from social movement
literature. Douglas McAdam provided a useful conceptual definition of protest in his 1982 book,
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. According to the author,
protests are “organized efforts to promote or resist changes in the structure of society or polity
and nature of regime that involve recourse to non-institutional forms of political participation”
(1982: 25). This form of expression can include demonstrations, marches, picketing, sit-ins and
so forth. It is similarly important to clearly define what the dependent variable is not. In the
umbrella discipline of contentious politics scholars have often studied protest alongside civil wars,
ethnic violence, genocide and politicide (e.g., Goldstone et al. 2010). While my work is situated in
the contentious politics tradition, it explores the causes of protest, not other forms of contention.
As a further specification, my dependent variable is protest onset regardless of size,
regardless of location. Events that brought the world’s attention to Russia were large, with tens of
thousands participating. With this project I do not hope to gain an understanding of when and why
only mass protests occur. I hope to gain an understanding of protest onset in general. I hope to
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gain an understanding of when and where citizens challenge the contours of society; I hope to
gain an understanding of the social contract, the Idea of the State, in modern Russia. Mass
protests are unarguably important events for potential audiences discussed above. Even small,
local protests hold interest for civil society groups and investors. Human rights are at risk in any
clash between state and society. Ildar Dadin, organizer of a set of one-man protests, was
hassled, arrested, and reportedly tortured in prison. After Dadin became the center of an
international human rights campaign Putin pardoned the man (Meduza 2017b). Seemingly minor
events can similarly have an outsized impact on economic conditions. Small groups of striking
factory workers are capable of shutting down production, as seen in agrarian equipment plants in
Siberia (KPRF News, 2008c). In the hands of aggrieved transport drivers, a single freight truck
can bring even Moscow rush hour to a standstill (Meduza 2017a). Justification for a
disaggregated approach holds for the remaining audience as well: the United States government,
and more generally, any actor concerned with regime (in)stability.
Academic work suggests that contentious political events small and large, provincial or
central, are often connected. Scholars have described mass protest as the product of a
latticework of state-society friction. Large, destabilizing movements may have humble beginnings.
And even small events that do not directly evolve into national movements establish a foundation
for future protest—a foundation of networks and experience. Sidney Tarrow popularized the term
“early risers” (1994) to highlight the catalytic nature of small gatherings. Building on this
foundation, Debra Minkoff outlined a logical chain which she refers to as social movement
sequencing (1997). Following Minkoff’s logic, early risers spark contagion by signaling elite
vulnerability. As more and more people take part in protest actions, increases in “organizational
density” then create a durable resource base for extant and future movements. The longer activist
networks persist, the more likely new groups will emerge through “attribution of similarity” and
imitation (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). As protests continue to spread, networks continue to
grow and await precipitous political conditions. According to this theoretical position, then,
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analysts hoping to understand the causes underlying mass protests would do well to consider the
general context of protest. Otherwise, what may be the logical culmination of a sequence of
conflict and organization will misleadingly seem to appear out of nowhere, or “out of never”
(Kuran, 1991).
Two examples demonstrate the importance of the disaggregated approach. The onset of
civil war in Syria and the collapse of the Soviet Union offer cautionary tales. In each case,
analysts who obscured the broader context of protest—the social movement sequence—were
caught off guard by mass protest and eventual regime collapse. Neither Bashar Al-Assad nor
Sovietologists working in the 1980’s were prepared for shocking upheaval. Working
retrospectively, scholars have since identified the importance of small, provincial events in both
cases.
On the eve of calamity, President Bashar al-Assad asserted in an interview with the Wall
Street Journal (2011) that Syrians were not going to revolt because the country’s security forces
had established ‘resistance credentials’. In hindsight, the leader confused center control with
national control. What began as a set of provincial marches, organized in response to the
imprisonment and torture of teenage vandals, steadily grew, and eventually spread across the
country. For Reinoud Leenders and Steven Heydeman, local contextual factors explain the
emergence of early risers, which in turn explains the emergence of mass protest. Contributors to
social movement theory label this phenomenon “scale shift,” as small movements slowly increase
in levels of coordination and participation. The authors argue that local context in Dar'a was
conducive to mobilization precisely because observers considered the area secure. Assad had
recently redirected regional troops and monitoring resources to the capital city (2014). Leenders
and Heydeman argue that early risers in Dar’a and other areas played a key role in “animating
and sustaining early mobilization” (2014). An overview of protest attendance figures offers means
to trace mobilization sequencing. During the conflict’s first months relatively high levels of
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participation were reported in Dar'a, Homs, Idlib and Deir Az-Zur, and only later in the capital of
Damascus.
For analysts ignoring the general context of fraying state-society relations, the fall of the
USSR was similarly unexpected. Employing the social movement sequencing approach, Mark
Beissinger describes the Soviet collapse, instead, as the product of “accumulating inevitability”
(2002). In the author’s rendering, several distinct streams of protest eventually formed a tide that
brought down one of the world’s two super powers. Over the course of several years, over a
massive geographic expanse, social movement networks built towards critical change. Through
numerous expressions of discontent participants and organizers developed a base of resources
and grievances. Beissinger identified three significant protest streams. Conservative reactionaries
resisted the changes of Glasnost. Nationalists hoped to push new-found local autonomy further,
a move towards complete independence from the federal center. And miners sought economic
sovereignty as a means to remedy wage arrears and a deteriorating quality of life.
Restricting analytical focus to large events in Moscow and Saint Petersburg would
completely obscure the sequence of social protest that eventually brought down the USSR. Each
of the protest streams occupied distinct geographic zones. The economically-focused unrest, for
example, occurred primarily in Donbass, Komi province in Northern Russia, and Northern
Kazakhstan. Statistics gathered by Beissinger’s research team frame the context of state-society
tension during the crucial period. Of the 5500 + protests in the Glasnost period, 1900 occurred in
the Russian territory, and 714 of these occurred in Moscow or Saint Petersburg (around 36% of
the total number). Individual events formed streams, which eventually formed a destabilizing tide
as nationalism, the fight for local governance and local identity, became a dominant mobilizing
force. Nationalist activists successfully harnessed existing social tensions related to living
condition concerns, including miners’ grievances. The tide reached critical magnitude as
connections between protests across time and space strengthened and multiplied (Ibid.). By
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tracing the social movement sequence in its entirety, by gathering data on events of any size and
any location, Beissinger generated an explanation of the USSR’s collapse.
Other scholars have recently begun to trace the humble beginnings of mass protest.
Research on Brazilian unrest in Sao Paulo surrounding the 2014 World Cup identified “scale
shift.” Small groups of graduate students organized to condemn increases in public
transportation. After a video of repressive response spread through social networks, breadth of
protest spread in kind (Alonso and Mische 2017) . Moving to the former Soviet space, a similar
shift occurred in Ukraine at the now famous Maidan square. Crowds capable of choking off city
transportation, crowds reported at over 80,000 people, only appeared after police cracked down
on a relatively small gathering, estimated at around 1,000 participants (Aytaç, Schiumerini, and
Stokes 2017). In another former Soviet state, Sharon Wolchik chronicled social movement
sequence in Kyrgyzstan’s color revolution. Broad-based social mobilization from Kyrgyz society
ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Early stages of the movement, however, can be traced to
the remote Eastern town of Naryn, where protestors voiced frustration with high oil prices and
local corruption. Democracy activists were able to harness the economically-focused strain of
protest to create a destabilizing mass movement (2012).
The examples above demonstrate that smaller protests can be considered “dress
rehearsals” that incrementally contribute to future mass mobilization (Wolchik 2012). As
Beissinger’s study suggests, the cleavages present in dress rehearsals can reappear in the main
event. My project is methodologically inspired by recent work that eschews monolithic treatment
of social unrest, and is particularly inspired by Beissinger’s approach. Only by defining my
dependent variable at the disaggregated level can I trace the streams and strains characterizing
the modern Russian environment. This approach will allow me to create an explanation of protest
onset that appeals to audiences concerned with both small and large events.
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Thus, I will focus my attention on acts of protest, whatever the size, wherever the
location. I define my dependent variable as protest onset frequency at the level of federal subject.
Subject is not the most micro geographical unit. In the Russian context, however, federal-subject
governments feature political and financial structures required to test leading theories, while
avoided the gross over-simplification of a broader analytic lens. Defining protest onset subnationally separates my project from much contemporary work. Tomila Lankina and Alisa
Voznaya argue that “the spatial dimension of protest has remained marginal to the literature”
(2015: 22). This means that a hypothetical study would focus on Russian or Brazilian protest,
rather than protest in Moscow or Novosibirsk, San Paulo or Brasilia. Any accompanying
explanation of onset would rely on national-level independent variables. This practice is puzzling.
States that have provided case material for recent studies of protest onset—Argentina, Mexico,
Russia, Ukraine—exhibit significant spatial variation in protest frequency and socio-political
conditions (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014). Failure to consider the actual location of
events is an astounding, common flaw in much contentious politics work. I will thoroughly address
the puzzling neglect of the local level more fully in Chapter 3.

The Puzzling Empirical Realm
This section begins with a discussion of the Russian Federation, a polity consisting of
numerous types of federal subject. With the federal structure established, I will then introduce
variation in protest onset. Since 2007, Russia has experienced over 4,500 discrete protest
events. In the last decade two groups of scholars have begun studying the phenomenon.
Nevertheless the academic terrain remains virtually unexplored, populated by descriptive work
(Robertson 2013; Lankina 2015; Lankina and Voznaya, 2015).
The modern Russian Federation consists of eighty three federal subjects, as outlined in
the Russian Constitution of 1993. (Two recent additions, Crimea and Sevastopol, are not
internationally recognized as part of the Russian Federation). Subjects hold numerous
designations: oblasts, comparable to provinces or states; republics, named after indigenous non32

Russian majority ethnic groups; krais, originally established as lower-order political units; and
autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs, which emerged as small ethnic groups won
autonomy from surrounding oblasts or krais. Finally, Moscow and Saint Petersburg hold the
designation of federal city, which entails full subject-hood. Subject designations appeared during
the Bolshevik years, and the formative years of the Russian Soviet Federative Social Republic
(RSFSR), the core member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). With the collapse
of the USSR, a constituent assembly met to reform relations between the federation and subjects.
Members hoped to phase out hierarchal political status of the subjects, in favor or an equal
system based on the German Lander (Sheehy 1993). After a contentious bargaining process—
one that may have threated the survival of the federation (Treisman 2001) —the 1993
Constitution did indeed reduce disparities between designations. However, individual regions
continued to press the center for conciliations, a process which produced numerous bilateral
agreements. James Hughes and other scholars label the resulting structure “asymmetrical
federalism” (2001). Each type of federal subject has equal representation in chief executive
elections, and in the Federation Council, the upper house of the federal legislature. Each type of
subject features a local executive, parliament, judicial body, and budget. However, under the
Russian system of asymmetrical federalism, each subject enjoys differing degrees of financial
and policy-making autonomy from the center. And this autonomy is fluid and extra-legal, as bilateral agreements can contradict federal or regional constitutions or go entirely ignored. For this
reason, Alfred Stephan (2000) describes federal-center relations as difficult to represent in
concrete terms. Indeed, a degree of vagueness was built into the post-Soviet constitution: Article
66 of the 1993 constitution leaves unclear conflict-adjudication between the center and its
subjects. Hughes argues that this provision was included to allow bi-lateral center-subject
negotiations as ad-hoc ameliorative measures (2001).
Because of the murky nature of this political arrangement, scholars of Russian
asymmetrical federalism infer relations from outcomes rather than legal designation. Scholarly
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work on center-subject budget transfers serves as a useful example. Scholars often assert that
certain regions, republics and the “autonomous” subjects, are privileged in comparison with their
counterparts (Triesman 2001). Vladimir Popov conducted a study in order to quantify this
privilege. After determining that subjects had similar budgets by law, Popov decided to explore
federal relations by looking at outcome indicators such as tax revenues, spending, and federal
transfers. Popov concluded that, more than subject type, financial privilege stemmed from
political performance. Specifically, net fiscal transfers varied in step with votes for pro-central
government parties (2004). Following this example, I do not expect subject designation to
influence protest onset frequency. Below, Figure 1 displays the current federal boundaries. The
two federal cities are not displayed.
Figure 1: Russian Federal Subject Boundaries

In recent years, Russia has experienced thousands of protest events, occurring unevenly
throughout federal subjects. Since 2007, a team of Russian sociologists have maintained a virtual
chronicle of protest—housed on the website namarsh.ru. The team gathers dispatches from
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regional print and web journalists. Dispatches cover protest events triggered by any type of
grievance, from environmental degradation, to wage conditions, to political corruption. The
website is funded by opposition politician and chess grandmaster Gary Kasparov. Tomila Lankina
and Alisa Voznaya created a dataset from namarsh.ru reports, hand-coding the timing and
location of protests. I build on the existing data, coding an additional year of event reports and
creating a dependent variable dataset that covers the time period 2007-2013. Data availability
dictates the starting year. However, 2004-2005 marked a critical juncture in Russia’s political
history, when a Duma decision abolished popular election of regional governors (Robertson,
2013). Even if data for 2005 and earlier years were available it would be reasonable to analyze
the two periods separately.
An initial look at protest onset data reveals concentration in the two federal cities. Over
1400 protests occurred in Moscow, and over 500 in Saint Petersburg. Despite such high
frequencies, the data further show that the majority of Russia’s more than 4,500 protests occur
outside the two major cities (more than 70% of the total figure). Frequency varies widely across
the eighty three federal subjects. The histogram displayed in Figure 2 below offers a quick look at
variation. Nearly twenty regions experienced over fifty events from 2007-2012. Fifteen regions
experienced between twenty five and fifty events. Seventeen regions experienced from ten to
twenty five. And twenty six regions experienced ten events or less. For a full list of regions by
onset see Appendix i. What drives protest onset frequencies across federal subjects?
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Figure 2: Protest Onset Histogram 2007-2013

Number of Subjects

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
10

25
Protest Events

50

More

Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i)

Leading theories of social protest onset offer an initial cut at explaining this variance. The
prevailing set of theoretical tools consists of three approaches to understanding conditions
shaping protest onset—political opportunity structure theory, resource mobilization theory and
grievance theory. Each of these three approaches offers tools for a structural explanation. As
Chapter 3 demonstrates, elements of the triad are often applied as explanations in isolation. Only
one explicit application to the Russian case exists: Lankina’s exploratory exercise based on
political opportunity structure. Neither this, nor an alternative based on the other traditions
provides a comprehensive explanation.
First, political opportunity structure predicts covariance between onset frequency and
local government openness. The initial, and perhaps the most well-known, strain of social
movement theory is political opportunity structure. Writing in the midst of the civil rights struggle
and the Vietnam War, Peter Eisinger (1973) produced a foundational expression of the position in
his study of protest onset in 43 American cities. In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s political
scientists were concerned with exploring the relationship between so-called “political
environment” variables and political outcomes of interest. Eisinger attempted to theorize the
context as a structure of political opportunity facing a particular community, which served to
obstruct or facilitate non-traditional political expression. Elements of the structure could include:
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whether a city is under a mayor or city manager; an at large or ward-alderman voting system;
partisan or non-partisan voting system. Employing the instrumental rationality assumption,
Eisinger argued that individuals would choose to protest when there exists little opportunity to
exercise influence through delegates or representative bodies. In other words, “protest is a device
by which actors making demands in the political system attempt to maximize the impact of their
meager resources…at the same time they strive to minimize the costs which they might incur by
such demand making”(1973: 13). Eisinger posited two hypotheses linking political opportunity
structure and protest onset. A linear relationship would see people frustrated as opportunity
structures were “closed,” or non-representative and non-responsive. A second, curvilinear model,
predicts protest as opportunity structure begin to open. The expected benefit of protest actions in
either very closed or very open structures is similarly low. When government is not at all
responsive or representative, would-be dissidents expect to fail. When government is very
responsive, directing resources from the system is a more likely route towards success. In the
middle range previously excluded groups acquire enough influence to hope to change the
system. In the structural tradition, then, Eisinger’s theory—and modern versions—explain protest
events through contextual factors. However, the context is limited to the political realm. This strain
of thought has thrived since its introduction. Indeed, the position is so often amended as to
“become a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” (Gamson
and Meyer, 1996). Some scholars even use the term in a loose, ad hoc manner, to describe any
protest driver. In the following, I refer to the more focused, political formulation—as discussed in
Chapter 2.
In order to evaluate this first argument, scholars must gather data pertaining to subnational political structure. Recent work by Lankina (2015), an international relations specialist at
the London School of Economics, followed this approach. The author created measures of
regional political opportunity structure openness. Instead of utilizing Eisinger’s objective local
political indicators, Lankina uses a subjective index of regional democracy: an index compiled by
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the Moscow Carnegie Center and the Independent Institute of Social Policy, covering the years
2000–2005. The index is based on expert opinions. Respondents were asked to indicate the
degree to which they considered each federal subject, "a political system, one of the
characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all
its citizens," meaning that citizens must be able "to formulate" and "signify" their preferences and
have them "weighed equally in the conduct of the government” (Moscow Carnegie Center).
Lankina employed the results to argue that regions exhibiting comparatively open regional
political systems are among the leaders in protest activism. She claimed that several members of
the top ten protesting regions are also those that have in the past received high democracy
ratings. It is true that, Sverdlovsk, Samara, Perm, and St. Petersburg have been among
“democracy” leaders according to the subjective index. And further, it is true that these regions
are among the leaders in protest activism. Upon further inspection, however, Lankina’s argument
is not compelling.
This evidence amounts to selecting several regions which exhibit the expected
relationship between political opportunity structure and social protest onset. John Stuart Mill’s
System of Logic quickly reveals the incomplete nature of Lankina’s claimed relationship. For Mill,
a necessary condition must always be present if the effect is present. Any properties which are
absent when the effect is present cannot be necessary conditions for the effect. Comparing other
regions’ political opportunity scores and onset frequency reveals that a relatively open political
opportunity structure is not a necessary condition of high protest frequency. Some regions score
highly on protests frequency but low on openness: Penza; Primorsky; Voronzeh; Krasnodar;
Kirov; Ulyanovsk. Moving beyond Lankina’s narrow examples renders the political opportunity
structure explanation inadequate; something else appears to drive protest onset. At best an open
political opportunity structure—at least under this operationalization—explains part of the
phenomenon of protest onset in Russia.
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The second set of theoretical tools, resource mobilization theory, captures part of the
environment that has not been “soaked into” political opportunity structure. Resource
mobilization, given name and initial formulation by McCarthy and Zald (1977), places explanatory
power in contextual factors that empower would-be dissidents. The authors focus on resources
available to collective actors in advanced industrial societies. Increased personal resources,
professionalization and financial support allow citizens to create professional movement
associations. Following this approach, protest drivers include the population of potential
protestors, the presence of potential sponsors and organizational capacity among activists. But in
addition to human and financial resources, cognitive and motivational factors facilitate
mobilization. Educational attainment, for instance, has long been identified as a driver of
traditional and non-traditional political participation (Almond and Verba, 1963; Chenoweth and
Ulfelder, 2015a). Resource mobilization theory shares assumptions with Eisinger’s political
opportunity structure theory. McCarthy and Zald’s framework rests on the rationalist assumption:
that would-be protestors act when perceived costs exceed perceived benefits. A further similarity,
both strains of thought assume that grievances are ubiquitous. Indeed, according to McCarthy
and Zald, “the definition of grievances will expand to meet the funds and support personnel
available” (1973: 103).
As an exploratory exercise, I will again evaluate perhaps the simplest operationalization
of this theoretical position. Willing participants are the fundamental protest resource. For this
reason, scholars hypothesize that higher population numbers correspond with higher resource
mobilization, and thus higher likelihood of protest onset (McCarthy and Zald 1977a; Chenoweth
and Ulfelder 2015a). The position would predict regional population size and onset frequency to
closely covary. This logic explains the high frequency of protests taking place in the two largest
Russian cities, Moscow and St Petersburg (Robertson 2011, 2013). However, a simple
comparison of regions indicates that this operationalization of resource mobilization, like political
openness, does not represent a necessary condition for high protest frequency. For example, the
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city of Kaliningrad has a population of nearly one million and accounts for a rough 2% of the
country’s protests—comparable to the 3% of protests experienced by Northern and East Siberian
divisions, which hold populations 5 and ten times larger than that of Kaliningrad. Other high
population areas experience low protest frequencies, including the North Caucasus (17.7 million)
and West Siberian divisions (14.6 million). Simple correlational statistics further weaken the
resource mobilization position. For all 81 regions outside of the federal cities, the r-squared
correlational statistic between population and protest onset is barely over .5. Under a simple
understanding of the statistic, population size explains roughly half of the variation in protest
onset in Russia.
The third and final theoretical position focusses the analytical lens firmly on grievances.
Again, the foundational statement appeared during the height of protest activities in America, in
Ted Robert Gurr’s Why Do Men Rebel? The study includes cross-sectional analysis of
contentious political events from 1961 to 1965 and assigns explanatory power to socio-economic
factors inspiring participation. Grievance inducing factors could include economic discrimination,
political discrimination, religious cleavages, or perceived financial injustice. At the heart of Gurr’s
theory lies the frustration-aggression thesis. Gurr posited frustration as the principal psychological
root of human rebellion. This frustration can arise out of relative deprivation, the “perceived
discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities” (1970, 37), or simply put, the
difference between how things are and how things should be. At first glance this third theoretical
tradition might appear incompatible with structural analysis. Explanatory power is placed in the
minds of men and women. For this reason grievance theory has been labeled psychological
(Goldstone, 2001). However, the level of analysis is not the agent, but rather the political
environment which are likely to engender grievances. This approach can be considered a
structural theory, because the assumed driver of protest is a “fundamental social dislocation,”
represented by broad socio-political context.
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A grievance-based explanation for protest onset is again incomplete at best. From 2007
to 2013 federal subjects that score relatively highly on common indicators of grievance do not
score similarly highly on protest frequency. In fact, the most deprived regions—those with highest
levels of unemployment and with lowest levels of regional wealth measured in GDP per capita—
are those exhibiting some of the lowest levels of protest activism. Lankina and Voznaya
highlighted the absence of North Caucasus republics among protest leaders. As the authors point
out, this absence is particularly damaging for the grievance position considering the highly
publicized socioeconomic problems in the region. For instance, the republics of KarachayCherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria recorded only six and five protests respectively for the entire
period under investigation, while Adygea recorded three protests. Again, a simple correlation
further weakens the explanation. The r-squared statistic for average protest and average
unemployment across sub-regions is a weak .20. Recently Robertson (2013) joined Lankina and
Voznaya in highlighting the weakness of the grievance position in the study of Russian protest
onset.
Each one of these leading theories offers an explanation for some regions and not for
others; each strain offers a sufficient but unnecessary element of protest onset. The three leading
theories, any one taken alone, offer only partial explanation of variation. For instance, none of the
three leading theories explain low levels of protest onset in the North Caucasus region or the Far
East region, together the home of 17 federal subjects. Both feature high rates of unemployment,
and particularly puzzling, the Far East also features high urbanization rates, and open political
opportunity structures. The region should produce relatively high onset rates, according to the
three theoretical positions. This is not the case. Not surprisingly, given the preceding
demonstration, something is missing; something is omitted. An explanatory model based on any
single element of the triad would suffer from omitted variable bias. But even an integrated model,
featuring all three, would suffer from omitted variable bias.
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The omitted variable is state capacity. Most commonly, a state’s capacity is considered
high when would-be activists are deterred through force or the threat of force (McAdam, 1982).
Coercion is only one aspect of the state, however. Softer and more abstract forms of power are
just as effective as boots and truncheons. States coopt their populations through measures aimed
to ameliorate suffering, such as social spending programs and access to social services. States
can also develop cooperative power that engenders feelings of loyalty. Fjelde and de Soysa’s
(2009) tri-part taxonomy nicely captures the dimensions of capacity that shape variations in
protest onset. A theory of state capacity expects high levels of protest where state capacity is
weak along dimensions of coercion, cooptation, and cooperation. As discussed in detail in
Chapter 3, the only element captured in Social Movement Studies is coercive capacity, often
crudely rolled into political opportunity structure.
Looking at the two most puzzling regions, this state capacity lens produces clarity not
offered by the three proceeding positions. Quiescence in the North Caucasus appears to be the
product of coercive capacity and cooperational capacity. A snapshot of Grozny, capital of
Chechnya and the most recognizable city in the region, encapsulates a set of structural
conditions not conducive to protest: heavily armed police patrol a pristine downtown, one marked
with modern commercial buildings, colorful light displays, and a massive, modern mosque. Less
than a decade ago the city was a scene of utter destruction, razed city blocks and burned-out
cars. The local Idea of the State takes the form of an iron fist legitimately buffering the population
from the horrors of instability. Quantitative operationalizations validate this interpretation—as
further discussed in Chapter 3. The area features very low levels of crime, a measure of coercive
capacity, and very high vote shares for the dominant United Russia party, a measure of
cooperational capacity. The key to understanding low protest rates in the Far East lies with the
third dimension: cooptational capacity. Local governments spend very generously on social
programs in the area. As well-known example, oligarch Roman Abramovich served as governor
of the federal subject Chukotka. Abramovich is today known as a secretive billionaire owner of
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the Chelsea football team, rumored to exchange financial support for protection from Putin. As
governor, the oligarch lavished financial assistance on residents of Chukotka, in a push to raise
the local standard of living. With his goal accomplished, he departed for more lavish surroundings
in London. Again turning to quantitative indicators, each of the 9 federal subjects in the Far East
feature rates significantly higher than average on per capita social spending. Here the Idea of the
State takes the form of a provider, buying off would-be dissidents even under conditions
otherwise conducive to protest.

A Model Of Russian Protest
I expand on existing work to develop and operationalize an integrated model of protest
onset, titled the Idea of the State, over the next three chapters. Members of the Putin regime, the
United States military and diplomatic communities, liberal civil society organizations, and
investors would all benefit from understanding the conditions precipitating and militating against
protest events in Russia; members of this diverse audience would deem important an explanation
of when and where protests are more and less likely to occur. Political scientists, economists and
international relations experts strive to provide the analytical tools needed to produce such an
explanation. Or put another way, King, Keohane and Verba (1998) claim that “social science
constitutes an attempt to make sense of social situations that we perceive as more or less
complex.” In order to make sense of phenomena, social scientists must first select an analytical
strategy. With the complexity of reality reduced and ordered, scholars can move on to address
causal forces. My approach is, thus, to simplify the reality of Russian protest, in a fashion that will
create a useful understanding of cause. I take inspiration from a noted historian.
There are innumerable ways to describe the onset, or the occurrence, of an event. As the
historian E.H. Carr argues there are, in fact, infinite pathways to identifying “cause.” In his book
What Is History? Carr (1961) provides a description of this concept. In history, every event is the
product of innumerable contingent forces occurring simultaneously. The historian’s job is to sift
through the mass of effects and create a useful account of say, the origin of World War II, the fall
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of the Roman Empire, the Arab Spring, or protests in Russia. For Carr the quality of good history
is utility, not truth. Numerous versions of an event can be deemed true, but only a useful account
will allow consumers to learn from historical analysis, in order to shape future situations. In a
memorable example, the author presents a hypothetical scenario: one rainy night, a drunken
party-goer decides to drive home against the wishes of his hosts. Elsewhere, a man, suddenly
realizing he is out of cigarettes, dons a raincoat and heads to the corner store on foot. Minutes
later with the smoking-man lying dead in the road, the contemporary historian, the social analyst,
is tasked with creating an explanation of the account. Equally valid arguments would deem
weather conditions, a lack of cigarettes, or an intoxicated driver as the main cause of the
accident. However, any account that did not lay primary blame with the driver would do little to
prevent similar future accidents. Social scientists face a similar conundrum when crafting
accounts of causation.
My integrated model places explanatory power with structural conditions in Russian
federal subjects. An event can be considered the cause of underlying structural conditions, or a
short-term catalyst. The goal of the first analytical strategy, the structural approach, is the
identification of “stable conditions that systematically determine” where an event is likely to occur.
James Fearon and David Laitin’s 2003 American Political Science Review article epitomizes this
position. The article employed statistical techniques to create measures of civil war risk. Fearon
and Laitin argued that civil wars have structural roots, represented by fragmented control of state
territory. The contrasting position holds that structural positions are incidental to contentious
politics onset, because the drivers are short-term triggers. This perspective holds that structural
conditions do not cause events to emerge. Instead cause resides with a triggering event, or a
concerted activist campaign as described in agency-based approaches. As one example,
Klandermans and Staggenborg (2002) argue that contentious politics onset should be understood
as caused by individual protest entrepreneurs. He argues that “movements consist of individuals,”
and thus too should the analytical frame. Fearon and Laitin’s work includes policy
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recommendations that nicely demonstrate the difference between the two strategies. A structural
approach finds that all sets of belligerent agents emerge in similar conditions of weak state
control—be they communists in Southeast Asia and Latin America, Islamic fundamentalists in
Afghanistan, Algeria or Kashmir, or reactionary militants in Nicaragua. If this is true, any shortterm trigger or ideology doctrine is incidental to cause. The attendant policy recommendation
becomes strengthening state capacity, not a focus on individuals. My model describes variation
in protest onset likelihood probability as driven by variation in similar underlying structural factors.
The Idea of the State framework hypothesizes that protest onset varies systematically
with particular structural conditions. Conditions include the triad of theories from Social Movement
Studies along with state capacity, as four sufficient but unnecessary causal drivers. It expects
high levels of protest in conditions of high social mobilization capacity, or high levels of grievance,
or open political opportunity structure, or weak state capacity; the framework expects low levels of
protest under inverted conditions. This project follows the tradition laid out by Fearon and Laitin,
attempting to explain protest onset variation through stable conditions. The relatively
undeveloped nature of Russian protest studies allows me to provide the first test of this general
analytical wager. Scholars have not yet determined whether or not a structural approach will bear
fruit at all. A test of the structural methodological position versus the agency alternative is itself a
novel academic contribution. Do there exist “stable conditions that systematically determine”
where and when Russian protest events occur? Findings—presented in Chapter 5—offer an
affirmative answer.
According to statistical results, structural factors do, in fact, systematically explain
variation in Russian protest from 2007-2013. A time series negative binomial regression model
reports that protests are most likely in federal subjects featuring highly urbanized populations,
high unemployment, and low social spending. These structural factors provide a probabilistic
explanation of Russian protest variation over the time horizon. The finding regarding state
capacity to coopt is particularly interesting. Ceteris paribus, a one thousand ruble increase in
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social cultural spending per capita results in a 3% decrease in expected onset potential. Such a
magnitude is not seen with the other significant independent variables. A one thousand ruble
increase is relatively small, less than 3% of most Russian federal subjects’ current spending
levels. Moreover, the finding is interesting because state capacity is generally omitted from
protest models. When it does appear, it is restricted to coercive capacity. Findings regarding
cooptational capacity underscore the importance of a dimensional approach. Not all of the
hypotheses generated by the Idea of the State framework were accepted, however. Neither
political opportunity structure, nor coercive capacity, nor cooperational capacity were significantly
linked to protest onset frequency. These elements seem to hold little explanatory power, at least
in the Russian context, over the time period 2007-2013. A case study exercise in Chapter 6
further evaluates the statistical results and offers suggestions for model improvement.
These findings throw a broad challenge to agent-based positions, such as so-called New
Social Movement Theory (NSM). The school of thought encompasses several strains of
academic work first appearing in the 1980’s and 1990’s. New social movement theorists describe
their work as ‘new’ in reference to classical Marxism, eschewing the monolithic theory’s economic
reductionism and class-based understanding of identity. The school is loosely connected
(Buechler, 1995), held together by a focus on temporary and fluid catalyzing factors. Scholars
emphasize the ephemeral nature of networks undergirding social action (Melucci 1989)–in direct
opposition to structural applications of the resource mobilization approach. Others sketch a
similar story of socially-constructed grievances and ideology, amorphous and unmoored to
objective conditions (Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994). The hallmark methodological
standpoint cuts against the structuralist analytical gamble. Contributors study ethnicity, gender,
and sexuality. All are united by an approach that places explanation with quickly-changing context
specific factors. My explanation will be based on macro, structural, factors that shape the relative
likelihood of Russian protest.
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In a sense, this project features two competitions: the first, between structural and agentbased explanations, and the second, within the structural methodological realm, a tournament of
variables, a search for the most compelling explanation offered by Social Movement Studies.
Based on statistical results, underscored by case study analysis, structural factors do offer a
systematic explanation. Protest onset patterns vary in step with urbanization, state capacity to
coopt the populace through public spending, and grievances associated with unemployment.

Moving Forward
In one of his earliest speeches, in 1999, Vladimir Putin claimed that “Russia needs strong
state power and must have it” (Taylor, 2011). Over the course of the remaining chapters I will
attempt to reveal the contours of the state that produce strength vis-à-vis social unrest. The Idea
of the State framework offers a set of hypothesized conditions that shape relative protest onset
frequency across federal subjects. Findings generate a novel understanding of this important
phenomenon.
A foundation of theory and data facilitates the knowledge-building exercise. I build the
datasets needed to evaluate Lankina’s political opportunity structure explanation, along with other
theoretical positions, and my integrated Idea of the State framework. In so doing, I conduct the
first ever robust exploration of Russian protest onset frequency. The next chapter leverages a
literature review to reveal major theoretical blind spots, in particular inadequate treatment of the
state. Over the last several decades social movement theorists and state capacity theorists have
covered similar conceptual and empirical ground without much communication. By merging the
traditions, I will craft a comprehensive structural framework that generates falsifiable hypotheses
regarding the likelihood of protest onset. The third chapter discusses independent variable
conceptualization and operationalization from the two areas of study. Moving to the dependent
variable, the fourth chapter introduces my hand-coding approach to Russian protest data. In the
fifth chapter I subject the integrated Idea of the State framework to statistical testing, using a
variety of models. Any observed patterns merely suggest causal mechanisms at play. The sixth
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chapter, thus, offers a process tracing exercise, evaluating protests in the case of Novosibirsk
and neighboring Krasnoyarsk Krai, regions similar in all respects other than state capacity profile
and onset potential.
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II - Theories of Protest and State Power
Introduction
Social science, the practice of crafting explanations for social phenomena, is a collective
enterprise. Even if political scientists, economists, and sociologists do not stand on the shoulders
of their predecessors, they explicitly and implicitly connect to extant work. Over the course of a
research project, scholars make choices that situate articles or books within a broad academic
narrative. Citation choice directly forms a conversation with previous work. And research design
shapes the conversation by defining the realm of testable hypotheses, and subsequently, the
realm of viable critique. In a memorable quote, Dietrich Reuschemeyer observed that “there are
many crossroads where social scientists meet, move, halt, or collide”(2003, 22).
In this chapter I place my study of Russian protest onset within a tradition of scholarly
work. I begin with a discussion of major contributions from political scientists and sociologists, a
body of work today known as Social Movement Studies. Since the 1960s scholars have
developed theoretical resources intended to facilitate the understanding of social movements and
protest events. The following literature review exercise identifies possible structural conditions
linked to protest onset potential—this is its primary purpose.
I further leverage the review to argue that the state of the art features two problems.
Today, a consensus view of the field identifies three potential drivers of protest: grievance,
political opportunity structure, and social mobilization.
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Very few structural studies, however, evaluate more than two of the concepts. Whether
the triad is complimentary or competing, omitting any one element is unjustified. As a second
problem, the theoretical triad grossly under-theorizes the role of the state. Indeed, compared with
a parallel research strain, civil war and conflict studies, Social Movement Studies’ formulation
takes on the appearance of a caricature or straw man. To address both problems, I leverage
resources produced by structural civil war studies and statist theories associated with the
Copenhagen School of international relations. Only by synthesizing insights from these traditions
will I be able to effectively test the structuralist analytical gamble: that there do indeed exist
“stable conditions that systematically determine” where a protest event is likely to occur. What I
title the Idea of the State theory of protest shifts focus to the state’s ability to mitigate driving
factors. My framework thus contributes to several academic traditions. In the following sections I
will explore the meeting points—and collision points—between my work and work on protest, civil
wars, and state capacity.
A chronological literature reveals the triad’s enduring nature. A timeless truth, scholars
have discovered and rediscovered the driving factors. Reiteration across time demonstrates the
importance of all three; any understanding of protest onset must include a representation of each.
But this is not enough. A comprehensive understanding of protest must include a fourth element:
state capacity.
Scholarly work on protest and state capacity has evolved alongside the course of human
history. The state of the world, current political, military or sociological events, shapes the
academic realm. As they attempt to generate useful knowledge, scholars frequently take
inspiration from the headlines. Robert Keohane notes that big research questions often appear “in
the wake of disaster” (2008). Whole sub-fields emerged after major events in the 20th century:
international relations after World War I (Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1948); security studies during
the Cold War (Schelling 1960); modern political economy after the economic malaise of the
th

1970’s (Gilpin 1975); terrorism studies after September 11 (Ranstorp 2007). As the previous
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chapter indicated, recent protests in Russia brought international and scholarly attention to the
phenomenon. Russian scholars have recently attempted to identify structural determinants of
protest onset in the country (Robertson 2007; Lankina and Voznaya 2015). And the Arab Spring
conflict has heightened attention to protest across authoritarian or mixed regimes (Wolchik 2012;
Koesel and Bunce 2012). Since the 1950s, protest and conflict theorists similarly reacted to
contemporary events. In the post-war decades, scholars faced a wave of protest, as people took
to the streets in support of civil rights, anti-poverty, and anti-war movements—a tumult, or
“American reckoning” (Appy 2015), that shaped national identity.
As I argue below, the current state of the field provides a useful but incomplete set of
tools for the structuralist. To improve my position, I turn to the state-centered study of civil wars.
In the wake of the Cold War, a new set of disasters shifted the academic community’s attention.
Ethnic conflicts and wars of secession represented a disaster that shifted scholarly attention
towards civil wars (Kaldor 2007). Scholars studying intra-state conflicts greatly expanded on
political opportunity structure theorists’ concept of state capacity. Below I describe the history of
scholarly work in these areas, proceeding roughly in chronological order. A synthesis of the two
traditions produces a complete, but large, set of structural drivers. In order to provide an orderly
theoretical framework for the study of Russian protest onset, I introduce Buzan’s concept of state
capacity before concluding.

Social Protest Theory Over Time
The following literature review serves to identify potential protest drivers. Through a
historical walkthrough of Social Movement Studies, I argue that a structural theoretical framework
of protest onset must include political opportunity structure, grievance, and social mobilization
capacity. The three major strains of Social Movement Studies emerge time and again, and make
up the current state of the field. Failure to include any element is inexcusable. Even such a robust
framework would be incomplete, however. I further argue that social movement theorists missed
an opportunity to include state capacity in their models, an omission that created an insufficient
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set of protest drivers. Sophisticated statist elements first appear in Social Movement Studies in
the 1970’s. After that point—as reviews of the current state of the field make clear—insights were
inadequately brought into theoretical canon. A search for structural protest drivers must extend
beyond narrow disciplinary boundaries, to leverage contentious politics work.
My search must begin with the turbulent post World War II decades. Throughout the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, protests erupted across America—The New York Times reported
thousands of protest events in the country during this time period (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith
1996). Study of protest emerged under a concurrent trend within academia. The behavioral
revolution, perhaps best described as a “mood towards developing systematic theories and
empirical testing” (Dahl 1961, 765), brought grand theoretical frameworks and big quantitative
datasets to prominence. Dahl titled his own framework pluralism, which described political
influence as the product of resources such as social standing or wealth. Referred to later by
statist theorists as the “cash-register” theory of government, the pluralist state simply tallied up
resources and preferences to produce appropriate policy (Evans, Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol
1985). Working under this framework, the study of protest became the study of “relatively
powerless groups” (Adrian 1960); because protestors lacked the resources held by mainstream
political groups, they had only a minor effect on politics under pluralism. Thus, the pluralist
established a place for protest studies while simultaneously deeming the phenomenon marginal.
Refinement of the grand framework generated useful theoretical tools. Beginning with the
work of Michael Lipsky, protest scholars began to carve out an independent area of study.
Lipsky’s American Political Science Review article “Protest as Political Resource” established a
conceptual baseline for protest studies (1968). The article’s title reveals that the author is clearly
working under Dahl’s pluralist influence. Lipsky, indeed, embraced the behavioralist reliance on
theoretical frameworks as organizational devices. In his work the author bemoans the widespread
use of the single-case case study, disconnected from broader theoretical discourses (e.g., Walker
(1963), on Atlanta; Burgess (1962) and Keech (1966), on Durham; Clark, (1965) on New York).
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However, Lipsky rejected the substantive content of pluralism as applicable to protest
study: protestors were not relatively powerless groups, as measured by pluralist resources.
Instead, protestors created their own resources in a way distinct from other political actors.
Against the cash-register theory of the state, Lipsky posited that under certain conditions
protestors could generate resources necessary to impact policy. This position corresponded with
James Q. Wilson’s (1961) contemporary argument that protestors can, and do, increase their
bargaining ability without acquiring Dahl’s resources of influence. Lipsky’s work strongly argued
that protest ought to be studied as an independent subject, and simultaneously offered the first
potential structural drivers of social protest onset.
The major streams of modern Social Movement Studies are first visible in “Protest as
Political Resource.” Lipsky established four dimensions of “protest as political resource.” Each
dimension conditioned the likelihood that a social movement would successfully influence policy.
First is personnel recruitment, uniting individuals under a common cause. Recruitment covaried
with fears, real or perceived, facing members of society—in other words covaried with perceived
grievances. Second is the informational environment in which protests are embedded. Lipsky
theorized that cohesive movements maximized exposure through communication media; media
coverage, in newspapers and on television, raised awareness of protests. Exposure benefitted
protestors by increasing recruits and winning allies—by increasing social mobilization capacity.
The third resource dimension is interaction with third parties. In their struggle, successful
protestors win support from third-party allies and combat third-party enemies—enemies to include
repressive state agents. Allies can include civil society groups and other protest movements,
while enemies can include repressive arms of the state. Finally, the fourth dimension is support
from targeted groups, which include institutionalized political actors. Lipsky saw effective protest
movements receiving support from elected officials, through conventional political channels such
as petitioning and voting—through openings in the political opportunity structure.
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Lipsky’s resource model, already present in the late 1960’s, suggests that grievances,
social mobilization capacity, political opportunity structure, and a measure of state capacity all
shape protest conditions. The model intended to “assist in ordering data and indicating the
salience for research of a number of aspects of protest” (1968: 1157). Dahl’s pluralism
established a common vocabulary and set of concepts to order the study of all politics. Lipsky’s
resource dimensions accomplished the same goal for the circumscribed area of protest studies.
At the same time, the dimensions offered theoretical tools for structural researchers. Lipsky’s
model was not designed as a theory of protest onset per se. The author attempted to explain the
conditions under which protest movements could affect political decisions. His conceptual tools
nevertheless offer plausible causal drivers of onset. In fact, his four categories foreshadow the
major theoretical positions introduced over the next half century in Social Movement Studies.
Today structural studies of protest onset evaluate the triad of grievance, political opportunity
structure, and social mobilization capacity, each of which resembles a posited dimension.
Lipsky’s resource dimensions theory set the stage for over half a century of work in protest
studies.
The first attempts to identify structural determinants of protest events, appearing during
the 1960’s, were atheoretical, offering no guidance to the modern scholar. Protest scholars, like
political scientists more generally during this period, explored observable patterns between socalled political environment variables and outcomes. Political environment studies exemplified the
behavioralist commitment towards empirical testing (Russet et al. 1968). The goal was to employ
quantitative methods to identify the effect of political environment elements across numerous
dependent variables. Several examples from protest studies illustrate such work. In an early
piece, Lieberson and Silverman (1965) found evidence that race riots occurred more frequently
under at-large electoral systems than in small district ward systems. Other studies produced
conflicting accounts of the predictive power of “environmental” variables. Palley and Palley
(1969) found that objective indicators of social and economic deprivation were unreliable
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predictors of urban strife. This contradicted Downes’ (1968) finding that that the incidence of riots
and protest fluctuated systematically with economic prospects and educational attainment of
black adults. These contributions, and many others, constituted the first generation of quantitative
protest studies. However, the findings often conflicted, a problem exacerbated by the lack of
explicit theorizing. As Peter Eisinger (1973) noted, the connection between environmental
variables and protest patterns was “seldom made explicit theoretically” (1973: 11). Absent a
theoretical framework, scholars were unable to carry on productive debate and refine studies to
account for disparate results.
Peter Eisinger’s work brought clarity to early structural studies of protest onset and
created one of the three major strains of Social Movement Studies; he provided a pathway
beyond atheoretical work in the political environment tradition. Eisinger restricted the definition of
political environment, merging the empirical goals of Lieberson and Silverman, the Palleys and
Downes, with Lipsky’s dedication to explicit theory crafting. Eisinger theorized that each American
city held a particular structure of political opportunities, which shaped protest behavior. This
original formulation included specific institutional factors: for example, whether the chief executive
is an elected mayor, or a manager hired by the city council, and whether elections are ward
aldermanic or partisan. Such formal arrangements defined the political opportunity structure for
each city. Protest is here not primarily the product of resources, even resources generated by
protestors. Protest is instead primarily a function of “openings, weak spots, barriers” (1973: 20).
Political opportunity structure, under Eisinger’s theory, conditioned the likelihood of
protest through mechanisms of frustration and rationalist cost-benefit calculation. Protest erupted
as a reaction to frustrated groups’ inability to gain access to political processes, an inability to
influence political outcomes through conventional means. However, rational protestors would
choose not to protest under hopeless conditions, conditions in which neither conventional nor
unconventional actions have an effect on policy. The joint theory generated two rival hypotheses.
First is a linear relationship between political opportunity structure openness and protest
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prevalence. As groups are increasingly blocked from policy creation, frustration sends them to the
streets. Second is a non-linear, U-shaped relationship between the two variables. This hypothesis
holds that very open systems prevent the rise of frustration, and very closed systems prevent the
rise of hope. In both cases protest onset will be limited. In middle ranges, however, a combination
of frustration and expectation spur onset. To test the hypotheses, Eisinger constructed a dataset
from newspaper reports in forty three American cities. His statistical tests support the U-shaped
hypothesis, and refute the linear hypothesis. The 1973 article is still widely cited in modern
work—according to GoogleScholar, the article has been cited over 1500 times. The study is a
landmark in the exploration of structural causes of protest onset. Thus, it directly provides
guidance for an exploration of protest onset in Russia, or any other context.
Eisinger’s work set a precedent by connecting to work outside of protest studies—a
precedent that is unfortunately ignored in modern Social Movement Studies. Specifically, the
author engaged with work in the tradition of rebellion studies. At first glance, this interdisciplinary
move appears surprising. In his work, Eisinger advocates for the study of protest as a standalone
phenomenon. In the 1960s scholars studied protest alongside related violent events, particularly
race riots. Eisinger contends that protest events and their violent counterpart were two forms of
collective action that should be “distinguished conceptually and empirically” (1968: 44). The
foundational article introduces the tense relationship between protest and other forms of political
conflict in academia; the article demonstrates how scholars can fruitfully draw tools from parallel
fields without jeopardizing the independence of protest as a phenomenon.
Interdisciplinary linkage connected political opportunity theory with Ted Robert Gurr, one
of the founders of rebellion studies. Gurr’s (1970) Why Men Rebel is a comprehensive
investigation into the causes of collective violence. As reviewers were quick to point out, the
boundaries of the collective violence category were fuzzy (Tilly 1971; Black 1972). The study’s
dependent variable sprawls to include revolutions, civil wars, strikes, and street demonstrations.
The dependent variable of protest studies thus falls under the broad umbrella category. For each
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form, the author theorizes the potential for collective violence as a function of relative deprivation,
or the disparity between “justifiable expectations and perceived value capabilities” (1970:43). Gurr
wagers that the processes underlying various forms of contentious expression are similar enough
to warrant aggregated treatment. Despite Eisinger’s clear rejection of the aggregate position, he
entertains Gurr’s hypotheses. Even though Eisinger strongly argues that protest should not be
studied alongside violent rioting, or the numerous phenomena that make up collective violence,
Gurr’s work provides a potentially useful theoretical tool, or resource. A search for structural
causes of protest onset must similarly consider the arguments put forth in rebellion studies.
By citing Gurr’s work, Eisinger brought the second strain of modern Social Movement
Studies, grievance, into the mainstream. Theories from revolution studies informed Eisinger’s
foundational political opportunity structure work in two ways. First, Gurr’s relative deprivation
hypothesis offers a theory for statistical testing. In his article, as mentioned above, Eisinger finds
support for an inverted-U relationship between political opportunity structures and protest, rather
than the linear relationship associated with relative deprivation theory. However, elements from
revolution studies inform a broader articulation of political opportunity theory. In a closing note
Eisinger brings elements of grievance into his model. Political opportunity structure is narrowly
constructed from formal institutional attributes. However, the author posits that opportunity is also
related to “social considerations which breed deviance” (1973: 17). Even under the original
formulation of political opportunity theory, Eisinger outlined a broader definition that included
societal elements of grievance. Even while introducing a single, parsimonious explanation, the
author recognizes the importance of a broader theoretical model. Political opportunity structure
expanded even more through contributions from sociology and collective behavior studies.
The full triad emerges for a second time in a move to expand upon political opportunity
structure. Charles Tilly built on Eisinger's work to offer the beginnings of a more dynamic theory
of social movements. In From Mobilization to Revolution Tilly (1978), echoing Eisinger,
contended that the frequency of protest and other collective behavior charts a curvilinear
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relationship with political openness. When the state offers individuals and groups access to
conventional politics, few will select more costly, unconventional alternatives. When the state
offers absolutely no access to politics, even unconventional politics may fail to achieve results.
Again, protest occurs in the middle ground, where ample obstruction breeds motive, and ample
openness breeds hope. Tilly’s formulation of tri-part opportunity structure, however, expands well
beyond formal political features. First, the interest dimension represents potential gains from
participation. Second, Tilly defines organization as the cohesion of community networks. And
third is opportunity, defined as the likelihood of repression, and the vulnerability of the state. Two
of these dimensions roughly correspond to Eisinger’s broader theoretical position. Interest
resembles grievance, and opportunity serves as a much broader take on Eisinger’s political
opportunity measures. The third dimension, organization, reestablishes Lipsky’s resources as a
central feature of social movement theory. Tilly’s opportunity structure theory thus recast the
preceding theoretical strains of grievance, political opportunity structure, and movement
resources.
In broadening the concept of political opportunity structure, Tilly also introduced a novel
statist element to protest studies. Lipsky’s state was capable of repression. Eisinger’s state
comprised of formal institutional elements. Now, in the alternative formulation, the state became a
complex actor as well as a set of political institutions. In fact, Tilly (1976) conceptualizes collective
action of all kinds as a push and pull between the state and its constituents. The author takes a
historical view to describe the rise of the modern nation-state as a narrative of political conflict.
For Tilly, “reactive forms” of action, such as revolution or civil wars declined when the modern
state won a battle for resources and control. With a monopoly of force established, early states in
Middle-Ages Europe no longer feared existential challenges from rival groups. Any potential
challenges had, by that time, lost the organizational power to mobilize territory, arms or popular
allegiance. However, the tension between state and constituents did not disappear with reactive
forms of collective action. Proactive forms of dissent, protest and strikes, continued to occur in
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modern states. Indeed, according to Tilly, the "social movement" as understood in the U.S. and
Western Europe co-evolved with relatively stable popular democracies (1976). In such contexts,
organization and interest often align to produce collective action. And at the same time, such
opportunity in advanced democracies is open enough to prevent repression. Tilly’s three
elements configure to produce a continued push and pull in which the state is an active
participant; protest is the manifestation of an ongoing struggle to establish the boundaries of
control between ruler and ruled.
Like Eisinger, Tilly’s work clearly identifies potential structural determinants of protest
events. An exploration of protest onset in Russia, or in any geographical context, would benefit
from the author’s theoretical work. Efforts to operationalize the rich framework outlined in From
Mobilization to Revolution would need to include elements of interest, organization, and
opportunity, as well as proactive state capacity. It is clear the theoretical position is much broader
than Eisinger’s. Unfortunately, subsequent authors have reduced the three elements to a shallow
version of Eisinger’s theory. For example, in their widely cited paper on civil war onset, Fearon
and Laitin join the two authors in parenthetical citation (2003). They write that “rebellion is better
explained by “opportunity” than by grievance (cf. Eisinger 1973 and Tilly 1978).” In casting the
two studies as counter to grievance this interpretation loses much of the richness inherent in both
Eisinger and Tilly’s work. Instead, political opportunity structure appears as a stand-in for any
explanation obscuring contentious actors themselves.
The final piece of the modern theoretical triad appeared as focus shifted back to actors.
In the late 1970s Lipsky’s resources approach made a comeback under the title of resource
mobilization theory. The shift started with Mancur Olson’s (1965) application of marginal utility
theory to socio-political contexts. This work produced the collective action problem, a situation in
which a group would benefit from cooperation, but the rational outcome of cost-benefit analysis
leads any one person to refrain from acting. In the classic prisoner’s dilemma, communication
restrictions prevent former accomplices from achieving their optimal outcome. In the game, the
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two individuals face a simple payoff matrix. If both cooperate with the police both receive a
moderate sentence. If only one cooperates, the silent partner receives a very harsh sentence.
However, if both remain silent, the authorities will lack evidence to convict either one. In order to
avoid the harsh punishment, with no method of assuring cooperation, the rational outcome is an
undesirable equilibrium; rational individuals will not bear the cost of working towards a collective
good. Would-be protestors, rebels, and revolutionaries face variants of this game. Collective
action events only emerge when the “rebel’s dilemma” (Lichbach 1994) is solved. According to
this position, analytical frames must focus attention on mobilization challenges and group
dynamics. Focusing on other factors, like political opportunity structures, or individual grievances,
is misguided.
Working in the area of protest studies, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald produced a
theoretical solution to the collective action problem—and in so doing provided an enduring tool for
structural applications. In a journal article McCarthy and Zald (1977a) published the touchstone
piece, and provided the title, for resource mobilization theory. The two authors focus analysis on
resources available to collective actors in advanced industrial societies. Only armed with
sufficient resources could individuals solve the collective action problem and engage in protest or
other group action. Under this framework personal wealth and free time, professional training and
external financial support, allow passionate citizens to create professional movement
associations. These movement entrepreneurs create associations to alter potential recruits’ costbenefit processes. A resource base and mass communication networks allow participants to
avoid costs associated with mobilization, and increase the chances that others will join the cause.
Here the entrepreneur does not necessarily suffer from grievances, and might even have
deliberately created the appearance of grievance. Here the entrepreneur’s resources hold
analytical priority over any political opportunity structure.
McCarthy and Zald’s framework operates in opposition to political opportunity and
grievance theories. Social mobilization was a self-conscious departure from the erstwhile “main
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tradition in social movement analysis” (1977: 1213). According to the authors, grievances are
ubiquitous. Formation of social movement associations, and by extension likelihood of protest
events, are a function of the absolute amount of resources available; as funds are available for
entrepreneurs, as communication networks facilitate recruitment and organization, these groups
will form (1977). The authors explicitly aim their attack at work in the grievance tradition.
McCarthy and Zald’s critique would apply as well to political opportunity structure positions,
however. This analytical lens obscures the political structure facing a group as well as
grievances. Resource mobilization sees emergence result from the tasks of transforming the
population into adherents and adherents into constitutents. In other words, McCarthy and Zald
argue that resources are the sine qua non for social movements: “only if survival is guaranteed
can other goals be pursued” (1977: 45). Like preceding work in Social Movement Theory,
McCarthy and Zald’s work offers suggestion for identifying contextual protest onset. A structuralist
working with resource mobilization theory would focus on elements of social movement
organizations (SMOs), resource streams, and informational connections between constituents.
Returning to a recurring theme, McCarthy and Zald include a broader version of their
position; returning to a recurring theme, even the broader articulation ignores Tilly’s insights vis-àvis state capacity. The foundational resource mobilization articulation includes reference to statist
elements. McCarthy and Zald mention that social movements’ ability to mobilize is contingent on
state responses. Any organization’s potential for mobilization “is also affected by authorities and
the delegated agents of social control” (1977: 56). This is to say, mobilization is contingent upon
actions of police or government surveillance organizations. The authors describe repressive
measures dampening population motivation through the demonstration effect. As the state as
actor punishes protestors, cost-benefit calculations change, despite the best efforts of movement
entrepreneurs. Thus, much like political opportunity theory, and grievance theory, resource
mobilization indicates the importance of a confluence of factors. And, most importantly, like the
previous two frameworks, it fails to account for the state as more than repressive force.
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More recent work on protest has explicitly established the three strains of theory as
parallel explanations, as the core of comprehensive empirical work. Here the triad appears for the
third time. One strain of literature published since the early 1980s falls into what is referred to as
the “political process model.” Douglas McAdams introduced this label in his Political Process and
the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (1982). The author lauded the progressive, but
in his view incomplete, turn towards resource mobilization. His attempt to offer a more satisfying
theoretical account joined the major streams of Social Movement Studies. For McAdam,
“movements develop in response to an ongoing process of interaction between movement groups
and the large socio-political environment” (1982: 40). McAdam elucidated his theory with the case
of African American civil rights activism. Civil rights movements only emerged when external
circumstances provided sufficient openness to allow mobilization. Favorable changes in policy
and the political environment, including the collapse of the cotton economy in the South, African
American migration to Northern cities, and a decline in the number of lynchings, for example,
lowered the costs and dangers of organizing for African Americans and increased their political
value as an electoral constituency. Secondly, the movement thrived with increases in indigenous
organizational strength, increases in communication networks and financial and human
resources. Here political opportunity structure and resource mobilization appear in tandem.
McAdam rounded out his account of mobilization with a third insufficient but necessary
element: insurgent consciousness. This element, novel in Social Movement Studies, updated the
concept of grievance. Insurgent consciousness activated through the process of “cognitive
liberation,” the belief that a set of circumstances are “unjust and subject to change through group
action” (1982: 51). In the case of the American civil rights movement, visible events led to
liberation. For example, the landmark case, Brown v. Board of Education, which declared de jure
racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional, brought widespread attention to the issue.
The court decision triggered subjective grievance, while simultaneously triggered collective
attribution, the recognition that one’s grievance is widely held. McAdam’s description of insurgent
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consciousness connected to constructivist theories of framing. Constructivists emphasized the
indeterminacy of material conditions because individuals "often misunderstand or experience
considerable doubt or confusion about what it is that is going on and why" (Snow and Bedford
1988, 212). Scholars used frames to describe the processes through which people define and
experience material conditions. Under this theory re-framing social movement context could
influence protest onset potential as much, or more than, shifts in material conditions. While
McCarthy and Zald were correct to establish the insufficiency of objective grievances, McAdam
argued that this subjective variant deserved consideration, alongside the other theoretical
elements.
The political process model represents the culmination of major preceding work.
McAdam’s work united the three main contemporary streams of Social Movement Studies.
Similar to Tilly’s conceptualization, McAdam brought together political opportunities and
organizational strength. Also following Tilly, McAdam’s concept of opportunity expanded well
beyond Eisinger’s formal politics. McAdam’s opportunity includes statist elements of repression.
The third element, subjective grievance formation, reintroduced Gurr’s concept in a new light.
This complex, position moves away from competing independent variables, towards a
multi-dimensional understanding of structural conditions leading to protest or other contentious
political events. Despite its considerable lack of parsimony, the complex model has endured.
McAdam’s synthesis places in the foreground the conjuncture mentioned as an aside in earlier
work. Eisinger, in his political opportunity theorizing, and McCarthy and Zald, in their resource
mobilization theorizing, briefly mention the importance of a complex, or conjunctural,
understanding of protest drivers. As I shall discuss below, the complex position has become the
core of social movement theory.
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State of the Field
The political process model is recognized as the modern state of the field in Social
Movement Studies. As such, it offers an exhaustive set of theoretical tools for structural work—
exhaustive within narrow disciplinary guidelines. This set is, unfortunately, incomplete. Tilly’s
innovative statist approach, comprising of reactive and proactive elements, appears in a very
weak articulation. As I will argue in the following section, Gurr’s willingness to reach across
disciplinary boundaries offers a clear solution.
Today the political process model holds pride of place in social movement studies. The
privileged position of McAdam’s synthetic framework is clear from comprehensive summaries of
the field, and from critiques. For example, the Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, edited by
Neal Caren, includes a section on social movements. The section’s author, George Ritzer, labels
political process theory the “standard explanation” for social movement formation and protest
onset (2012: 3). Ritzer describes political process as incorporating three foundational elements:
opportunities, resource mobilization, and framing (of grievances). David Meyer (2004) came to a
similar conclusion in his field review for the Annual Review of Sociology. Meyer writes that work
that explores the interaction of a social movement with its context has accumulated within the
"political process" tradition (2004: 125). McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) tried to unite the
main strands with their collection Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. The book is
divided into four sections, one section each for the triad of opportunities, mobilization resources,
and subjective framing, and a fourth section arguing for synthesis. State capacity is conspicuous
in its absence.
Analysts of the field agree on the three core theories—see social movement reviews in
recent handbooks of political science (Ishiyama and Breuning 2010) and comparative politics
(Boix and Stokes 2009) . However, some analysts reject the move towards synthesis. In a recent
book-length review of Social Movement Studies, Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) prefers positing a
competition between political opportunity structure and grievance and resource mobilization
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theories. So where do structural scholars stand today, given the current state of the field? How do
scholars leverage the resources provided by major theoretical contributions to social movement
studies?
Theoretical tools identified in the above literature review offer clear guidelines for
structural work. Scholars often attempt to create observable indicators of the three leading
theories: political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and grievance. Equipped with
variables they proceed to test hypotheses using statistical analysis. Scholars have continued
Eisinger’s attempt to test political opportunity theory. Protest scholars studying formal political
opportunity structure variables established a connection between protest onset and partisan party
structure (Arce and Mangonnet 2013), voting patterns (MiKyoung Kim Park 1997; Machado,
Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011), and level of electoral competitiveness (Lankina and Voznaya
2015). A third group of scholars has explored the connection between the active and institutional
state. They argue that sham elections serve as a political opportunity opening, increasing the
likelihood of protest (Tucker 2007; Robertson 2010; Bunce and Wolchik 2011). In the grievance
tradition, Walton and Ragin (1990) established a link between austerity measures and political
protest in 65 countries. Other structural work in the tradition explores the economic inequality and
political conflict nexus. Protest and political conflict scholars who cast grievance as within-country
report mixed results (Lichbach 1994). Moving away from simple measures of inequality, however,
others have established a connection between “horizontal inequalities,” the overlap of inequalities
and other group characteristics, and violent and nonviolent political conflict (Goldstone et al.
2010; Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014). Moving to the third element, scholars have
evaluated hypotheses linked to resource mobilization theory. Studies have explored the link
between political unrest and demographic growth and urbanization (Urdal 2006; Wallace and
Weiss 2013), and the spread of information communication technology (Meier, 2007). Work on
diffusion also falls under the mobilization tradition, as scholars have traced regional and
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international spread of protest (Beissinger, 2002) and violent political conflict (Gleditsch and
Ward, 2006).
Thus, over half a century of theoretical work has provided structuralist scholars with
ample theories to test the methodological position. Numerous studies have evaluated the core
structuralist wager, that contextual factors can systematically shape protest onset potential.
Through their work, scholars have made progress towards defining the contours of the
relationship. Concepts pioneered by Eisinger, Tilly, McCarthy and Zald, and McAdams today
appear in quantitative form, as independent variables in statistical studies. Scholars have realized
Lipsky’s hope that protest would be studied systematically, under the organizational guidance of
theory. Unfortunately, the theoretical resources provide only incomplete guidance to structuralist
explorations of protest onset.

Not In Circumstances They Choose
The current state of affairs in protest studies suffers from two problems, one procedural
and one theoretical. First structural scholars have failed to adequately test the political process
model, the leading strain of social movement theory. And secondly, the leading theory is itself
flawed. Recent consensus on the elements of political process has failed to adequately represent
the statist position, originated by Tilly, that the state as an actor shapes protest potential.
For these two reasons structural studies fail to adequately analyze social movements and
contexts in which they are embedded. Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte claimed dictatorial rule of
France through a coup in 1851. Karl Marx was appalled to see a man he deemed a “grotesque
mediocrity” play the role of national hero. Members of society, from the landed to the indentured,
united to support military rule, in contradiction with their class interests. According to Marx, fear of
bloodshed lay at the root of this puzzling turn of events, puzzling from the perspective of Marxian
th

revolutionary theory. Events from this 18 Brumaire of Louis Napoleon have become a common
allegory for the agent-structure dilemma in political science (Katzenstein 1977; Ruggie 1998).
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Modern-day scholars often make use of the famous observation that, “men make their own
history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected
circumstances, but under circumstances existing already” (1869: 10). A take on this quote opens
David Meyer’s assessment of the political process model. Meyer’s coyly writes: “social protest
movements make history, one might paraphrase an earlier analyst, albeit not in circumstances
they choose“ (2004: 125). What structuralist scholars of protest onset must do, then, is sketch the
contours of these circumstances. Only by expanding hypothesis testing, and expanding the
theoretical base can scholars accurately capture effects of structure.
Structuralist studies have failed to adequately test the political process model. As recent
overviews of Social Movement Studies demonstrate, as mentioned above, the consensus view of
the field includes political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and subjective grievances.
Scholars do not agree on whether the triad operates as three necessary but insufficient causal
factors, or three competing explanations. From either stand point, however, it is unjustifiable to
restrict testing to one or two elements of the accepted wisdom. A fair test of structural conditions
of protest onset, a test that adequately leverages the extant stock of theoretical tools, must
evaluate all three. Of all structural studies of protest, which tend to employ quantitative methods,
only two studies evaluate the complete triad. Kurt Schock (1996) produced a test of a “conjectural
model” of protest and political violence onset. Schock explored the interaction effects between
political opportunity, operationalized as state repressive tendencies, grievances, operationalized
as economic inequality, and mobilization capacity, operationalized as ethnic community ties. The
author reported that inequality increases the likelihood of conflict, especially in open political
structures. And more recently, Erica Chenoweth and Jay Ulfelder (2015a) evaluate all three
elements, arranging them as competing explanations. Chenoweth and Ulfelder determine that
none of the factors effectively predicts the onset of maximalist non-violent protest movements.
Other than these two studies, structuralist scholars have failed to give the political process model
its due.
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A second, more serious problem is that the current state of the field has incompletely
incorporated Tilly’s statist elements. This problem is more difficult to overcome because it
fundamentally restricts the shape of scholarly inquiry. Or in other words, the set of theoretical
tools available to the structuralist and the “context” are not co-terminus. Academic research is the
product of a chain of steps. Scholars form theoretical models of the phenomenon of interest.
Scholars operationalize their models as concepts turn to observable data points. Then scholars
test theories. In the final step scholars turn back and amend their theories on the basis of
findings. A flaw in the early part of the chain will negatively affect all future work. Existing statist
elements appear under the political opportunity structure heading. The field has moved towards a
consensus definition in response to critiques that “political opportunity threatens to become an allencompassing fudge factor for all conditions and circumstances that form the context for
collective action” (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 281), or that “opportunity is seldom defined”
(Koopmans 1999, 96). Scholars often rely on dimensionality to order complex concepts. In his
overview, McAdam identified the constituent elements of political opportunity structure, across
numerous articulations. McAdam identified a list of four dimensions. First is relative openness of
formal political institutions. Second is the stability of elite alignments within a polity. Third is the
presence of allies, among elected officials and among civil society groups. And fourth and finally,
state capacity and propensity for repression. The problem is that only the fourth dimension
describes the state as actor.
Since Tilly’s (1976,1978) path-breaking work the state as actor has done more than
repress. After the formation of modern nation states in Europe the process of state-making did
not end. Recall, under Tilly’s theory, reactive forms of political expression like protest are actions
that determine the boundaries of state control. And the state is an active participant in reactive
political expression, through repressive action or ameliorative responses to protestor demands.
Ameliorative responses would capture changes across political, economic, educational or health
policy realms. Tilly’s fellow statist theorists Charles Bright and Susan Harding eloquently
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summarized the position: “statemaking does not end once stately institutions emerge, but is
continuous…contentious politics both define the state vis-à-vis other social and economic
institutions and continually remake the state itself” (1984, 12). Repression is a single part of the
state’s repertoire. Repression is a single facet of the ongoing exchange between ruler and ruled
that continuously constitutes the state. Responses from the state condition the likelihood of future
contentious political events.
Thus, the consensus view of political opportunity structure described by McAdam (1996),
that the state-as-actor only acts through repression, is incomplete. Structuralist scholars hoping to
evaluate the ways in which the state conditions protest onset cannot rely on the tools provided by
Social Movement Studies. Instead, they need to operationalize the full range of state responses;
they must place the full range of responses within a clearly organized framework. Lipsky valued
theoretical frameworks as means to “assist in ordering data” in the 1960s. Theoretical frameworks
are just as important today. A need for order and clarity is especially clear for such a sprawling
conceptual domain as state action.
Three of the major social movement theorists offer a possible way forward. In their 2001
book Dynamics of Contention, Douglas McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly introduced the
umbrella category of contentious politics to highlight similarities between distinct phenomena
including revolutions, protests, strikes, and ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. The authors hoped to
pool theoretical resources across the boundaries of sub-fields. The authors called for a focus on
recurring mechanisms—such as social mobilization, identity shifts, and accreditation/deaccreditation of political entrepreneurs—across the various forms of contention. The vision of
academic work outlined in the book concerns the dynamic unfolding and outcomes of contention.
However, as Eisinger demonstrated by connecting to Gurr and revolutionary studies, theoretical
cross-pollination is equally effective for structural studies of event onset. Following McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly, following Eisinger’s older example, I will reach outside of Social Movement
Studies for theoretical resources. I will turn to civil war studies and the Copenhagen School of
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international relations to craft a comprehensive structural theory of protest onset. These two
areas of study features a concept of state capacity that is much more robust than the variant
featured in the modern political process model.

State Capacity Theory
Compared with other disciplines, Social Movement Studies’ treatment of state capacity
appears thin, simplistic even. The concept of state capacity entered international relations and
comparative politics through two related sub-disciplines. In the decades following the Cold War,
international relations scholars were forced to focus on a “new” type of conflict: civil war. Since
the 1950s and 1960s the accumulation of protracted wars and the eruption of additional conflicts
greatly increased the total number of active civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003). According to one
widespread designation, post-Cold War civil wars were qualitatively “new.” They were criminal
rather than military, ethnic and religious rather than secular (Kaldor 2007). As the threat of
interstate war and nuclear annihilation appeared to fade, pundits predicted a “coming anarchy”
(Kaplan 1994). In the anarchic scenario collapsing states gave rise to international security
threats. Poor countries in Africa and elsewhere no longer represented a site of superpower
competition. Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, Uganda, and other countries now represented
areas of concern in their own right, as breeding grounds for military and epidemiological threats.
As the international community began to intervene in intra-state conflicts scholars initiated the
discipline of peace-building and state-building studies. Both groups of scholars, those exploring
the onset of conflict, and those studying the reconciliation phase, place state capacity at the
center of their theoretical models.
State capacity and the study of civil wars entered the discipline of international relations
simultaneously. And much like protest studies in the tumultuous post-war decades, the shift
followed historical developments. Since Kenneth Waltz’s 1952 The Man the State and War,
international relations theorists had organized their discipline around the study of war. In the mid1990s Kalevi Holsti led a reassessment of the field. Holsti hoped to maintain focus on war, which
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would remain, for him, the “central problem of international relations” (1996, 19). However, he
argued that changes in the frequency of conflict forced analysis to the domestic level. Since 1945
over three quarters of wars broke out internally (Ibid.). Theories of international relations, to the
extent that they were applicable to domestic events, could only place the causes of civil war at
the international level. Holsti acknowledged that international phenomena of superpower
competition, the flow of arms and the flow finances, shaped domestic conflict. The author argued
that domestic institutional strength, domestic state-society relations, held causal primacy,
however. So international-level theories such as realism and neo-realism should be
supplemented with theories of the state.
Holsti produced just such a theory. In The State, War and the State of War, he introduced
a robust theory of state capacity. State capacity is often conceptualized in material terms, such as
military power or repressive power featured in Social Movement Studies. Holsti, alternative,
defined state capacity in ideational terms. As he writes, “the critical dimension of state strength
is legitimacy, which is an idea or feeling” (1996: 33). Legitimacy arises when constituent members
of the state recognize the rightful nature of officials, and obey state commands not only out of
fear, but also out of moral authority. Thus, state capacity becomes a measure of citizens'
attitudes towards authority, whether they withhold or grant the 'right to rule' to those who act in
the name of the state. This framework clearly goes well beyond the state as repressive force.
Repression is not absent from Holsti’s state capacity. Instead, it is one part of the complex set of
state-society relations that establish legitimacy.
Holsti imported a nuanced understanding developed by statist theorists working in
comparative politics. Through his work, Joel Migdal revitalized the theoretical treatment of the
state in comparative politics. Working in the post-Cold War context, characterized by civil war and
failed states, Migdal addressed the question: “why have so many third world countries been so
ineffective in accomplishing what their leaders and others have expected of them?” (1988, 9).
According to the author, the contemporary set of theoretical resources vis-à-vis the state
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precluded effective exploration of the question. In short, as states themselves had deteriorated,
so too deteriorated the utility of the ideal-typical state. Scholars could no longer effectively turn to
the Weberian ideal of the state as holding a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Since the
end of World War II, the collection of 200 formal states produced such a range of outcomes that
terms like failed, fragile, or collapsed state arose. As a replacement for the outdated ideal, Migdal
provided a tri-part definition of the state. The first element is the familiar concept of repression
appearing in the political process model: the state as a field of power marked by the use and
threat of violence. The second element brings in Tilly’s concept of a continuously redefied state,
shaped by recurring transactions between ruler and ruled. Migdal’s second element is
transactional loyalty, achieved through contentious and conventional politics. The first two
elements lead naturally to the third: the actual practices of state representatives and
organizations. This is a dynamic framework that captures the state as actor and institution—thus
incorporating insights of Reuschemeyer, Stevens and Skocpol (1985) and Tilly’s application in
social movement theory. The framework was created intentionally to be as broadly applicable as
possible. Analysts could describe and compare the capacity of advanced industrial states or socalled failed states using a single conceptual vocabulary.
Structural scholars studying civil war onset have applied this robust theory of state
capacity, offering a way forward for Social Movement Studies. Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) model
of insurgency—mentioned above—serves as the touchstone example. The authors famously
claimed that “not cultural differences and ethnic grievances, but rather the conditions that favor
insurgency” (2003: 17) determine the onset of civil war. The authors conceptualized the structural
conditions as the state’s ability to patrol and control territory, and the state’s ability to discourage
recruitment. Since Fearon and Latin’s foundational piece, numerous studies have posited more
accurate measures of state capacity; numerous scholars have attempted to improve upon Fearon
and Laitin’s application of state capacity, producing variants that resemble Holsti and Migdal’s
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framework more closely. I will discuss the operationalization techniques in depth in the following
chapter. Here however, it is important to note the theoretical underpinnings.
The numerous, diverse approaches to state capacity developed since Fearon and Laitin’s
work can be organized neatly, multi-dimensionally. Fjelde and de Soysa (2009) introduced a
typology that places various elements of state capacity within the dimensions of coercion, cooptation, and cooperation. These three dimensions nicely represent Holsti and Migdal’s theories
of state capacity. Coercive state capacity signifies, as usual, military and financial resources, and
the state’s ability to extend official presence throughout territory. The second dimension,
cooptation, consists of the state’s ability to strategically placate segments of the population
through public expenditure. The author’s final dimension, cooperation, represents the level of
trust between the state and the populace. Civil war scholars have treated the state as a rich actor
as well as a set of institutions.

Protest and the Idea of the State
Lipsky began the study of protest with a call to organize data in a broad, clear theoretical
framework. Generations of scholars, working over decades, have followed his directive. The
amount of data required to test the comprehensive framework is daunting, however. An effective
structural study must operationalize all three components of the political process theory.
Even that is not enough. An effective study must operationalize all three state capacity
components to create an integrated model. The actions of the state, which according to Tilly
shape the likelihood of onset, appear in truncated form under the political protest model. An
effective structural study of protest must, following Holsti and Migdal’s’ lead, reflect a rich
understanding of state capacity—moving beyond repressive capacity. The triad of coercive,
cooptational, and cooperative power is an essential part of any comprehensive theoretical
framework of protest onset.
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State capacity may even hold more explanatory power than rival explanations.
Grievances build a reservoir of discontent that may drive people to the streets. Social mobilization
capacity catalyzes discontent, while at the same time offering a channel through which
movements gain momentum. Open political opportunity structures offer the space for protest
movements to originate and grow. Each theoretical driver increases the likelihood that protests
will occur. State capacity should dampen protest potential and interrupt causal chains. Local
governments’ coercive, cooptational, and cooperative capacity should, theoretically, snuff out
protests before they begin. Grievances lose their catalytic aspect when states effectively
ameliorate feelings of injustice; where social services address sources of anger, impetus for
congregation fades; where citizens are cowed or satisfied, open political opportunity structures
will remain devoid of dissident action.
Barry Buzan articulated this position, distinguishing weak states by “their high level of
concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government; in other words,
weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and societal
consensus” (1983: 64). Rather than the ability to win an external war, state capacity here
coincides with socio-political cohesion. As state capacity strengthens, protest frequency falls—
according to the theoretical position. Buzan argued that a complex idea of the state determined
strength. I will utilize this formulation as an umbrella theoretical framework for protest onset. In
the remaining chapters, Idea of the State signifies a broad framework including political
opportunity structure, grievance, social mobilization capacity, and multi-dimensional capacity.
Each polity holds a unique Idea of the State, where underlying elements produce frequent
protests, the Idea is weak.
A synthesis of Social Movement Studies and state capacity work will allow me to explore
what some describe as the unfathomable enigma of Russia (Zekulin 2009). In the next three
chapters I will operationalize the idea of the modern Russian state in an attempt to establish a
structural understanding of protest onset. The complexity inherent in the position will allow me to
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contribute to several academic traditions. My work will encounter—and collide with— theories
proposed in Social Movement Studies and state capacity studies. Perhaps most significantly, my
work will suggest whether or not scholars of protest onset can unravel enigmas working from an
abstract, structural level of analysis.
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III - Operationalizing Core Concepts
Introduction
Good social science research requires both abstract concepts and precise observable
variables. Without abstract concepts, researchers cannot formulate theories and testable
hypotheses, cannot form general understandings of how the social world works. A social science
discipline without concepts would lack cohesion. John Gerring, in a recent treatise on
methodology, argued that political science, economics or sociology without abstract concepts
“would be a series of disconnected facts and micro-theories” (2001, 38).
In order to proceed from theorizing to testing, researchers must bring their concepts from
the realm of the abstract to the realm of the concrete. Noumenal and phenomenal, mental and
sensual, ideal and empiric, each pair defines the two realms. Scholars use operational definitions
to cross the boundary. An operationalization clearly defines an observed quantity and guides
measurement. Theories and variables are thus co-constituted. Indeed, Gerring eloquently wrote
that “large-order concepts comprise the scaffolding on which we hang observables” (Ibid. 38).
The choice of how to make a concept operational, useable, is fraught with potential difficulty.
Should conflict scholars move beyond military and economic capability to include measures of
inter-subjective meaning and control (Barnett and Duvall 2005)? Should state capacity scholars
move beyond coercion to measure elements of cooptation and cooperation (Fjelde and de Soysa,
2009)?
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Across areas of study, the manner in which concepts are operationalized shapes
findings. Critics have called attention to the tenuous link between concept and variable in
integration in international relations (Hughes, 1971); the democratic peace (Gartzke 1998);
democratization (Teorell 2010); revolutions (Goldstone 2001). When observable variables do not
adequately reflect the conceptual scaffolding, even the most rigorous study will produce specious
results and conclusions. This raises the concern of construct validity: “the degree to which
inferences can legitimately be made from the operationalizations in a study to the theoretical
constructs on which those operationalizations were based” (Trochim and Donnelly 2008, 137).
This concern is not unique to social scientists. Biologists’ common practice of animal testing
represents a potentially catastrophic problem of construct validity. Hypotheses derived from
human beings are commonly tested using the decidedly non-analogous subjects of mice, rats or
ferrets.
Commonly as well, natural science journals feature assessments of construct validity in
the animal model (Cronbach and Meehl 1955; Willner 1984; Ellenbroek, Geyer, and Cools 1995;
Nestler and Hyman 2010). Across disciplines, poor operationalization can lead to misleading
findings. This chapter argues that protest scholars, and contentious politics scholars more
broadly, fail to achieve construct validity. Decades of scholarly work features flawed
operationalizations of major theoretical drivers: grievance, political opportunity structure, social
mobilization, and state capacity each take underspecified forms, jeopardizing conclusions,
blunting the impact of academic work. I will expose threats to construct validity before compiling
superior alternative operationalizations.
Two canonical examples of construct validity—the cautionary tales encountered in
research methods seminars—underscore the importance of operationalization. As Fordist
production practices took hold in the United States, scholars turned their attention to productivity.
Elton Mayo hypothesized that workers’ productivity, output per hour, depended on context rather
than innate ability. Mayo selected lighting in order to operationalize the concept of working
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conditions. He then proceeded to organize an experiment at an electricity factory in Hawthorn, a
suburb of Chicago. A conditioned group worked under improved lighting, while a control group
worked under usual lighting conditions. Mayo and his colleagues reported a positive correlation
between illuminated environment and productivity. Encouraged by the results, Mayo and his
colleagues repeated the experiment with changed working hours and rest breaks. Each time
productivity increased vis-à-vis the control group. Upon completing the study, working conditions
for all workers returned to pre-experiment levels. Surprisingly, the experiment group continued
their productivity increases. It appeared that the physical changes were only indirectly responsible
for increased production. Instead, the fact that “someone was actually concerned about the
workplace” (Adair 1984, 337), motivated workers. Decades later, the Hawthorne effect has been
immortalized, though perhaps not in the manner in which the authors of the 1925 study would
have anticipated. The effect today signifies that workers who are aware of being observed worked
harder, regardless of external environment, regardless of inherent ability.
Renowned biologist Stephen Jay Gould revealed a similar problem in his 1981 book The
Mismeasure of Man, a discussion of early attempts to operationalize the concept of intelligence.
th

Psychologists working in the early 20 century developed survey instruments, which included
questions on current events. One question asked, “in which city do the Dodgers play.” Many
Americans living in the 1920s would have correctly identified the city as Brooklyn. This was not
the case for recent immigrants. Survey respondents included many Eastern Europeans, recently
arrived in the country, lacking an understanding of local sports. Predictably, psychologists inferred
that Eastern Europeans had lower intelligence. The intelligence survey creators, like Mayo, failed
to capture their core concept in practice. Mayo’s attempt to evaluate physical work environment
captured instead attention to environment. Gould’s surveyors only measured how long one had
lived in the USA and become acculturated to a popular pastime. These errors in
operationalization precluded effective testing of hypotheses; in both cases, scientists failed to
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navigate the tenuous link between concept and observable variable, leading to faulty inference
and specious conclusions.
Continuing from the preceding discussion, this chapter will operationalize core concepts
relevant to protest onset in Russia. Scholars working in contentious politics have, fortunately,
begun the work of operationalization. Progress in the field could not occur otherwise. Though
useful, these studies also exhibit ample room for improvement in operationalization. Scholars
have routinely failed to account for two threats to construct validity. First, contentious politics
scholars have often underspecified the dimension captured in variables—for example, GDP per
capita as a representation of state capacity in general (Hendrix 2010). And secondly, scholars
studying structural causes of protest and violent conflict routinely place their state capacity
measurement at the incorrect geographical level (Buhaug 2010). I will use extant quantitative
work as a starting point in my attempt to traverse the “perilous span” (Hughes, 1971) connecting
concepts and variables.

The Importance of the State
While operationalization is a building block in my study, forming new measures of state
capacity is a stand-alone scholarly contribution. State capacity appears across a diverse range of
work in political science. Since Evans and her colleagues famously “brought the state back in” to
comparative politics and international relations in the 1980s, scholars have treated the concept as
both independent and dependent variable. Because it is central to so much work, flaws in
construct validity are similarly widespread. This section will motivate the search for new, better
measures.
The state is central to political science by definition. Scholars working across the porous
disciplinary boundaries connecting American political science, comparative politics, and
international relations study the concept. Although politics is difficult to define (Magstadt 2015),
two well-known authors provided useful attempts. Max Weber defined politics as the struggle for
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power. In Politics as Vocation, he writes that politics is “the pursuit for a portion of power or for
influencing the division of power whether it is between states, or between groups of people which
the state encompasses.” The state enters this first definition as a holder of power—indeed as the
sole holder of the legitimate use of violence—and a context in which the struggle occurs. Harold
Lasswell alternatively defined politics as involving the state as distribution mechanism. For
Lasswell politics was “who gets what, when and how” (1950). Working from either definition,
political scientists of any sort cannot help but study the state. In the influential volume, Bringing
the State Back In, Evans, Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985) attempted to reshape the manner
in which scholars approach the state. The authors argued that foregoing work failed to sufficiently
account for the state as actor. They argued that, despite its central role in political science, the
state appeared in studies as a passive set of institutions.
Whether or not Evans and her colleagues’ critique of the field was accurate (Burnstein
1987), the Bringing the State Back In moment serves a useful organizational function. Evans,
Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol highlighted the centrality of the state across substantive issue
areas. And they exhorted scholars of all sorts to add sophistication to the core concept. Their
contribution demonstrates the widespread importance of state capacity as a concept.
Furthermore, it implies that problems of construct validity would negatively affect a wide range of
studies.
Scholars employing state capacity as a dependent variable clearly rely on effective
operationalization of the core concept. Across sub-fields of state-building and post-conflict
reconciliation, scholars attempt to elucidate processes through which state capacity develops. For
example, some scholars study historical formation of early states, or rebuilding of modern lessdeveloped countries. Charles Tilly (1975) describes the origin of the modern state in the pithy
line, “the state made war and war made the state.” Tilly and other contributors to this bellicist
tradition of state-building study the development of state capacity to extract taxes, military
service, and loyalty through the war making process (Herbst 1989, 1990; Thies 2004). Another
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set of scholars, neo-institutionalists, trace the relationship between economic change and state
capacity. Focus shifts to the role of the state as an institutional solution to transactional and
informational hurdles (North 1982). Others explore the stilted development of state capacity
where neither war-making, nor efficiency incentives work to produce a strong state, in
environments characterized by informal control structures (Migdal 1998; Reno 2000). Still another
strain of work focuses on the sociological drivers of state capacity, to include identify-formation
and myth creation (Anderson 1974; Geertz 1981; Ruggie 1993).
A second body of literature explores forward linkages of state capacity, treating state
capacity as an independent variable. As I will discuss in detail below, civil war studies, protest
studies, and other components of contentious politics commonly explore the effects of state
capacity. This strain of work traces the relationship between fluctuations in state capacity and
corresponding fluctuations in the onset of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin
2003; Hendrix 2010), the duration of conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004; Buhaug,
Gates, and Lujala 2009), the intensity of conflict (Benson and Kugler 1998; Lacina 2006) and the
outcome of conflict (Rouen and Sobek 2004; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009).
Others trace the connections between state capacity and economic development (Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Rodrik 2003, 2009), a debate with fraught policy implications in the
wake of the international debt crisis (Blyth 2015).
Across a vast swath of academic work scholars rely on the concept of state capacity.
They must all traverse the perilous span between concepts and variables; they must
operationalize conceptual elements of state capacity. Improving the construct validity of state
capacity measures would, thus, mark progress for diverse research traditions.
Leveraging the experiences of others, their struggles and their successes, I build tangible
representations of each element present in the Idea of the State framework. As discussed below,
early attempts to move from concept to measurement generated threats to construct validity.
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Scholars studying protest and contentious politics more broadly occasionally worked with overly
general, observationally equivalent measures. Problems associated with GDP per capita serve as
a warning: studies in which it appeared produced specious findings, faulty policy
recommendations. My measures are more refined. As mentioned in Chapter 2, state capacity
itself consists of three dimensions. I operationalize coercive capacity as crime rates. I use
government spending directed towards social projects to operationalize cooptational capacity.
And for the third dimension, cooperational capacity, I use electoral support for the ruling United
Russia party.
My choices are not perfect. Data were unavailable for desired measures of coercion and
cooperation. An ideal measure of coercive capacity would evaluate law enforcement’s ability to
achieve express goals. Crime rates reflect the general physical security environment, and capture
the state’s monopoly on the application of violence. Rates do not, however, control for official
indifference. High crime would prevail in areas where law enforcement possesses capacity to
coerce, but not the will. Furthermore, the crime rates measure poses a possible endogeneity
problem: if authorities register protests as crimes, the measure would simultaneously capture
both independent and dependent variables, jeopardizing causal inference. Fortunately, protests
are not considered crimes in the Russian case (Rossstat, 2018). My measure of cooperational
state capacity is similarly second best. Social survey data would represent an ideal, direct
assessment of regime loyalty. Russian elections get at the phenomenon indirectly. They are
notoriously corrupt. Still, I argue that vote fixing primarily exaggerates existing tendencies. High
vote shares will appear where the populace supports Putin, even if figures are artificially
increased. Take Chechnya for example. The region features an improbably high United Russia
vote share, over 95% in 2007 and 2011. Despite the dubious figures, support for the ruling regime
has been strong since Putin brutally put down an Islamic insurgency (Seddon 2018). Despite
concerns, my choices do not suffer from major threats to construct validity—they are not ideal,
but good enough given data restrictions.
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I follow best practices in the field to operationalize the remaining three elements of the
Idea of the State theoretical framework. Social mobilization capacity becomes concrete measures
of total population and urban population percentage, as well as a measure of educational
attainment. I use unemployment as a somewhat crude, but common, representation of grievance.
And I rely on the Carnegie Institute’s Openness Index to capture political opportunity structure,
following Lankina and Voznaya’s lead.
Though imperfect, chosen independent variables avoid what I consider the biggest threat
to construct validity. Each operationalization avoids the all-too-common problem of geographical
over-aggregation, or methodological nationalism, discussed in detail below; each is measured at
the correct, subnational level. A close look at existing work, at the choices of scholars studying
civil wars and protests, reveals the problem’s scope and magnitude. Geographical abstraction,
measurement at the incorrect level, produces a significant threat to construct validity, and thus, to
causal inference. In order to preserve the value of academic inquiry, the field must carefully move
from concepts to measurement.
And, as early studies of productivity and intelligence demonstrate, operational
improvement is a critical component of knowledge generation. This overview should convey the
room for cross-fertilization between my study of protest onset in Russia and a wide range of other
studies. In the following two sections I shall demonstrate common problems in operationalization
afflicting contentious politics work.

The Tenuous Link
To generate useful knowledge, scholars must construct observable variables that
effectively capture their conceptual and theoretical frameworks. Studies situated within protest
studies, contentious politics, state-building, and peace-building all require an operationalization of
state capacity that meets construct validity standards. Otherwise, the inferences drawn from any
of these studies will be faulty, the hypotheses will remain untested, and any conclusions will be
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incorrect at best, misleading at worst. Over the preceding decades contentious politics scholars
have encountered several threats to construct validity. Some threats have been identified and
addressed; others have not been taken seriously enough. I will here discuss operationalization
challenges appearing in structural contentious politics work. The study of Russian protest events
fits directly into this research tradition. Critiques and measures of state capacity discussed below
apply directly to contentious politics work. Contentious politics scholars have identified related
problems of observational equivalence and over-aggregation. A third problem, however,
inappropriate geographical specification, remains a major problem in the field. This discussion
pertains to any work incorporating state capacity concepts, on either side of the regression
equation.
In structural contentious politics studies early operationalizations of state capacity failed
to adequately reflect the core concept. These studies have become touchstones in the field,
despite their flaws. Civil war studies in the early 2000’s established state capacity as a driver of
conflict. These same studies established poor operationalization, variables failing basic construct
validity tests, as a central feature of quantitative work. Structural scholars defined the so-called
greed versus grievance debate. Funded by the World Bank, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004)
found that economic contexts—including overall level of development, GDP per capita—
outperformed measures of grievances in large-n statistical studies of civil war onset. Collier and
Hoeffler employed the theory of instrumental rationality to explain the correlation. For them, as
economic development increased the benefits associated with non-rebellious activity increased.
Individuals would, all else equal, earn a living and even obtain wealth legally, rather than risking
punishment for taking part in violence. The catchy greed-grievance dichotomy drew other
contributions. Writing shortly thereafter Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued that state context, state
capacity, conditioned the likelihood of civil war onset, not economic context. Fearon and Laitin
argued that GDP per capita is negatively related to the probability of civil war onset because it
serves as a useful proxy for a state’s capacity to project coercive force. States with greater levels
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of material resources, they argue, can leverage military force to deter would-be insurgents, and to
crush existing insurgents. A quick look at citation records underscores the influence of Fearon
and Laitin’s article. According to GoogleScholar, as of March 2017, the article has been cited over
6,200 times. This figure approaches the gold standard in social science citation. Seymour Martin
Lipset’s “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” published in the American Political Science
Review in 1959, holds the distinction of most cited journal article. Lipset’s place-holding article
totals over 6700 citations. In their widely-cited contribution, Fearon and Laitin captured the
concept of state capacity with the observable variable of GDP per capita. GDP is, of course, an
estimate of the total value of goods and services produced by an economy. It seems a perilous
span indeed that connects the concept of state capacity and the population weighted sum of
private consumption, gross investment, government investment, government spending, and net
trade balance.
The weakness of the GDP operationalization was visible from the beginning. It featured
two related threats to construct validity: observational equivalence and over-aggregation. First,
the operationalization facilitated multiple interpretations. Fearon and Laitin’s central finding was
not novel. Collier and Hoeffler had already published the negative correlation between overall
economic development and civil war onset. Fearon and Laitin’s interpretation of the finding was
novel. Troublingly, the two disparate interpretations, the two causal stories, emerge from an
identical evidence base. The theory of economic opportunity and the crude version of state
capacity theory generate the same observable implication: as overall economic development
rises, civil war rates declines. The argument that GDP per capita captures coercive capacities
and the argument that GDP per capita captures economic capacity to compete for the labor of
rebel recruits are equally plausible at first glance; the correlation could represent state success in
coercing compliance just as easily as it could represent state success in purchasing compliance.
The empirical evidence cannot serve to distinguish between two rival explanations, precluding
productive debate.
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The problem of observational equivalence can even lead to weak or misguided policy
recommendations. Government and international organization groups attempting to reduce the
onset of civil war have limited resources. These groups will have to carefully select an actionable
strategy. Collier and Hoeffler’s explanation implies a focus on job opportunities. Fearon and
Laitin’s would divert resources to government military command and control structures. But,
again, the policy recommendations derive from an identical evidence base. Policy makers lack
the confidence that either causal story is correct, and thus lack confidence that either policy will
work. Worse still, the problem of observational equivalence can even jeopardize the integrity of
social science. Evidence cannot distinguish between policy recommendations, and evidence
cannot definitively rebut counter explanations. Operating in a vacuum of objectivity, policy makers
or scholars are free to let ideological and political biases guide their conclusions. Mark Blyth
levies such a claim at scholars who advocate for pro-austerity economic policies (2015).
Indeterminacy brought on by observational equivalence is the product of overaggregation, the problematic practice of subsuming disparate elements into a whole. GDP per
capita captures supporting evidence for disparate theoretical positions. Even a scholar restricting
analysis to the state capacity explanation would find evidence for multiple competing
explanations. The operationalization captured a crude, aggregated concept of state capacity.
Employing GDP per capita transforms state capacity into an undifferentiated monolith. As
discussed earlier, theorists recognize numerous interrelated but distinct dimensions or elements
of state capacity. They have responded to Margaret Levi’s call to disaggregate the state. She
argued that “good analysis requires differentiating among the features of the state in order to
assess their relative importance; the state becomes less than the sum of its parts” (2002: 34). My
Idea of the State framework employs Fjelde and de Soysa’s (2009) tri-part break down of
coercion, cooptation and cooperation. Several other scholars, however, produce alternative
dimensional categories. Hillel Soifer (2008) adapted Michael Mann’s (1984) infrastructural power
to develop dimensions of central state capabilities, the territorial reach of the state, and the
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effects of the state on society. Cullen Hendrix (2010) presented dimensions of military capacity,
bureaucratic administrative capacity, and the quality and coherence of political institutions.
Hanson and Sigman (2013) preferred extractive capacity, coercive capacity, and administrative
capacity. Despite their differing organizational categories, all of these authors agree that state
capacity is best conceptualized as featuring dimensionality. That is to say, state capacity consists
of sub-components that do not consistently covary, and that operate through distinct causal
mechanisms. An increase in, say, coercive capacity does not imply a corresponding increase in
cooptation or cooperation. And as their labels indicate, the three dimensions condition social
cohesion through unique processes.
Fearon and Laitin’s initial article, along with other studies, demonstrate the perils of
eliding dimensionality in state capacity. The GDP per capita variable precluded the observation of
differing mechanisms. Returning to the problem of observational equivalence, the
operationalization blocked attempts to adjudicate between the options. For example, Cameron
Thies demonstrated that either extractive capacity and military capacity, or a combination of the
two, could explain the original findings of the greed-grievance literature. He argued that individual
dimensions or combinations of dimensions could lie concealed within the crude indicators of GDP
per capita (2010). A disaggregated operationalization of state capacity is the only way to expose
the causal mechanism at play. The problem of over-aggregation appears likewise in the related
strain of work that explores the link between regime type and conflict. The “murder in the middle”
hypothesis (Fein 1995) posited that regimes falling in between the poles of autocracy and
democracy experience highest rates of violence. Echoing the political opportunity structure
theory in Social Movement Studies (Eisinger, 1973), the hypothesis sees conflict emerge from
inadequate capacity for repression with insufficient ability to accommodate opposition through
institutionalized channels. Scholars have operationalized the theory using regime type, reporting
that semi-democratic regimes correlate with the highest risk of conflict (e.g., Mueller and Weede
1990; Reynal-Querol, 2014). Again, this over-aggregated operationalization obscures multiple
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causal processes. Only equipped with more nuanced variables can scholars determine whether
repressive capacity, representation, or another aspect of regime type drives the relationship
(Hegre 2014).
Suffering from observational equivalence and over-aggregation, the original
operationalization of state capacity was clearly problematic. GDP per capita has, nevertheless,
become a mainstay in structural studies of state capacity since the early 2000’s. As recently as
2014 Camber Warren could opine that the “operationalizations of state strength utilized in the
quantitative literature on civil war have generally relied on measures of economic advancement,
such as gross domestic product per capita, as proxies for state effectiveness” (2014, 115).
Since Fearon and Latin’s foundational piece, numerous studies have posited more
accurate measures of state capacity. The crude, problematic operationalization created an
opening for future contributions. Dozens of alternatives offer tools for scholars hoping to
overcome the problems of construct validity. Measures of state capacity include: anocratic regime
type (Goldstone et al. 2010); extractive capacity, measured in terms of taxation rates, and the
size of government, in terms of total spending, and type of spending (Bethke and Bussman
2011); tax/GDP ratio (instrumented by geographical features to control for endogeneity or reverse
causality) (Hendrix 2011); total revenue/GDP ratio (Thies 2010); relative political capacity, or
RPC, the ratio of actual tax revenue to expected tax revenue, estimated as a linear function of the
structure, size, and social spending in the national economy (Buhaug 2006); strong revenue
mobilization capacity coupled with low levels of corruption (Hughes et al. 2014) ;the share of
money held in savings deposits and legal paper, rather than currency, as a measure of trust in
institutions as credible guarantor of property rights and contracts (Fjelde and de Soysa 2009);
economic freedom (de Soysa and Fjelde 2010); frequency of irregular leadership transition
(Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010); total welfare spending, and welfare spending as a percentage of
GDP (Taydas and Peksen 2012); positive credit rating, and global liquidity (DiGiuseppe, Barry,
and Frank 2012; Shea 2014); “soft” state capacity, or the presence of economies of scale in the
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market place of ideas, measured by mass media penetration (Warren 2014); military capacity,
measured through military personnel, military expenditures, and military expenditures per soldier,
and administrative capacity, measured through a bureaucratic quality index (Hendrix and Young
2014); lack of economic autonomy, measured by the presence of IMF conditionality (Abouharb
and Cingranelli 2007); exposure to the international economy (Flaten and de Soysa 2012). This
lengthy, though far from exhaustive, list demonstrates that improving measures of state capacity
has become a growth industry in political science. The popularity of state capacity variable
development indicates that the field recognizes problems of observational equivalence and overaggregation. The studies mentioned here span the breadth of contentious political studies.
Scholars interested in civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and protest have all attempted to better translate
state capacity from concept to observable variable. A separate threat to construct validity, and
thus to causal inference, has received far less attention. Contributions to the field routinely ignore
sub-national dynamics of contentious politics onset.

Methodological Nationalism
The second threat to construct validity in studies of state capacity is geographical.
Contentious politics scholars routinely operationalize the concept of state capacity at the level of
the nation-state. As others have pointed out, this wide-spread, seemingly innocuous aggregation
technique can negatively affect the quality of causal inference. Andreas Wimmer and Nina
Schiller identified problems associated with nation-state level data in the discipline of
anthropology, and the narrow field of migration studies (2003). The authors use the term
methodological nationalism to signify the assumption that the nation-state is the natural social
and political form of the modern world. Working from this assumption, scholars would naturally
construct their variables at the nation-state level, creating a corresponding “reduction of the
analytical focus to the boundaries of the nation-state.” As migration scholars, Wimmer and
Schiller were concerned with the loss of trans-border connections. The truncated analytical focus
elides the trans-national. Or more importantly from the contentious politics perspective, elides the
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sub-national. As studies have established, state capacity along these dimensions varies widely
within countries (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014). Theories of civil war, political violence
or protest onset connect structural conditions of coercion, cooptation, and cooperation to onset
potential at the sub-national level—to the region in which the event actually occurs, not the
abstract aggregate level of the state. To the chagrin of anyone looking for progress in the
“scientific study of civil wars” (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), the problem was identified in several
high-impact studies, and then largely ignored.
Methodological nationalism represents a serious threat to state capacity variables’
construct validity by way of ecological fallacy. The practice severely undermines the ability of
observable variables to reflect corresponding concepts, and thus undermines inference,
2

conclusions, and policy recommendations .
Quantitative contentious politics scholars’ inappropriate employment of a type of
methodological nationalism creates an opening for more scholarly work. The mismatch between
theory and methodology erodes the strength of inferences and conclusions drawn in this area of
study. By explaining sub-national events with national-level indicators, scholars have, at best,
poorly captured hypothesized explanatory mechanisms, and at worst, generated decades worth
of specious findings. Positive findings in the field may provide the basis for misguided policy
recommendations. Negative findings may prove to be incorrect. Indeed major findings have been.
In the civil wars literature, one of the most robust positive statistical findings is a correlation
between national levels of economic development and conflict. The World Bank spends aid
money in accordance with Paul Collier’s ‘economics of civil war’ approach, which promotes

2

An ecological fallacy occurs when conclusions about individuals or component parts derive from aggregate
data (Trochim and Donnelly 2008). Imagine, that a particular high-school class reported the highest statewide math scores. An observer, running into one of the high-schoolers on the street, would be mistaken to
congratulate the student on his or her performance. The individual could be a dunce in a class full of math
wizzes. Aggregation can conceal meaningful variation among the parts. This insight is simple but important.
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economic growth as the cure for preventing civil wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009).
However, because the scholars ignore the sub-national level, it is possible that an omitted
variable accounts for the relationship between overall development (GDP per capita) and
domestic peace—say stronger local governments or stronger local employment prospects.
Devoting resources to a national project would be a mistake if a third factor drives the statistical
relationship; a rise in per capita GDP that obscures regional inequalities could, in fact, exacerbate
grievances associated with relative deprivation. Another often-cited finding in quantitative civil war
studies is that geographic features such as mountainous terrain facilitate conflict. What, though, if
the conflicts do not occur near mountainous regions? By locating both independent and
dependent variables at the national level, large-n, quantitative work on contentious politics has
failed to adequately confront these scale problems. As discussed in depth below, one of the most
robust negative findings in the civil wars literature has been debunked. Throughout the 2000’s the
greed-grievance dichotomy purported to prove the irrelevance of grievance on conflict, as
measured by latent ethnic strife or vertical inequality. Numerous studies have reversed these
findings, studies which shift focus away from the national level.
The remainder of this section will further outline the scale problem in structural studies of
contentious politics. I will first discuss the problem in civil war studies. This strain of contentious
politics is an unlikely site for a problem linked to variable operationalization. A long sequence of
contributions has been rigorously self-reflective at the methodological level—even explicitly
striving to create a “scientific field” of research (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). By thoroughly
tracing the prevalence of methodological nationalism in this high-profile area, I hope to
underscore the threat to contentious politics of any sort. The persistence of methodological
nationalism in civil war studies is particularly puzzling given the work of Halvard Buhaug and
others, who identified the problem in the mid-2000’s. The authors’ most recent contribution
demonstrates that the sub-national movement has not gone far enough, that leading scholarly
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work is still operating under the assumption of methodological nationalism. In closing the
discussion I identify the problem in the narrower field of protest studies.
At first glance, the quantitative study of civil wars is an impressive strain of political
science research, approaching the orderly accumulation of knowledge demonstrated by the
natural sciences. A chain of inquiry stretching back over four decades has produced knowledge,
which has been challenged and refined as new contributions directly engage the old. Scholars
employ cutting-edge statistical analysis tools. Conclusions have driven policy, as evidenced by
the World Bank’s connection to Collier’s work. And the discourse has taken place across the
pages of high impact journals including American Political Science Review, International
Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and the Journal of
Peace Research among others. For these reasons, scholars refer to “decades of scientific
debate” (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014) on the topic. Unfortunately a missed
opportunity to adequately address the scale problem associated with methodological nationalism
has marred the sub-field with weak inference and logical failings.
The counter-intuitive finding that grievances are irrelevant to the onset of civil war was
derived from national-level statistics. As discussed in Chapter 2, Gurr introduced his relative
deprivation theory in the 1970 Why Do Men Rebel? According to the theory, individuals become
aggrieved when value expectations do not match value realities—a rethinking of Davie’s (1962) Jcurve hypothesis. Expectations are driven by visible experiences of other individuals, groups,
countries, or past personal experiences. Quantitative support for relative deprivation includes
findings based on inequality of income (Muller and Seligson 1987), or more recently immobile
assets like land (Boix 2008); and based on socio-political access measures derived from the
Minorities at Risk Project (Gurr and Moore 1997). However, since early literature on revolutions,
mobilization capacity theorists (Tilly, 1978) and statist theorists (Skocpol, 1979) complained that
aggrieved populations were ubiquitous, too common to hold explanatory purchase. Explaining
conflict through individual or group grievances was to mimic the methodologist who, having
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achieved a hangover with a water and whiskey and water and vodka started taking her drinks
neat (Aya, 1979). In the early 2000’s two landmark studies purportedly provided strong evidence
for this over-prediction critique, winning the day for greed (or perhaps the similar state capacity
position) against grievance.
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s (2004) Greed Grievance and Civil War gave the debate
its enduring label. The authors found that proxies for grievance—inequality and political
repression (captured by the Polity Index)—did not increase the likelihood of conflict in their
sample. Ethnic diversity as a measure of latent identity-based grievance even reduced the
likelihood of conflict, except in situations of “ethnic dominance,” in which one group comprised a
large majority of society. Greed indicators on the other hand—overall economic development,
growth rates, education levels, oil exports—explained significant variation in civil war onset.
Fearon and Laitin (2003) offered additional support for the opportunity structure position, further
bolstering the greed-grievance dichotomy. The authors demonstrated the statistical power of their
state-capacity model in which police and counter-insurgency weakness is proxied by GDP per
capita, and insurgent strength is proxied by mountainous terrain and large populations. A rival
grievance-based model again failed to show a significant relationship between latent ethnic
tension and inequality and civil war onset. Koubi and Böhmelt’s recent Journal of Peace Studies
article exemplifies the way in which the field has interpreted these two studies: “scholars interpret
the non-finding as a confirmation that grievances are largely irrelevant for explaining civil war
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004)” (2014: 21). However this conventional
wisdom rested on weak inference. Other weaknesses in proxy variables aside, both groups of
scholars ignored the potential scale problem underlying their work.
Scholars in the field attempted to bolster their findings against critique of inferential
weakness, and in the process hoped to solidify their scientific credentials. In 2006 Harvard Hegre
and Nicholas Sambanis conducted a sensitivity analysis of the correlates of civil war onset. A
quote from Ed Leamer, UCLA economist and frequent critic of social sciences statistical work,
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opens the piece: “a fragile inference is not worth taking seriously.” Results surviving Hegre and
Sambanis’ testing would form a baseline of the conventional, accepted knowledge in the field.
The ensuing set of correlates included large population, low per capita income, recent political
instability, rough terrain and anocratic regime types—closely resembling the drivers identified by
Fearon and Laitin and Collier and Hoeffler. The authors conclude with a sense of renewed
confidence: “some of the empirical results in the civil war literature are fragile, but others are not,
and they are worth taking seriously” (2006: 531). Unfortunately, this confidence was misplaced.
The rigorous attempt to establish a “scientific field” should not have given warrant for findings to
be taken seriously. An inference is a conclusion reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning.
The statistical analysis did nothing to improve faulty reasoning and poor evidence. The
dependent variables were country-year format, based on 1,000 or twenty five battle deaths. Of
the more than eighty independent variable operationalizations, not one evaluated sub-regional
effects.
The enduring weakness of Hegre and Sambanis’ findings emerged alongside challenges
to the conventional wisdom. It is telling that these challenges emerged from scholars employing
sub-national logic, logic that rejected methodological nationalism. In the late 2000’s and early
2010’s, studies overturned the purported irrelevance of both commonly-captured grievance
factors: inequality and ethnic strife. In the process these studies brought the broader scale
problem to the attention of the field.
In 2011 four researchers from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) laid down the
framework for the modern study of civil conflict. Siri Rustad, Halvard Buhaug, Ashild Falch, and
Scott Gates argued that “all conflict is local.” The authors argued that contributors to civil war
studies, “traditionally apply a rigid country-level approach whereby aggregate country data are
used and any resulting conflict is assumed to affect the entire country” (2011: 20). A number of
peripheral conflicts in the contemporary world illustrate the limit of such an assumption—conflicts
located on isolated Philippine islands or in Nepali mountain valleys. Using Southeast Asia as
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exemplar, the authors demonstrated that the estimated probability of observing intrastate armed
conflict varies substantially not only between states, but within most states. In order to abandon
methodological nationalism, the authors were forced to abandon national-level indicators. Thus,
Rustad and her colleagues used provincial-level data on population, GDP (gross provincial
product) per capita, infant mortality, and HDI scores from national Human Development Reports.
Moving beyond crude national-level measures of ethnic population composition, the scholars
used ArcGIS data to identify the dominant ethnic group in each sub-national region under study
and calculated the share of the population in the region belonging to the largest ethnic group.
With independent and dependent variables operationalized sub-nationally, results showed a
political risk map that varied significantly within Nepal, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian
states. In addition to clearly stating the critical position, Rustad, Buhaug, Falch and Gates provide
a ready-made plausibility probe for my study: the theoretical drivers of domestic conflict do vary
dramatically below the national level.
Roughly contemporaneous work further challenged weak inference associated with the
methodological nationalist position. Gudrun Østby’s work has provided large-n statistical support
for Frances Stewart’s theory of horizontal inequality. Stewart (2002) argued that inequalities
between culturally-formed groups can activate ethnic group boundaries, drawing evidence from
case studies of Mexico’s Chiapas region, Fiji, Uganda, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland,
South Africa, Brazil, and the United States. Adding an identity-based element to Gurr’s logic,
Stewart argued that unequal access to political, economic or social resources by cultural groups
can engender frustration because individual self-esteem is “bound up with the progress of the
group.” Østby generated a measure of polarization that captured this effect, for thirty six
countries. She argued that a society that is split into two well-defined groups with substantial
intragroup homogeneity and intergroup heterogeneity in resource ownership is particularly likely
to experience social unrest—such a society would be marked by both strong group identification
and sharp divisions between the groups. Her data include economic inequality measured by
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asset ownership, and social inequality measured by educational attainment and by ethnic group.
Although this initial study does not explicitly consider sub-national geography, the creation of
horizontal inequality indicators moves away from methodological nationalism. Østby argues that
ethnic cleavages that coincide with systematic socio-economic inequalities may enhance both
collective grievances and group cohesion among the relatively deprived, among a specific group.
Shifting analysis to the group level entails a move away from the national-level, away from a
model of the state as a unified actor or billiard ball.
The sub-national turn gave scholars the tools to continue effectively challenging the
prevailing wisdom vis-à-vis ethnic grievance and conflict. Working with Ragnhild Nordas and Jan
Rød in 2009, Østby made the disaggregated nature of horizontal inequality work explicit. The
authors now positioned their theory as a challenge to national-level measures of inequality such
as Gini coefficient: “neglecting or failing to measure the spatial variations and group aspect of
inequalities may produce tests that do not capture the essential group dynamics of civil conflicts”
(2009: 309). Exploring sub-national regions in 22 Sub-Saharan African Countries, the authors
leveraged Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data to reveal risk factors. Conflict onset was
more likely in regions characterized by absolute educational inequality, and horizontal inequality
in household assets. By applying sub-national analysis to horizontal inequality theory, Østby and
her colleagues’ work resembled S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates’ 2005 work on the Maoist
insurgency in Nepal. Murshed and Gates’ single country, large-n statistical study found that
fatalities were highest in regions in which life expectancy, educational attainment, road density,
and rates of land ownership diverged from national averages. Contradictory new findings
accumulated as scholars realized that “all analysis thus far had been conducted at the country
level whereas the causal mechanisms are located at the substate level” (Buhaug, Cederman,
Rød 2008: 540).
Sub-national work challenged the irrelevance of the second form of grievance as well:
socio-economic inequality. In 2009 the Journal of Conflict Resolution published a special issue
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titled Disaggregating Civil War. The issue was a clear call to move beyond methodological
nationalism. In their contribution, Hegre, Østby, and Clionadh Raleigh (2009) created sub-national
models of the Liberian civil war. Drawing on a single year’s worth of data from DHS the authors
created a wealth index, comprised of durable goods ownership and educational attainment,
measured by GIS grid squares. To disaggregate the dependent variable, the authors used conflict
data from the ACLED event database, which includes precise geographic location information. In
a complete reversal of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) findings, the
authors reveal a positive relationship between development and conflict: in the context of Liberia
in 1986, conflict events are more frequent in locations that were absolutely and relatively well off.
This finding is consistent with an interpretation of wealth representing target value, or the
presence of a strong support base. Hegre and his colleagues then leveraged case study and
ethnographic work to expose the causal mechanism at play. This qualitative analysis provided
support for the target value interpretation. That a sub-national level study could reverse the socalled conventional wisdom exposes the serious weakness in Hegre and Sambanis’ (2006)
attempt to create inferences that deserved to be taken seriously.
In two articles, Buhaug worked with co-authors to broaden the attack on methodological
nationalism in the civil wars literature. Moving beyond the greed-grievance debate, the scholars
provided large-n tests of all sub-regional drivers of civil wars. In a 2006 article Buhaug and Rød
attempted to move beyond the flaws associated with the “statistical study of civil war that uses
country-level approximations of local phenomena” (2006: 320). Looking at African civil wars from
1970 through 2001, the authors find sub-regional correlates of conflict, which vary by conflict
type. Specifically, territorial conflict was more likely in sparsely-populated regions near the state
border, at a distance from the capital, featuring sparse road density, and lacking significant rough
terrain. Conflict over state governance was more likely in regions that are densely populated,
feature dense road networks, near diamond fields, and near the capital city. Later, in a 2011
article published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, “It’s the Local Economy Stupid,” Buhaug et
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al. expanded the sub-national quantitative study of conflict to all countries captured in the PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset. The primary independent variable in the study is “gross cell product
(GCP),” calculated by GIS, relying on economic production data tied to geographical coordinates.
Whereas GDP per capita income provides a population-averaged per capita measure for the
whole country, the GCP per capita values for individual local cells reflects spatial variation in
income within a country. Unlike Hegre et al. (2009) who focused on Liberia only, Buhaug et al.
(2011) found that conflict events were more likely to occur in absolutely and relatively less
developed sub-national areas.
In their piece Buhaug and his colleagues provide a hint of what the field would look like if
scholars took the problem of methodological nationalism seriously. Conducting sensitivity
analysis of their model, they explicitly compare the predictive power associated with gross cell
product per capita and gross domestic product per capita. The authors find that minimum GCP (a
measures of a state’s poorest sub-region) provides a better predictor for whether states will see
conflict than GDP per capita. This is exactly the type of sub-nationally sensitivity test that Hegre
and Sambanis failed to consider in their attempt to create scientific consensus in the field.
Sub-national quantitative work on civil war clearly shows the weakness of the “state of
the field” as described by Koubi and Böhmelt in 2014. It appears that it is, in fact, the local
economy and other local factors that drive the onset of conflict. Indeed, the results of Buhaug et
al.’s sub-national sensitivity analysis demonstrates that local drivers of civil war hold more
explanatory power than national-level analogues—a finding that is only surprising in light of years
of weak inference produced before the article. The push to align theory with methodology in the
study of intra-state conflict exposed the weakness of the field’s current state of knowledge
production. Unfortunately the insights of sub-national scholars have not become the new
conventional wisdom.

98

Recent work by Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch suggests that the sub-national push
has not gone far enough. Echoing their earlier work, the authors accuse quantitative civil wars
scholars with “pushing square pegs through round holes,” (2014:420) by failing to adequately
operationalize both the independent and dependent variables in the grievance-conflict nexus.
Buhaug and his recent set of collaborators attempt to remedy these failings by employing grouplevel indicators associated with horizontal inequality. However, the authors now deem
problematic the limited geographical scope of previous horizontal inequality work. They tout their
work as “the first to propose global country-level measures of both economic and political
horizontal inequality” (2014: 422). The work of Stewart, Østby, and others developed horizontal
inequality measures as a corrective to national-level measures of grievances like the
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index and Gini coefficient. These scholars obtained valid
operationalization of grievances while losing the generalizability associated with ubiquitous
national-level data. Østby‘s 2009 article is the broadest early work on horizontal inequalities,
spanning 22 countries. So, by expanding the reach of the data, Buhaug, Cederman, and
Gleditsch are broadening the reach of the more accurate operationalization; they are reducing the
generalizability cost of turning to more accurate quantitative measures.
However, a closer look at the study suggests that the move back to the national,
generalizable level occurred too soon. The improvements to inference that have occurred for
grievance have not occurred for other potential drivers of civil war. For example, in Buhaug,
Cederman, and Gleditsch’s recent article, the opportunity structure or state capacity position is
represented by crude national-level indicators: level of democracy, GDP per capita, and total
population. Only one of the potential drivers of civil war is captured at the sub-national level.
Related concerns of generalizability and data availability explain the enduring mismatch between
sub-national theoretical mechanisms and national-level variable operationalization. The authors
betray the importance of data availability, a decidedly non-theoretical problem, with a strange
caveat. Discussing statistical and forecasting models, they claim that “available input data on core
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features such as economic development, democratization, and demographic changes almost
exclusively pertain to countries” (2014: 423). Economic development and demographics clearly
vary sub-nationally, as does level of democracy in anocratic countries, including Russia (Lankina
and Voznaya 2015). So, such input data do not exclusively pertain to countries. What may pertain
exclusively to countries exclusively is available input data. It appears that even the pioneers of
the sub-national turn in civil wars are still pushing square pegs through round holes. Despite the
sub-national turn in the 2000’s, the problem of methodological nationalism still mars the
quantitative sub-field. And in fact, this is a problem that much quantitative work in the broader
contentious politics field shares.
The preceding discussion introduced the problem of methodological nationalism with
examples from civil war studies, the most voluminous, most widely cited branch of contentious
politics. The problem similarly afflicts quantitative studies that focus exclusively on protest onset.
Eisinger launched the quantitative study of protest. Since his foundational work in the 1970’s,
however, such studies have been relatively rare, until the turn of the century. Patrick Meier (2007)
explored the relationship between information communication technology (ICT) and protest onset,
defining independent and dependent variables at the national level. Patrick Regan and Daniel
Norton (2004) compared the conditions leading to three types of contentious politics onset,
protest, rebellion, and civil war, with aggregated predictors drawn from grievance and social
mobilization theories. In the same year, Benjamin Smith (2004) conducted a large-n, nationallevel study evaluating the relationship between oil wealth and protest events. Smith concluded
that oil bust periods correlate with relatively high protest frequencies. Taehyun Nam (2007)
worked at a more refined geographical level to study the relationship between political opportunity
structure and protest onset. Nam focused on Western Europe, rather than the entire globe, but
still operationalized variables at the national level. T.V. Maher and Lindsay Peterson (2008), and
a year later Sabine Carey (2009), theorized political opportunity structure as repressive regime
tendencies. Both studies employ methodological nationalism as they trace statistical relationships
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between repression and protest onset. Felix Bethke and Margit Bussman (2011) consider
government financial effects in a similar study of repression and protest. The authors restrict
analysis exclusively to the national level. Finally, recent work defines grievance as food price
spikes and then explore the forward linkages to social unrest. Cullen Hendrix and Haggard (2013)
find significant relationships between price increases and increased frequencies of protests and
riots. The study operationalize most, but not all, variables at the national level.
The problem of methodological nationalist is wide-spread. It erodes the construct validity
of any study. And it must be corrected. By developing sub-national measures of state capacity for
Russia, I shall make a contribution to structural studies of protest onset, and contentious politics
more generally. The few quantitative studies of protest onset that do operate at the sub-national
level do not comprehensively test structural drivers. Wilkinson (2004) evaluated the forward
effects of politically motivated transfer rates, ethnic composition of police and federal
administration, as well as corruption. He does not find a significant relationship between onset
and any of his measures. Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) conducted a more recent study of social
unrest in Indian federal states. The authors mimic the initial, invalid operationalization of GDP and
report negative results. Gillezeau (2014) analyzed the relationship of federal spending at the state
level and both the onset and severity of racially motivated protests in the United States. Recently,
Arce and Mangonnet (2013) conducted a sub-national study of political opportunity structure and
protest onset in Argentina. The state of the field, then, sees many quantitative scholars of protest
onset either operating at an inappropriate level of analysis, or applying an incomplete set of
theoretical drivers.

Organizing Operationalizations
The fraught history of quantitative contentious politics studies offers valuable lessons for
scholars hoping to traverse the tenuous link between the concept of state capacity and
operational variables. Effective work must avoid the short-comings of Fearon and Laitin’s (2003)
initial contribution. Operationalizations must take the dimensional characteristics of state capacity
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seriously. Effective work must avoid the alarming problem of methodological nationalism rife in
the field. Operationalizations must appear at the appropriate level—the sub-national level. For my
exploration into the drivers of protest events, dimensionality is especially important. I will first
outline the state of the art in terms of operationalization. After identifying the most prominent
operationalizations and requisite data, I produce commensurate measures for the Russian case.
Following the Idea of the State theory outlined in Chapter 2, state capacity consists of 3
dimensions: cooptation, coercion, and cooperation.
The first dimension of state capacity is coercion. State capacity to coerce increases as
citizens fear government retaliation, as citizens are deterred from breaking laws. States with high
coercive capacity are able to monitor, deter, and suppress dissent effectively. The Hobbesian
concept of the Leviathan represents this first dimension. Here legitimacy is attained through the
social contract of myth: individuals forgo some portion of their freedom in order to establish a
power to overwhelm them all. The power then ensures peace and security. It is the coercive
Leviathan that Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue deters rebel organizations, precluding the
appearance of dual sovereignty (Tilly 1978). It is the Leviathan that increases the opportunity cost
of joining dissident groups according to Collier and Hoeffler (1998). These conceptualizations
recall Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous claim that, the “sovereign should punish immediately any
fault that he discovers, but he cannot flatter himself into supposing that he sees all the faults he
should punish.”
Scholars have operationalized coercive capacity along military and economic lines. The
first, problematic, attempts to capture coercive capacity took the form of general levels of
economic development, GDP per capita. Two groups of scholars used distinct approaches to
refine the measure. The first group attempted to create more direct measures of military strength.
For example, Herbst (1989) and Lacina (2006) compiled military expenditures and military
personnel figures in their work. The second group turned to extractive capacity as an alternative.
The government’s capacity to extract resources from society is a less ambiguous proxy for
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institutional reach and, in turn, the capacity of the state to credibly threaten and coerce:
“governments rely on revenue to invest in the military, police, and bureaucratic apparatus, which
in turn allow them to accumulate power for further penetration and extension of state rule” (Levi,
1988). For this reason Hendrix (2010) described tax capacity as the “sine qua non of state
capacity.” The simplest formation of extractive capacity is tax take, measured in absolute or
relative terms. As a more complex alternative, over three decades ago, in 1980, A.F. Organski
and Jacek Kugler introduced relative political capacity. Organski and Kugler’s measure compares
the actual level of tax revenue extraction to an expected level of extraction, given the state’s
economic and natural endowments. This formulation controls for advantageous or
disadvantageous circumstances. For example, a state rich in oil, or endowed with a wealthy
population, would be expected to extract more taxes than a relatively poor counterpart. My subnational focus precludes the use of military spending. Police competence, on the other hand,
varies across federal subjects. I collect data on local crime rates as a proxy for state coercive
capacity. As an alternative operationalization, I follow Organski and Kugler and compute a
measure of extractive capacity for each Russian subject region.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a comprehensive statistical model must include
the three major strains of Social Movement Studies. The first strain, social mobilization theory,
offers a counterbalance to coercive capacity. Armed with resources and propitious environments,
activist populations will resist the iron fist of law and order. Across quantitative contentious
politics work, scholars have employed a variety of operationalizations. A long—though not
exhaustive—list would include: presence of professional movement organizations (McCarthy and
Zald 1977b); emancipatory values (Welzel 2013); membership in network-building associations
(Norris 2002; McClurg 2006; Kaplan, 2013); educational attainment and transportation
infrastructure (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002); access to
information communication technology (ICT) (Meier 2007; Earl 2013), especially in light of the
Arab Spring revolutions (Chung and Cho 2013; Jansen 2010); urbanization rates and a
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demographic “youth bulge” (Goldstone, 2001b); existing protest networks, as measured by
history of protests or strikes (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015b); demonstration effects, measured
by high levels of contentious politics onset in neighboring regions (Gleditsch and Ward 2006).
Data availability dictates my selection of social mobilization capacity measures. Of the
operationalizations produced across contentious politics studies, I was able to compile subnational data on population characteristics, educational attainment, and transportation
infrastructure. I employ total population, urban population, and tertiary attainment as primary
operationalizations. I compiled a measure of annual bus transit volume, to capture transportation
infrastructure available to would-be protestors and protest organizers. As alternative
operationalizations, I further compiled a measure of population age to capture Goldstone’s
demographic variant.
The second dimension of state capacity is cooptation. A state that is strong in cooptation
maintains civil peace not merely through the Leviathan’s threat of violence. Cooptation is
precisely, “the process by which a group subsumes or assimilates a smaller or weaker group with
similar interests” (Selznik 1984). Through this mechanism the state is able to appeal to the
interests of would-be dissidents. Dissident groups’ relative socio-economic condition and
demands shape the concessions required to subsume or assimilate. In the words of Levi (2006:
9), one of the central challenges of creating capable governments is to “offer constituents enough
in the way of benefits to retain their loyalty.” Citizens consent to fall in line, conditional on the
government’s provision of political goods in return. The Hobbesian social contract, and underlying
feelings of fairness, rest on exchanging freedom for security. The move to cooptation instead
involves a broader exchange. The state provides goods, quality of life, in exchange for a feeling
of fairness that keeps protestors and rebels off the streets. Recent actions in Saudi Arabia offer a
touchstone example. In Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Libya unemployed masses played a significant
role in social unrest (Goldstone, 2014). In response, Egyptian leaders began paying a generous
monthly subsidy to job seekers.
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Scholars have produced a wide range of operationalizations of cooptational capacity.
This second dimension of state capacity often includes government spending and measures of
effective governance. Total spending levels on public goods signal to the population that shortterm citizen well-being is a government priority. A relative measure is more common, however,
such as a ratio of government expenditure to total GDP or a per capita calculation (Fjelde and de
Soysa, 2009). Other studies disaggregate spending by destination. For example, Thyne (2006)
suggests that spending specifically on education creates an indirect link to civil peace, working
via channels of economic growth, greater social mobility, and lower inequality. I employ data
from RossStat from 2007 to 2013 to generate two measures of sub-national capacity to coopt. I
follow Fjelde and de Soysa and capture the state’s inclination to ‘give back’ as total government
spending per capita. I also follow the disaggregated approach by computing a per capita measure
of government spending directed towards socio-cultural projects, which include pensions,
subsidized health care, housing assistance, unemployment assistance, and green space
construction projects.
The grievance position from Social Movement Studies offers an inversion of cooptational
capacity logic. Undesirable living conditions catalyze manifestations of social unrest. In the
decades since foundational contributions of Davies and Gurr, contentious politics scholars have
developed numerous measures of grievance. The historical list would here include: income
inequality and ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler
2004); power balance between politically excluded ethnic groups and dominant actors in terms of
group sizes and access to political, economic, and social resources (Buhaug et al. 2011);
polarization and horizontal inequality as a measure of ownership of consumer durables and
educational attainment (Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009); retrenchment in government budgets
associated with austerity policies (Ponticelli and Voth 2011; Ban 2012); the erosion of elite
economic interests (Robertson, 2007); corruption (Neudorfer and Theuerkauf 2014). Explicitly
sub-national work on grievance operationalization is scarce, but includes several significant
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operational definitions: the risk of conflict onset in a location may increase with larger income
deviations from the national average (Buhaug et al., 2011); or may increase with relative
electricity shortages (Juan and Bank 2015). I develop several sub-national measures that capture
grievance across Russian federal subjects. I use unemployment rates by subject as the primary
measure of grievance. I generate two alternative operationalizations: percentage of local
populations living in poverty, and annual reported morbidity, as a measure of living conditions.
The third dimension of state capacity is the most abstract. Cooperation signifies the
extent to which the state and the populace are integrated. Securing compliance is easier where
effective governance allows the populace to trust leadership, as compared to countries where
compliance depends on coercion or cooptation (Levi 2006). Fjelde and de Soysa alternatively
describe the dimension as “integrative capacity,” which increases as citizens begin to trusts the
state to be an impartial enforcer of the societal contract, to uphold property rights, and generally,
to exercise public authority in a way that is not biased towards particular segments of society
(2009). I consider cooperation the degree to which citizens identify with government and trust
government officials to remedy social ills. The abstract dimension of capacity has received less
attention than the previous two. Scholars have operationalized the dimension in a few ways: a
measure of Contract Intensive Money (CIM) in society, as a measure of financial trust (Clague et
al. 1999); corruption (Fjelde and de Soysa 2009); and vote shares won by the ruling party
(Lankina and Voznaya, 2015). I gathered data on voting patterns to calculate the share won by
United Russia in parliamentary and presidential elections, for all federal subjects.
The third major strain of Social Movements Studies similarly concerns political interaction
between state and society. Social scientists have been operationalizing political opportunity
structure for decades. Eisinger theorized that each American city held a particular structure of
political opportunities, which shaped protest behavior. Protest is here a function of “openings,
weak spots, barriers” (1973: 20). More specifically, the relationship between degree of openness
and risk of conflict should take the shape of an inverted-U, with the greatest risk of violence
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among semi-democratic polities that combine insufficient ability to deter violence and insufficient
political openness to induce non-violent participation (e.g., Muller and Weede 1990). The core
idea connecting earlier and later work is that protest frequencies vary with the relative closure of
the formal political system. Measuring political opportunity structure in an illiberal democracy like
Russia is particularly difficult. Lankina and Voznaya employed qualitative interviews to
operationalize the level of political competition and electoral freedom at the regional level. The
pair also included a measure of corruption. Corruption fits under the political opportunity structure
heading through the channel of responsiveness: corrupt political dealings can render even
competitive, clean elections meaningless. Unfortunately Lankina and Voznaya’s results were only
available for roughly a third of federal subjects. I leverage a recent study by the Carnegie Center
in Moscow to significantly improve on this operationalization. The center published a list of
openness indicators, regarding democratic elections, political pluralism, independent media,
economic liberalism, civil society, political society, elite cohesion, corruption, and regional
autonomy. Each indicator, available for every region, is the result of expert consultation.
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Table 1: Independent Variable Operationalization

Theoretical Driver

Operationalization

Coercion

Crime Rates

Social Mobilization Capacity

Population Figures; Transportation Data;
Educational System Data

Cooptation

Total Government Spending;
Government Spending on Socio-Cultural
Projects

Grievance

Unemployment; Poverty; Morbidity

Cooperation

Electoral Support

Political Opportunity Structure

Openness Index

Moving Forward
Structural contentious politics studies have often failed to effectively cross the perilous
span between concept and measurement. Facing twin threats of misspecification and
methodological nationalism, contentious politics scholars must operationalize state capacity
carefully in order to form meaningful inferences, conclusions, and policy recommendations. As I
shall discuss in the following chapter, protest scholars studying countries characterized by illiberal
press face an additional challenge: official reports of events may be inaccurate. Scholars often
rely on newspaper records to identify protest events and to build datasets. They provide a
relatively accessible source of data. They are often, in fact, the only available source of data.
Several studies have demonstrated that newspapers are not a transparent conduit of protest
information, and that systematic reporting biases can affect the types of events appearing on the
printed, or digital, page (Barranco and Wisler 1999; Koopmans 1999; Mueller 1997a, 1997b;
Maney and Oliver 2001; Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Myers and Caniglia 2004).
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Only after identifying and addressing problems associated with protest event data can
this study effectively explore the relationship between state capacity and protest onset in Russia.
Only then can this study begin to illustrate the shape and strength of the Russian social contract.
As Turgenev wrote, “Russia cannot be measured with an ordinary yardstick” (Zekulin 2009).
Scholars should interpret the author’s warning as a challenge to develop innovative tools, not as
cause for despair.
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IV - Data Politics
Introduction
In March of 2017, almost six years since the Bolotnaya square events, a tide of mass
protest actions spread across Russia. Thousands of people, in dozens of cities, participated in a
march against corruption. The Anti-Corruption Fund played a catalyzing role. Fund leader
Aleksey Navalny published an explosive piece of investigative journalism, directed towards
exposing the staggering personal wealth of former president, current Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev. Touring Tuscan vineyards, luxury condominiums, and a person yacht, the film tells a
tale of state funds funneled into a personal empire. Navalny urges viewers to remember, “He Is
Not Dimon To You, or Don’t Call Him Dimon (Он вам не Димон),” a play on Medvedev’s
personal, playful nickname. The subsequent surge in protest activity comes in the wake of years
of calm at the national level. Duma elections held in September witnessed a record low in turnout. Observers wondered if dissident movements had run out of steam (Shevtsova 2012). Large
crowds from Moscow, to Yekaterinburg, to Novosibirsk, to Vladivostok in the Far East, highlight
the presence of lingering tension between state and society. Official actions in response to
Navalny’s campaign, created a counter narrative, a false image of tranquility that starkly opposed
reality.
Russian government reaction lays bare an information suppression campaign. The
compromising film was immediately banned from all Russian television outlets. In the neutral
confines of YouTube, it was viewed 14 million times in less than a month, since publication on
March 2, 2017.
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Despite mass interest, officials refused to even entertain questions, dismissing the AntiCorruption Fund as the work of a known criminal, a reference to Navalny’s questionable charge
for corrupt business dealings. Once protestors hit the streets, officials continued their dampening
strategy. Riga-based Meduza News compiled a profile of all major Russian news agency
coverage during the mass actions. Russia Channel 1, the most-watched channel in the country,
completely ignored the turmoil, with one exception. Over the course of forty eight hours, talk show
host Vladimir Solovyov spent 6 minutes denouncing the action in vague terms, avoiding
Navalny’s name, avoiding the word protest. No other mention appeared. State-aligned television-,
radio-, and web-outlet RIA Novost completely ignored the thousands of people marching across
the country.Websites Life, Isvestia, Forbes Russia, TASS, and Interfax were likewise
meaningfully silent throughout the day. The only sites featuring significant coverage are
considered oppositional or at least independent, foremost TVRain (Дождь) (Meduza 2017c).
Even a keen observer of current events in Russia would likely consider the wave of protests a
minor expression of social unrest.
This chapter argues that traditional media are inadequate sources of Russian protest
data. So-called event data projects, based on traditional media, are similarly inadequate.
Newspaper accounts in Russia ignore most dissident action, as predicted by news worthiness
theory from media studies. Even a single data point is the product of numerous decisions, and
each decision is potentially objectionable, fraught with value judgments. Only careful decision
making will produce useful data on Russian protest onset. The previous chapter built a
connection between independent variable concepts and operationalization. Here the task
becomes traversing a second perilous span (Hughes 1971), this time with the dependent
variable.
My dependent variable definition—one that includes even micro events–renders
traditional news media entirely unreliable. Thanks to the mass scale of events, and thanks to the
efforts of dedicated media outlets like TVRain, official suppression did not entirely obscure
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Navalny’s 2017 marches. Smaller events do not share the scale advantage. Demonstration
effects mobilized an anti-corruption march in Krasnodarsk, in a rural area outside Sochi. A film
crew from the firmly anti-regime Radio Freedom struck out to cover the event. Before reaching
their destination, the group was beaten and robbed of cameras, cell-phones and notebooks by a
group of masked men (Meduza 2017a). From the position of social science research, the push
and pull around reporting becomes a battle for data creation or data suppression. Recent events
surrounding “Don’t Call Him Dimon” highlight the political nature of data in social science in
general, and contentious politics in particular. Individuals like the battered crew, operating despite
official restriction, provide an alternative source of protest data.
Below, I argue for activist-generated data as a viable alternative. Facing censorship,
scholars are often unable to study contentious politics in illiberal regimes (Barsalou 2012). The
charged, political process of data gathering thus makes allies of dissidents and academics.
Without a record of events, dissidents cannot spread their message, to potential sympathizers, to
targets within the ruling circle. Without a record of events, academics cannot even begin to
answer questions of state-society relations. The Russian coalition Collective Action
(коллективное действие), a group of liberal activists, journalists, and professors, appreciate
the political power of data gathering. The group claims: “we are dedicated to participating in the
formation of the Russian future; our weapons are critical thought, information and collective
action.” Successful scholars rely on the very same arsenal.
With a source identified, this chapter then argues against mainstream collection
methodology: automation is an inappropriate method of data collection. The discussion below
introduces event data coding, a common method of quantifying protest. Over the last fifty years
contentious politics scholars have interfaced with print and web media to build event databases.
Striving for efficiency, they leverage automated coding algorithms to dramatically outstrip hand
coding speed. As I will argue, however, what is an acceptable error rate for massive datasets is
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unacceptable for Russian protest from 2007 to 2013. For this reason, I hand-coded hundreds of
articles to compile the updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset.
This study foregrounds the political nature of gathering data, especially protest data. If
participants are unaware of sympathetic actors across the country, coordination failure will stymy
nascent movements. For example, in the former U.S.S.R. and in Russia today broad anti-regime
sentiment has been, and remains, an insufficient condition for mass mobilization. Only when an
informational connection appears will sympathizers recognize each other and act. The connection
in East Germany and other former Soviet republics took the form of leaked videos depicting
resistance and police abuse (Kuran 1991). In Russia today, the connection takes the form of
independent news and eyewitness accounts. Putin’s social project thus requires censorship, to
sever the informational link. If a string of anti-corruption protests breaks out in Novosibirsk or
Irkutsk, but censors block national media coverage, Moscow-based organizers may miss the
signal of support. A choice to study modern protest, then, is a choice to directly affect the
prevailing protest environment.

From Concept to Measurement, Again
My arguments concerning source data and methodology naturally follow a dependent
variable definition that includes micro events. This first section presents this definition in detail.
International relations scholars have long argued that definitional choices shape research.
Choices restrict the questions scholars can ask and the conclusions they draw (Holsti 1964;
Buzan 1991; Holsti 1996; M. N. Barnett and Duvall 2005). My choices are driven by the research
question: why have certain Russian regions experienced higher or lower levels of protest than
others? The answer requires an understanding of when, where, and why protests occur, as a
means to sketch the contours of the modern social contract in Russia.
Recent studies offer inadequate definitional resources. Erica Chenoweth’s work on
protest often employs a “maximalist” variant (2010, 2014; 2015a). Non-violent protest campaigns,
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under Chenoweth’s definition, hold explicit goals related to removing incumbent governments,
and involve more than one recorded event, in which at least 1,000 people participate. As the
language suggests, this variant is too macro for my purposes. Campaigns capture protest in a
general sense while ignoring individual protest events. Graeme Robertson’s definitions, on
display in his work on Russian protest, are similarly inadequate. His early work defines protest as
contentious political events involving labor organizations (2007). His recent work expands scope
beyond labor but fails to provide definitional clarity. Especially troubling, Robertson fails to define
a scope of protestor identity (2013). It is not clear if pro-government assemblies fall under his
definition, a particularly important consideration in the Russian context (Lankina and Voznaya
2015).
In order to construct an appropriate dependent variable definition, I merge contributions
from two studies. A classic study in the social movement literature provides an ideal foundation—
as I mentioned in the introductory chapter. Douglas McAdam provided a broad conceptual
definition of social protest in his 1982 “Political Process and the Development of Black
Insurgency, 1930–1970.” Protests are, “organized efforts to promote or resist changes in the
structure of society [or polity] that involve recourse to non-institutional forms of political
participation” (1982: 25). McAdam’s definition is sufficiently micro to capture individual events.
This form of contentious politics can include demonstrations, marches, picketing, sit-ins, with one
thousand, one hundred or ten participants. Moreover, his focus on change highlights negotiation
and renegotiation of state-society relations. To this definition, I follow Lankina and Voznaya’s
recent practice and add an explicit proscription of pro-regime activities. I define protest as antiregime group action only. Youth marches or counter-rallies organized by the ruling United Russia
party would not qualify.
Appropriate temporal and geographic parameters round out the definition. Dependent
variable data must include refined geographical information in order to support sub-national
inquiry. And moreover, dependent and independent variable specifications must coincide. As I
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have argued—in Chapter 3—the Idea of the State theory can only be effectively tested at the subnational level. The body of social movement studies, developed over the last five decades, posits
associations between structural factors and the onset of protest events. Causal mechanisms tied
to grievance, state capacity or social mobilization capacity work to increase or decrease onset
potential in the immediate area. I thus select Russian province as the appropriate geographical
unit. Choosing a temporal unit of analysis is a practical question, rather than a theoretical one.
Following tradition in the social sciences, I select yearly increments. My dependent variable
dataset organizes protest events, events corresponding with McAdam’s definition, into provinceyear categories.
With a working definition in hand, the next step is dependent variable data gathering.
Common data gathering methods in contentious politics studies include participant interviews,
archival research, quasi-experiments, and media event coding (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). The
last method is widely used to build protest databases.

Effective, Efficient Accumulation
Event data coding has become a viable methodology in political science. Previously the
work of human hands, it has increasingly become the purview of machines (Schrodt and Brackle
2013). This transition has advantages and disadvantages. Efficiency, objectivity, and replicability
are counterbalanced by inaccuracy and a lack of transparency. Modern data projects carefully
process newspaper data to produce reliable data. News agencies and activist reporting networks
instantly transmit protest events over even expansive geographic territories, from the west coast
of the United States back to Washington D.C., from the center of Siberia or the eastern steppes
to Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Event data sources leverage such informational flows to further
social science research.
Event data thus represents a logical choice to build my dependent variable database.
Despite advantages discussed below, however, it is inadequate for the case at hand. In order to
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conduct effective studies of Russian protest onset, scholars must break with tradition and seek
alternative sources.
Event data, derived from media accounts, has recently achieved a place in the
methodological canon. As recently as the 1980s, event datasets were rarely used in mainstream
journals (Earl 2004) despite the fact that methodological development began much earlier
(McClelland et al. 1971). Today they are a ubiquitous sight in methods sections. Any
retrospective of collective action studies would be incomplete without mention of media data and
its development over time. Jennifer Earl and her co-authors describe the event data research
tradition as arising to seize “numerous theoretical and methodological opportunities”(2004 65).
Scholars could not test leading contentious politics theories without newspaper accounts of
protest events. Research questions addressing the internal dynamics of social movements or the
calculus of participation often do not require event data. On the other hand, questions addressing
onset (Meier 2008; Chenoweth 2003), repertoires of contention (Tilly, 1979; 1995) tactical
innovation and diffusion (McAdam 1983) all require newspaper data. There is simply no other
suitable source of event data (Franzosi 1987), an insight as true today as it was 30 years ago—at
least for those reluctant to embrace recent attempts to crawl and code social media posts
(Valkanas and Gunopolus 2013). Only methodological innovation in data gathering allowed
scholars to begin to answer many research questions.
Efficiency is the first advantage of event data. Over the last several decades, scholars
have attempted to achieve efficiency in data gathering. Large-scale projects gathered contentious
political event occurrences in Europe (e.g., Koopmans and Rucht 2005), in the United States
(e.g., McAdam and Su 2002), and internationally (e.g., Bond et al. 1997; Jenkins and Bond 2001).
Beginning with early projects, scholars exploited newspaper staff labor to increase the volume
and speed of accumulation (Taylor and Jodice 1986). A single newspaper issue represents the
aggregation of hundreds of observations, filtered through reporters and editors. Editorial staff
identify sources, and filter out unreliable stories. Event data pioneers added another layer to this
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parsing structure. They took available issues of major newspapers and coded events of interest.
Cooperation between academics and journalists later turned explicit. Indexing was an early
attempt to improve coding efficiency, a process by which newspapers would prepare brief
descriptions of article content. Critical research, however, quickly revealed flaws. Indexing
generated data collections that captured neither the total population of events, nor the total
population of relevant articles (Earl 2004). Researchers reverted to the previous method of “daily
newspaper scans” (Ibid.). Even a rapid look through daily issues of a single newspaper, say the
New York Times, is labor intensive. As an alternative, scholars moved to sampling techniques,
replacing daily papers with Monday editions or weekend editions (Kriesi 1995).
As a second advantage, event data achieves the objectivity and replicability desired by
positivist social scientists. Milton Friedman provided the touchstone defense of positivism for a
generation of scholars (1966). Social science research of the highest quality, according to
Friedman, mimicked the natural sciences. Sociologists, like chemists, like physicists, strove to
identify general laws that could explain empirical phenomenon. Only by rigorously testing and retesting hypotheses could researchers begin to make claims about the presence of laws, or lack
thereof. Only by reproducing major findings could social scientists take their results seriously.
Event datasets derived from newspaper data corresponded with the doctrine nicely. Newspaper
articles are static, freely available sources. Critics can replicate scholarship. Collaborators can
expand methods and theories beyond original contexts. Data derived from newspapers thus
facilitate comparisons between contentious political patterns across geography and time
(Koopmans and Rucht 2002). Innovators in data time-space compression have recently
attempted to further the positivist dream. Today, two projects begun in the late 1960’s, the CrossNational Time Series Data Archive (CNTS) and the World Handbook of Political and Social
Indicators, employ automated parsers rather than research assistants (Taylor and Jodice 1986).
Modern event data developments enhance objectivity and replicability. Modern event
databases are populated by automated content-analysis software. Programmers construct
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dictionaries of terms, connected by nested algorithms. Logic chains parse text blocks into data
fields, regarding the location, timing, and characteristics of contentious political events. By
creating links to aggregated newswire feeds, programmers can even create real-time updates to
underlying databases. Several high-profile projects have recently emerged as social scientists
attempt to bring the tools of the internet and computer programming to bear on scholarly work—
with varying degrees of success. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)
and the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) feature in mainstream political science and
international relations journals such as the American Political Science Review, Journal of Peace
Research, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Potential disadvantages are visible in the shift towards increased automation. The fate of
a high-profile project, GDELT, has become something of a cautionary tale in the discipline. Its
creators overstated its utility and perhaps even committed fraud in the process of gathering data
(Spath 2014). Analysts identified twin concerns of accuracy and transparency. Creators defined
the data as recording contentious political event onset. Publicized definitions changed after
scholars identified puzzling discrepancies between GDELT and other sources. The dataset, as it
turned out, recorded reporting about events, rather than onset (Ulfelder 2015).
Currently, leading projects acknowledge these problems. Modern event data projects rest
on a tension between breadth and efficiency, on the one hand, and context specificity and
accuracy on the other. Developers of the Social, Political and Economic Event Database
(SPEED) attempt to harness the advantages of automation, while mitigating the disadvantages.
Housed at the University of Illinois’ Cline Center for Democracy, SPEED features a combination
of machine coding and strategically placed human oversight. Scholars at the Cline Center
strikingly frame the efficiency gains offered by machine coding. Peter Nardulli and Matthew
Hayes estimated that classifying 5.9 million New York Times articles on the basis of civil unrest
content would have taken a single human analyst working 24 hours a day and 365 days a year
over two decades to complete. Once SPEED’s classifier model was fine-tuned, the task was
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completed in a matter of hours. This discrepancy is breathtaking. It is no surprise, then, that
social scientists have hoped to develop event databases—and similarly unsurprising that such
projects continue to receive significant funding from the likes of the government Minerva Initiative
(Shellman, Hatfield, and Mills 2010) and private foundations(Nardulli, Althaus, and Hayes 2015).
The cost of incredible efficiency is accuracy. For instance, unlike computers, humans usually
have little trouble determining which of several named persons any given “she” refers to, or
whether a date refers to the day of a protest or the day of the news report covering a protest. The
SPEED project provides the most satisfying solution to this tension. Nardulli and Hayes describe
their methodology as a “supervised learning system.” In this system, human coders are presented
with input data that have been pre-processed by classification software. Then, humans perform
only the most difficult coding decisions, leaving the simpler work to automated processes.
Methodological innovations have indeed seized an opportunity to spur knowledge
generation in contentious politics; it represents a viable methodological option. Protest event
data, from hand coding, to indexing, to machine coding, and back to the hybrid approach, has
facilitated a number of landmark studies, on European contention (Tilly 1995), California farm
workers (Jenkins and Perrow 1977), the U.S. civil rights movement (McAdam 1982), protest
cycles in Italy (Tarrow 1994), new social movements in Western Europe (Kriesi 1995), and
nationalist protest in the former Soviet republics (Beissinger 2002). The study of protest in Putinera Russia could fit into this tradition.
As the following section will argue, however, reliance on newspaper data renders any
event data source inappropriate; the study of modern Russian protest cannot rely on traditional
media accounts. Even the most sophisticated, reflexive projects like SPEED produce data of
unacceptably poor quality.
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Event Data Flaws
There are many reasons to doubt the adequacy of SPEED or any other large-scale,
machine-coding project. Event data innovators have constructed more and more complex parsing
systems. Each attempt to improve efficient data accumulation introduces error. Newspaper staff
and research assistants built the first generation of event data projects. Both parties represented
a potential source of error. Clumsy reporters or overworked graduate students threated accuracy
of the final product. Automated systems added faulty algorithms to the list. Sociologist Roberto
Franzosi conducted a social history of media-based data in the social sciences. He elaborated
threats associated with data and discussed scholars’ subsequent reactions. The results are
worrying. Franzosi concludes that “social scientists involved in quantitative empirical research
generally are relatively unconcerned with problems of measurement” (1987, 7). Jay Ulfelder,
similarly accused the current cohort of contentious politics scholars of expecting their data to
stream onto virtual desktops free of errors, “like manna raining down from digital heaven” (2015).
Only by outlining and explicitly considering each threat to data viability can scholars avoid
blindly using flawed datasets. Because they rely on newspaper data, older critiques of newspaper
data apply to projects like SPEED. An older literature thus provides a useful set of tools. Scholars
working in the field of media studies developed a theory of “news worthiness” that organizes
potential sources of bias (Lipmann1922; Galtung and Ruge 1965). The distortion effect
jeopardizes the objectivity of any newspaper, journal or website, even those covering high-profile
events like American presidential elections or international military conflicts. Selection bias
threatens to push small-scale events out of papers due to lack of interest. When the subject of
coverage is Russian protest, however, an additional danger arises: lack of translation can prevent
stories from making the move to international news wires. In this section I restrict discussion to
automated event data construction in general. In the following section I move on to challenges
associated with the Russian environment.
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Every news story includes a point of view. Even the most detached rendering of events
includes tone. Even the most bare-bones account is the product of deliberate choices. In a
reflective moment, the Guardian conducted a study on media’s treatment of natural disasters
versus armed conflict. Respondents reported that, as fundraising campaigns reflect, victims of
floods and earthquakes appear more sympathetic than victims of civil war (The Guardian 2014).
Media studies scholars dub this the distortion effect. Between occurrence and reporting all events
pass through a filter. The filter distorts events by attaching elements of style and association. The
degree of distortion is an empirical question, varying on a case by case basis. Contentious
politics scholars must be cognizant of distortion effects. Jennifer Earl, Andrew Martin, and their
colleagues published an overview of media studies work on distortion bias. The scholars
concluded: “newspaper reports are generally accurate in their portrayal of the ‘hard facts’ of the
event” (2004, 67). This optimistic conclusion features an important caveat, however. Even the
hard facts—the who, when and where—are less reliable when news stories implicate authorities.
Worse still, such events, including anti-regime protests, may go unreported (Ibid.).
3

The second major threat to media data is selection bias . Event data managers similarly
strive to minimize selection bias. Walter Lippmann (1922), regarded as the founder of the news
worthiness theory (Earl et al. 2004), counts mainly the characteristics ‘proximity’, ‘surprise’,
‘prominence’ and ‘conflict’ amongst the influencing factors. The theory expects nearby, surprising,
large-scale, violent events to make the news (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Barranco and Wisler
1999).
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Influential individuals, or so the scene goes, begin each morning with a stack of newspapers and a cup of
coffee. According to CNBC Warren Buffett begins his day with a thick stack: the Wall Street Journal, the
Financial Times, The New York Times, USA Today, and even the Omaha World-Herald. Barack Obama
drinks his coffee over The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and the Atlantic
(Crippen 2007). Even the most reputable sources are incomplete. Editorial boards determine the type of
stories that make the cut, a decision shaped by readership and the slate of potential leads appearing on any
given day. The selection of each paper is thus biased. Looking for a more complete picture of world events,
Buffett and Obama expand their scope. Looking for a more complete picture of local events, the two men
turn to sources focusing on Omaha and Washington D.C.
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Since at least the 1970’s sociologists and political scientists have built a large body of
literature, quantifying selection bias, testing Lippmann’s theory. Evidence supports the
expectation that, as event participants increase, so too increases the likelihood of reporting
(McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996). Other factors militating against selection bias include
sponsorship by an organization connected to media (Ryan 2010) and the presence of well-known
actors (Snyder and Kelly 1977). In line with expectations, the presence of violence increases
likelihood of reporting (Oliver and Myers 1999). Evidence has also supported the proximity
dimension of Lippman’s theory. Over the period 1968-1969 The New York Times was thirty times
more likely to report events occurring in New York City compared to those occurring elsewhere in
the United States (Myers and Caniglia 2004). And in general the distance between media
headquarters and the protest site reduces reporting frequency, as does rural location (Ibid.).
Contentious politics scholars must acknowledge risks associated with newspaper data.
Any event dataset built on top of newspaper feeds will reflect the distortion effect and selection
bias. If proximate, surprising, prominent, violent events are overrepresented in the pages of the
New York Times and other papers, such events will be overrepresented in event databases as
well. Small-scale, non-violent protest events, occurring outside of urban centers fail Lippman’s
news worthiness test across the board. Working under the assumptions of news worthiness
theory, and given empirical testing from sociology and political science, it is unreasonable to
expect newspaper data to serve as an adequate base for sub-national protest data.
Not surprisingly, critics have repeatedly deemed media data unsuitable for contentious
politics research. Mainstream media have failed to overcome the threats of distortion, selection
bias, and translation. In 1996, John McCarthy, Clark McPhail, and Jackie Smith systematically
compared newspaper accounts of protest against police accounts. McCarthy and his co-authors
concluded that only a small portion of protests receive even cursory mention in mainstream
media. The group further reported unstable selection bias across news sources. No major United
States source reported more than a fraction of events, and the fraction captured in The New York
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Times and The Washington Post differed (1996). The majority of American protests failed to
make the news, even when the events occurred in the seat of government, in Washington D.C.
(Mueller 1997b). Across the country, scholars identified specific correlates of bias, including race.
American papers tend to ignore riots in cities that have higher percentages of whites in the
population (Myers and Caniglia 2004). Underreporting held in other contexts, including in East
Germany, where protests only began receiving coverage when the number of participants
surpassed the 10,000 threshold (Mueller 1997a). Numerous studies have demonstrated the
pitfalls of treating contentious politics data like “manna falling from digital heaven” (e.g., Barranco
and Wisler 1999; Koopmans 1999; Mueller 1997a, 1997b; Maney and Oliver 2001; Koopmans
and Rucht 2002; Myers and Caniglia 2004). American-based contentious politics scholars face an
additional challenge. Large-scale news aggregation feeds include translated stories from
international sources. The transition from original language to English erects another hurdle. Only
a fraction of foreign language stories ever make the transition to English (Ortiz et al. 2005;
Lankina and Voznaya 2015).
A recently study exposes the problems associated with, specifically, non-English
language source data. In 2011, Mark Herkenrath and Alex Knoll designed a test of newspaper
protest data. They selected a small group of countries, used an alternative source to compile
event data, and then compared the findings against LexisNexis archives, a searchable database
of major news articles. The study focused on events in Mexico, Argentina, and Paraguay in 2006.
The alternate data sources, Observatorio Social de America Latina, culls data from local news
outlets, as wells as activists themselves. Large-scale, international projects draw on Englishlanguage translations of events, overlapping with archives such as LexisNexis. The two authors
employed logistic regression to construct a profile for omitted events. Results were striking: in the
three Latin American countries surveyed, in 2006, roughly one twentieth of all protest events
make it to the international news. Herkenrath and Knoll concluded that such data sources should
be used rarely, if ever. Such dramatic results lead inevitably to the conclusion that newspaper
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data may not meet acceptable standards for event analysis, that the data can distort findings and
misguide theorizing (2011, 22).
Not all critics share Herkenrath and Knoll’s dismissal of newspaper data, however.
Scholars working with English-language sources often include an optimistic note in otherwise
critical articles (Mueller 1997b; Barranco and Wisler 1999; Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Schrodt
and Brackle 2013). Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule’s review article, published in the Annual
Review of Sociology in 2004, serves as a representative example. The authors spend pages and
pages elaborating sources of media bias, and recapitulating critical empirical work. In the
conclusion however, pragmatism seems to triumph over caution. Earl and colleagues note that,
for many research designs, newspapers “remain the only source of data on protest” (2004: 71).
The group falls victim to a familiar pitfall. They argue that, precisely because of the news
worthiness effect, newspapers are unlikely to omit important protests. Failing to consider the
political nature of problem definition, the sociologists fail to question the definition of “important.”
Others acknowledge newspaper reporting bias, but argue that biases are constant over time.
McCarthy et al. (1996: 496) argued that American media “provides an amazingly stable portrait of
the churning mixture of protest forms, purposes, and contexts in Washington D.C. during1982
and 1991”—a finding that has repeatedly come under attack (Oliver and Myers 1999; Myers and
Caniglia, 2004). Exploring the biases of newspaper data remains a valuable academic enterprise.
Given media studies theoretical work, and given the strength of empirical work, mainstream media appears a poor source of protest data—in any polity. This section has presented
critique leveraged against automated content analysis in general. The following section will focus
on challenges related to the Russian environment in particular. Each source of bias enumerated
in Lippman’s news worthiness theory, when applied to the Russian case, further sharpens threats
to data collection. Furthermore, the illiberal nature of the Russian press introduces sources of
distortion not considered in the original model. These theoretical concerns are strong enough to
preclude newspaper data for my project. My research question and motivation simple cannot
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justify such problematic data. Must the inadequate become the standard because “that’s all there
is?” This resigned approach seems to undergird the efforts of major event data projects such as
SPEED. There exists an alternative. Like Herkenrath and Knoll, I choose to jettison mainstream
media for alternative sources, those operating outside of government oversight, often in the
murky realm of the internet. In the following section I shift attention to activist-based data sources.
In the penultimate section I will use Lipmann’s theory to quantify the expected selection bias visà-vis Russia protest coverage. In the Russian context, Earl and her colleagues’ conclusion that
important events seldom fail to make the news appears baffling and misguided. Putin’s regime
censors media precisely because events are considered important.

The Russian Environment
Even in environments characterized by vibrant, liberal press, newspapers are a
problematic source for contentious politics data. As I shall discuss in detail below, the situation in
a country like Russia is much, much bleaker.
Classic and more recent media studies models predict high levels of bias in Russia. The
news worthiness model expects geographical distance and event size to increase selection bias.
The physical distance between the location of the event and news headquarters shapes the
probability reporting (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Almeida and Lichbach 2003; Myers and Caniglia
2004). The expansive Russian continent poses a serious challenge for comprehensive news
coverage. Secondly, media coverage is most likely when protests are characterized by a large
number of participants. In Russia large-scale rallies are illegal without express government
permission (Gelman 2010). David Ortiz, Daniel Meyers, Eugene Walls, and Maria-Elena Diaz
expanded Lippmann’s (1922) original theory. Their “media process model” describes selection
bias as a function of audience demand and media supply (2005). When readers fail to show
interest, events fail to appear in even local publications. It is difficult to judge the degree to which
the Russian population demands information regarding anti-regime protests. Public opinion polls,
conducted by the Levada research center, place interest in dissident actions at a fluctuating level
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(Russian Times 2014, Moscow Times 2015). However, it is certain that media supply represents
a significant source of bias. The updated model sees economic and political environments
shaping the content that the media is willing and able to provide. For the last several years, the
Russian economy has faced stagnation and recession. News agencies, like all businesses, would
be forced to trim costs, leading to less coverage over the Russian continent. The political context
represents a more significant source of bias. The Russian media has been historically unable to
operate independent of the governing regime.
Political leaders closely monitor and shape media supply in Russia. Vladimir Putin has
successfully dismantled independent media. The Russian government has used mainstream
media as a tool for decades. Literary journal and news outlet, Snob, established in 2008 by
Vladimir Yakovleva, describes the current media censorship as a return to old practices. The
1996 presidential election in Russia, considered the last—or alternatively the first and last—
competitive election in the country’s history, captured public attention for months. In the preelection days citizens found a newspaper waiting in their mailbox, despite the fact that they were
not subscribers. The paper was printed in full color and on high quality paper, despite the fact that
such materials were luxuries in the early days of the Russian Federation. The mysterious issue
was a gift from the sitting president. Incumbent Boris Yeltsin faced faltering support. His response
to a hostage situation in Chechnya failed to impress. His economic policy failed to pull the
economy out of recession and failed to end the distribution of promissory notes in lieu of salaries.
Communist candidate Gennady Zyuganov and his party were confident they could seize the
presidency. Today the communists’ KPRF party is a minor member of government at best. In the
early 1990’s however, the party retained millions of loyal supporters. A wide base, coupled with
Yeltsin’s abysmal approval ratings, presaged change. The unexpected journalistic gift was a
preventative measure. Titled, God Forbid!, the flashy newspaper contained “a weekly dose of
anti-communistic propaganda”(Vasiliev 2017). Readers were treated to condemnations of
Zyuganov’s political positions, ad hominem attacks, cartoons. The God Forbid crossword contest
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encapsulates Yeltsin’s strategy. Clues attacked political opposition, and the winner of the
competition received a vacation package to the Czech Republic (Ibid.). Yeltsin ended up winning
reelection with 54% of the vote.
In 2011 God Forbid! returned. Again, the magazine served to support an embattled
Russian president, Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor Vladimir Putin. The second incarnation of the
propaganda vehicle denounced the protestors taking part in the mass protests of 2011-2012. The
impact was muted. As Snob writes, “political discussion had left print media for the internet”
(Ibid.). In my search for appropriate dependent variable data I follow the shift, to the internet, to
non-traditional sources of event data.

Activist Sources
The Russian environment is completely unconducive to traditional event data gathering.
Is there a better alternative? Is there any alternative at all? Jack London is reputed to have said
“life is not always a matter of holding good cards, but sometimes, playing a poor hand well”
(Millman 2004). Fortunately, social scientists interested in studying protests and other contentious
events do, in fact, have other cards at their disposal. Activists themselves often keep records of
their activities, and the activities of others. Treated with a skeptical eye, activist sources can
become a viable alternative to newspaper data.
Activist content, appearing in print and digital media, takes a number of forms. Some
collectives focus exclusively on journalism, providing a digital home for news stories, eye-witness
accounts and videos. For instance, change-links.org is the digital form of a Los Angeles area
community newsletter. Content includes stories that touch on current national and international
events, as well as opinion pieces, and even book and film reviews. All pieces are written from the
point of view of the progressive, non-violent activist. There are no direct calls to action or meeting
announcements on the website. Others use their web presence as an organizational tool,
attracting participants, scheduling rallies, and generally building public influence. The Ruckus
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Society, host of ruckus.org, describes itself as a “toolbox of experience, training and skills.”
Through the website, consumers can book classroom instruction or live roleplaying scenarios
directed towards building non-violent action competency. The site even includes a bird-dogging
instruction manual. Pushing the boundaries between contentious and mainstream politics, birddoggers attend public events and pressure elected officials to change their stance on important
issues. Other activist-based web sources combine elements of the two archetypes: their missions
consist of both journalistic and organizational elements. As one example, elksoft.com publishes
news content as well as calls to action. Site organizers employ the combined approach to further
their goals, a cessation of logging in the redwood forest region of the United States. The site
includes upcoming gathering announcements, boycott instructions, and news briefs regarding
political and commercial action in the area. The three examples mentioned here give a glimpse
into the set of English-language based activist media sources, a small population of at around
twenty sources (Almeida and Lichbach 2003).
Activist websites and newsletters correct the sources of bias identified in Lippman’s news
worthiness model. News agencies provide information about Los Angeles area events, national
politics, and deforestation in the United States. Members of change-links, the Ruckus Society and
elksoft, however, refuse to accept the distortion effect and selection bias inherent in mainstream
sources. Instead of accepting journalists’ point of view, activists create their own. Instead of
journalists determining just what constitutes an important story, activists take selection into their
own hands. International activist organizations even attempt to correct the translation bias. One
particularly interesting example arose during the Egyptian Arab Spring. Launched in early 2011,
Tahrir Documents is a collaborative effort to archive and translate activist papers from the
Egyptian uprising and its aftermath. Volunteers collect materials from demonstrations in Cairo’s
Tahrir Square and then publish complete English translation alongside scans of the original
documents. The project is not affiliated with any government organization, Egyptian or otherwise.
I sat down with founding member Elias Saba to discuss the initiative. Saba, a doctoral candidate
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in the Near Eastern Studies department at the University of Pennsylvania, felt a responsibility to
chronicle these contentious events. Otherwise no record would appear in local news sources in
Arabic, much less in international sources in English. By inserting themselves into the news
generation process, the Tahrir documents team generates data that would otherwise not exist.
Contentious politics scholars who rely on mainstream newspaper data are indeed playing
with a lousy hand. Even local news sources often miss the occurrence of contentious events (Earl
et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005; Chenoweth 2010). And, as scholarship has shown, as the purview of
news organizations expands, the number of omitted cases rises. Reuters international newsfeed
missed major contentious African events captured in two local sources: the African Research
Bulletin and the Zimbabwe Herald (Sommer and Scarritt 1999). These findings extend to
Palestine and Germany, where local sources are again more reliable than international news wire
services (Gerner et al. 1994). Alternative news sources, activist-generated and otherwise, reduce
scholars’ reliance on flawed reporting. Police agencies can supplement incomplete reporting from
local news sources (Maney and Oliver 2001). Eye witness accounts and official state reports
provide another option (Day, Pinckney, and Chenoweth 2015). Activist organizations, however,
like change-links.org, elksoft.com, or Tahrir documents, offer perhaps the most comprehensive,
easily-accessible alternative data source (Ortiz et al. 2005).
Evidence suggests that activists can effectively produce a parallel chronicle of
contentious events. Paul Almeida and Mark Lichbach tested the discrepancy between
mainstream media and activist sources by focusing on a single contentious campaign, the socalled Battle of Seattle, a series of protests held in response to negotiations in the World Trade
Organization headquarters, spanning November and December of 1999. The primary battle saw
tens of thousands of protesters cause the closure Seattle’s retail district, millions of dollars in
property damage, and eventually, the failure of trade negotiations. Outside of the battleground
dozens of parallel protests occurred through the United States, and in other countries. Almeida
and Lichbach created a master list of news sources, from local outlets like The Seattle Times, to
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the national New York Times, to the international aggregators Global Newsbank and LexisNexis.
The alternative, activist-driven sources took the form of three websites, identified by the authors.
Careful comparison led the authors to the conclusion that, “activist websites have a much lower
threshold for reporting transnational protest events at the local, national, and international level”
(2003: 267). And furthermore, not all activist sites are equally effective chronicles. The authors
found that the most useful activist websites were those that focus primarily on news information
and reporting. Patterns of omission in mainstream coverage, selection bias, support Lippman’s
model. Large, urban events characterized by violence were most likely to appear in major
newspapers.
It is important to address the possible drawbacks to activist-generate news accounts.
Perhaps the most significant drawback concerns data reliability. Data generation, data collection,
is always a political process. Activists record contentious events in a conscious effort to effect the
political environment in which they operate, in an effort to achieve their goals. These actors,
naturally, have incentive to over-represent or plainly fabricate events. The only solution to validity
issues is triangulation. Scholars argue that media coverage may provide a means to crosscheck
activist-based reports (Franzosi 1987; Mueller 1997b; Sommer and Scarritt 1999; Oliver and
Myers 1999). This technique can only provide limited validation.
The second major concern regards temporal availability. Parallel chronicles of the 1999
Battle of Seattle, the Arab Spring, or the 2013 anti-election protests in Moscow and Saint
Petersburg all occupy space on the internet. Despite its ubiquity in modern life, the internet is a
relatively new technology. Department of Defense technicians added TCP/IP protocol to Arpanet
in the early 1980s. It was not until the late 1980s that civilians gained access to the
technology(Ryan 2010). Some data sources—Tahrir Documents, for example—contain digitalized
version of paper documents. Such sites could house primary documents with provenance dating
from the 1980s and even earlier. However, the lack of the internet as an aggregation and
dissemination medium in previous periods reduces the likelihood. For these reasons all of the
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activist-based data sources that I have encountered cover events beginning in the mid-1990s or
later.
Concerns notwithstanding, activist data is the only promising source of contentious
politics data in the Russian case. Traditional media would be a very poor source for my
dependent variable. Both Lippmann’s (1922) news worthiness model and Ortiz et al.’s media
process model predict insurmountable obstacles for traditional event data collection. General
restrictions to press freedom, massive geographic scale, and active informational suppression
tactics, as seen in the recent Don’t Call Him Dimon protests, render traditional methods
inadequate. Small-scale events are often not covered in national or international media. The
events I wish to study are often small. Geographic distances introduce bias. Russia is the largest
landmass on earth. And most importantly, the Putin regime has dismantled independent media
outlets, enforced strict anti-assembly laws, and is in the process of deeming protest coverage “a
terrorist or extremist act” (Gessen 2013).

March of the Discontents
In order to cross the second perilous span, between definition and operationalization, I
choose to depart from common event-data gathering practices. Despite significant selection bias
and underreporting, most contentious politics datasets rely on mainstream news sources
(Herkenrath and Knoll 2011; Day, Pinckney and Chenoweth 2016). Drawing inspiration from
Almeida and Lichbach, Ortiz and others, I turn to activist-based news sources operating in the
fraught Russian political environment. Two promising options are available, each of which has
received scholarly attention. Though the collective action institute and namarsh are both
promising, the latter is a superior source of sub-national Russian protest data.
First, namarsh.ru is a web-collective, founded in 2006, dedicated to promoting awareness
of dissident activity across Russia. Site organizers include a social movement founded by Gary
Kasparov, the United Civilian Front (Объединённый гражданский фронт (ОГФ)). Membership in
131

the movement is connected to the broader collective action group Another Russia (Другая
Россия), and smaller offshoots Solidarity and Charter 31. The United Civilian Front has
attempted to alter the course of politics, first through conventional means, supporting Kasparov’s
presidential campaign, and thereafter through non-traditional channels, organizing numerous
protests. The namarsh website proudly displays a banner announcement: “the server works
without Kremlin censorship.”
The second source is a similar activist web presence, organized by a different group.
The collective action institute (коллективное действие) is a group of sociologists and activists
dedicated to progressive politics. The group’s manifesto espouses support for socio-economic
equality, transparent elections, and labor reform. This range of causes forged a connection
between various strands of civil society, between leftists, professional unions, ecological activists,
and youth groups. In today’s Russia, membership in such an organization entails professional
and even legal risk. Nevertheless, ikd.ru, the central website, includes a list of founders, all of
whom work as professors, either in political science or sociology departments. These individuals
believe that social rights and solidarity are “not empty words and abstract phrases, but values that
must be brought to life”. Through free information exchange, the founders hope to accomplish
their goals. And by leveraging this information, I hope to adequately operationalize my dependent
variable.
Namarsh.ru, like the redwood forest conservation activists at elksoft.com, includes both
logistical and media resources. The site consists of sections titled dissident march, agitation,
general protest in Russia, and eye-witness accounts. Dissident march (марш несогласных) is
the title of a campaign waged by the website organizers. The movement began with street
protests in 2005, in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and around the country. Protestors called for an
end to United Russia’s reign. Rallying cries of “Russia without Putin” began at this time and
remain a standard of liberal protest marches. The agitation section includes advice for gathering
supporters and carrying out successful campaigns. The two remaining sections serve a
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journalistic function. Under general protest appear news reports culled from Gary Kasparov’s
independent media project. Banned in Russia as “extremist propaganda,” Kasparov.ru is an
“independent socio-political information-analysis web publication.” The chess-master turned
politician organizes a network of regional correspondents to generate a counter narrative,
providing coverage of contentious events, and opinion pieces addressing local and national
Russian politics. Namarsh.ru culls only protest stories from the site, a collection representing a
fraction of overall content. The final section, eye-witness accounts, is original material, gathered
by individual contributors working across the country.
The collective action institute’s website offers similar content. Ikd.ru includes resources
for would-be organizers, as well as news stories. The organizational sections of the two sites are
very similar. The collective action institute includes announcements and overviews of sponsored
events. Under a news-wire section, ikd.ru organizes stories describing protest events. Unlike
namarsh.ru, however, the site’s digital archive includes non-protest topics, the release of protestinspired music, or a local election, for example. Each story is written by a contributing author, a
member of the collective action institute.
Each of the websites is a potentially useful resource for scholars of Russian contentious
politics. Indeed, a small group of scholars, Graeme Robertson, Tomila Lankina, and Alisa
Voznaya, have recently employed the activist sources to circumvent the severe biases described
above. Practicalities of research drove the scholars to work exclusively with either ikd.ru
(Robertson) or namarsh.ru (Lankina and Voznaya). Working with an alternative news source
eliminates, or at least mitigates, the numerous biases associated with newspaper data.
Unfortunately, the two sources overlap only partially: events captured by Kasparov’s group are
not always captured by the collective action institute and vice versa. It is important to note then,
that Robertson, Lankina, and Voznaya do not overcome reporting bias entirely, a common
sacrifice to the “economics of research” (Dasgupta and Maskin 1987). Practical constraints force
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me to follow their decision. With limited time, with limited resources, I am forced to choose one of
the two sources, rather than merging the two into a master list.
Gary Kasparov’s namarsh.ru is superior for three reasons. First, and indeed foremost, is
data coverage. Ikd.ru has dramatically decreased its output of news coverage over the last
several years. At the time of writing, in August, 2016, the collective action institute published only
seven articles for the entire year. Over the same period of time, activists working at namarsh.ru
published over 200 web articles. Political pressure may be responsible for the decline in material
on ikd.ru. Stanslav Markelov, human rights lawyer, liberal activist, and founding member of the
institute was murdered in Moscow in 2009, in the middle of a busy street, in broad daylight
(Harding 2009). The second reason concerns broader media integration. Stories appearing on
namarsh.ru frequently include links to related stories appearing in mainstream, state-supported
publications, as well as other independent sources. For example, accounts of wage protests may
include mention of Ria News articles on declining economic conditions. Such cross-references
are less frequent on the collective action institute site. Thirdly, Lankina and Voznaya’s existing
work serves as a solid foundation on which to build. The pair provides clear coding
documentation, and their data is easily accessible in convenient format. The same cannot be said
of Robertson’s work. For these three reasons, I selected to work with, and augment, the Lankina
and Voznaya protest dataset.
With an activist data source identified, the problem of data reliability remains. Research
on media bias has determined that, while event details and descriptions are often distorted,
journalists consistently get the core of a descriptive story “right” (Earl et al. 2004). No
corresponding research that I know of has addressed activist-based news sources. Major news
organizations construct layers of quality control to vet stories. A widespread readership creates a
second layer of validation. Activist-based news sources do not enjoy either check to content
validation. And furthermore, the political nature of underground journalism creates incentives for
dissimulation. Lankina and Voznaya write that “namarsh.ru is maintained by opposition groups in
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Russia and is thus potentially subject to some degree of bias in its reporting of protest events”
(2015, 23).
What is to be done? Moving away from commonly-used newspaper-based data sources
improves the researchers’ “hand of cards,” so to say. But is this the point at which scholars must
play with the cards, flaws and all? I believe it is time to play the game. It will never be possible to
have complete confidence in the quality of activist-generated data. It is clearly impossible to
validate the veracity of each article on namarsh.ru, ikd.ru, or on any other analogous site. And
furthermore, working with my definition of protest, a definition that includes very small-scale
events, it will never be possible to capture every event; even the most thoroughly vetted
dependent variable dataset will be a partial reflection of reality. There are two methods, however,
that at least begin to address reporting bias.
The first option is cross-discipline triangulation. Lankina and Voznaya note that regions
ranked as having comparatively high levels of civil society activism in previous studies also
appear among the most actively protesting regions according to namarsh.ru (Lankina and
Voznaya 2015). Democracy scholars have followed the trajectory of contentious politics and
begun to build a body of sub-national literature. Kelly McMann and Nikolai Petrov, an American
political scientist and a Russian geographer, used a survey tool to quantify provincial levels of
democracy in the Russian Federation. In their work, McMann and Petrov gathered data on noninstitutional political participation, including protests. Using this limited corroborative data,
namarsh.ru data corresponds with public opinion polls. Areas in which respondents express
interest in protest participation exhibit relatively high protest frequencies (Ibid.).
The presence of two disparate datasets creates another opportunity for cross validation.
Should the namarsh.ru data confirm general trends that Robertson found when employing ikd.ru
data, it would validate both datasets. Lankina and Voznaya conduct a very brief—puzzlingly
brief—comparison of the two datasets. The two authors note that both sets present increasing
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protest concentration in Moscow, particularly over the last two years, 2011–2012. The
comparison begins and ends here. I conducted my own attempt at cross validation. The
differences were significant. The collective action institute data, gathered by Robertson, produces
consistently higher protest frequencies than namarsh.ru, over the period 2007-2011.
Discrepancies range from a low of 267 in 2011, to 451 additional events in 2010. Many of the
additional cases appear in the two capital cities. Still, considering only additional events recorded
in other regions, the increase is significant: around 100 cases each year.
What explains the disparity between the collective action institute and namarsh datasets?
I hand-coded every article appearing on the two websites over a two-week period, chosen at
random, for a glimpse into reporting discrepancy. Namarsh.ru published thirty five articles,
compared with seventy five on ikd.ru. These 110 articles produced a common pool of thirteen
protest events, with each site reporting an additional, unique set. Contributors to namarsh.ru
reported ten events not reported in ikd.ru, and contributors to ikd.ru reported fifteen unique
events. I was not able to identify any common characteristic among unique articles. It appears
that the two networks simply catch different events, and further, that the collective action
institute’s network is larger. Another potential explanation regards methodology. Robinson does
not include coding decision details in any of his publications. He does not mention whether or not
his dataset includes pro-regime demonstrations. Divergent coding rules could partially account for
greater frequency counts. With more time and resources I would like to systematically study the
discrepancies between the two sources.
It is clear that both datasets are incomplete. Neither source provides a complete picture
of protest in modern Russia. Despite the lack of overlap, Voznaya and Lankina are satisfied that
namarsh.ru “data provide a reasonably accurate portrait of the general temporal and spatial
trends in protest activism” (2015: 43). There is thus expert opinion on the side of the activist data
source. Still, I would stress that only additional research can quantify the gap between protest
activity and reported events. Even with unlimited time and ample resources it would likely be
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impossible to eliminate the gap altogether. This is an important epistemological admission, an
admission that the ability to generate knowledge in the area of protest event onset will always
remain, at best, incomplete.
I do share some of Voznaya and Lankina’s optimism, however. The partial overlap in
events, revealed during my brief exercise, provide a preliminary data validity check. It does not
appear that the activists are inventing events to report. Rough similarity in overall frequency
counts provides further weak corroborative evidence. Discrepancies of around 200 cases per
year are much smaller than the discrepancies between activist sources and large-scale
automated programs—as discussed below. No single data source can create a perfect reflection
of reality. Incomplete data can still be useful, fortunately. To conduct statistical testing scholars
must eliminate “systematic bias” that shape reporting frequencies in certain areas (Little 1992). If
omitted cases are randomly distributed, if observed patterns approximated patterns in reality, the
dataset will not produce spurious conclusion. Social mobilization capacity represents a possible
source of systemic bias. Where communication networks are thin, where chances for interpersonal communication are limited, namrsh.ru contributions could systematically fall. By
recognizing and framing potential systematic bias, incomplete data can serve as a basis for
correlational analysis. The incomplete nature of dependent variable data only strengthens the
imperative, inherent in all social science research (Brady and Collier 2010), to supplement
correlational analysis with a qualitative process tracing exercise.

The Coding Decision
After choosing to augment the existing namarsh.ru dataset, a major methodological
decision arises. Despite the allure of machine coding, hand coding is the best way to gather subnational protest event data. My experience demonstrates the superiority of the human approach.
This section presents a data vetting exercise, which exposes the relative shortcomings of leading
automated projects, validating predictions from news worthiness theory.
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To reiterate, automation is much, much more efficient than hand coding. Large-scale
international event-data generation projects employ machine coding to benefit from returns to
scale. Machine coding increases speed by a breathtaking margin. Automated coding processes
like GDELT or SPEED process millions of articles, from thousands of news sources. Coders take
advantage of the relatively constant format of major news articles. A flexible template can parse
headlines from the New York Times, El Monde, or RIA Novost with relative ease. Country-specific
event collections, often the product of activist-based news sources, are the product of handcoding. This is not a coincidence. Generally country or area specialists focus on a small,
contained are of the world, a small, contained set of contentious political events. The efficiency
gains won through automated coding decline sharply with the number of cases at hand. Instead,
scholars and their teams of research assistants read articles and code using the oldest
processor, the human brain. The labor-intensive research variant requires no template.
Researchers are not even aware of varying html tagging structures or spacing patterns.
The best approach would combine human and machine strengths. Merging the sheer
power and efficiency of the machine, with the local source and language knowledge of the
human, this combination could vastly improve the accumulation of research on contentious
politics. The TABARI program can code 26-million articles in 6 minutes (Schrodt and Van Brackle
2013). Russia specialists have a lifetime of contextual knowledge. Can the two advantages align?
The coding choice cuts along the fraught quantitative-qualitative boundary in the social
sciences. Debates on the topic usually concern the centrality of statistical methods and their
epistemological foundations (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Brady and Collier 2010). Just as
important to the quantitative toolkit, however, are computer programing skills, especially when
directed towards data management, collection, and analysis. Programming avoids the ubiquitous
discussions of r-squared values and causality. But like more traditional quantitative
methodological tools, programming brings up the question of academic training. The split is not
an artificial talking point. It touches on academic identity. It touches on hiring and promotion
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decisions—it is “incontestable that quantitative training makes scholars more productive, as
measured by articles per year, than qualitative workers” (King, 2011). If a question of training
accessibility separates the two sides, computer programming creates an even deeper rift. Gary
King lamented the state of quantitative education. He saw universities offering an array of
mathematical and statistical courses. Programming did not make the list.
4

For this set of content, an error rate of 20-25% is unacceptable . The total source set
consisted of thousands of articles, not millions. The unquantifiable bias of missed reporting is
unavoidable. Knowingly embracing a second source of bias was, in my view, unjustifiable. Aside

4

Leveraging coding skill and contextual knowledge, and relying on Phil Schrodt’s Open Data Alliance for
guidance, I created an automated data gathering program. Written in Python, the program logged onto the
protest events section of namarsh.ru, sequentially accessed each article, and stored each one on a harddrive. Python Natural Language Processing Toolkit (NLTK), configured for Cyrillic, processed each article,
one word at a time, and pulled out important information. Each article became a data record, holding the
location, date, and type of protest event. Lankina and Voznaya’s existing dataset served as a useful
sounding board. An automated run of a single year’s worth of Russian protest events produced a set of over
1,200 articles.
The margin of error between computer- and hand-coded results was acceptable for the quantitative
methodologist, unacceptable to the qualitative methodologist. After a lengthy dialectic process, of calibration,
evaluation, recalibration, and reevaluation, the success rate eventually rose to 80-85% for the trial year. This
figure compares favorably with large-scale coding programs. For example, the Open Data Alliance’s
TABARI system marks success at 80%, in an accuracy contest horserace against the Department of
Defense’s Integrated Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS) (Schrodt and Brackle 2013). Lockheed Martin
has employed TABARI as an institutional resource. The defense contractor conducted a number of accuracy
tests. Initial results were disappointing, clocking in at 58%. A concerted effort to improve the results,
consisting of enhancing coding dictionaries, achieved an overall precision level of 75% with a 3% confidence
interval (Ibid.). Human coders are themselves far from perfect. Scholars have devised projects that quantify
the degree of inter-coder reliability, or the ability of coders to match a set of rules. Surprisingly, a reliability
test, for the Comparative Manifestos Project, reported correspondence is less than half of cases, and for
some indicators correspondence drops as low as 25% (Gemenis 2013). This is an extreme case, but the
point holds: human coders are fallible. Concerns around research assistant training and inter-coder
variability do not apply to my small-scale project. Even working against my own coding rules, however, it is
naïve to think that I would match Voznaya and Lankina’s data with 100% accuracy. Schrodt notes that
machine coding has crossed the threshold into utility, but “remains a work in progress” (Schrodt, Beieler,
and Mark 2014). Lauding an error rate of between 20 and 30% may seem surprising. Surprise dissipates
when considering the scale of material. Indeed, the scale is so striking it warrants one last example. Schrodt
describes the arithmetic as follows: six minutes of automated coding compares with 500,000 labor-hours of
manual coding, probably costing on the order of $10 million when labor and administrative costs are taken
into account (Ibid.).
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from error, hand-coding offered a second significant benefit. Reading through thousands of
articles gives the reader access to rich, contextual detail. Aside from specified details, automated
coding obscures general processes at play. Hand-coding allowed me to develop a feel for
Russian protest events and offered material for a qualitative exercise. Lankina and Voznaya’s
(2015) dataset includes coverage for five years, 2007-2012, coded from reports published on
Kasparov’s namarsh.ru. I hand-coded roughly 1000 source articles, translating from Russian to
English, noting the most refined geographical information available, along with the date and
reason for protest. Following my working definition of protest, the dataset includes anti-regime
events of any size.
A comparative exercise demonstrates the utility of the updated Lankina and Voznaya
dataset. Such an exercise contributes to media studies and contentious political studies alike.
Like Lichbach and Almeida’s work, the exercise systematically compared reporting of
transnational protest in activist-based web sources to the coverage in conventional media
sources. Comparisons of this nature quantify the difference between mainstream and alternative
event data sources. This particular comparison provides a look at coverage provided by two
major projects. Scholars have uncovered serious flaws with the GDELT program (Spath 2014).
Even critics of past event data projects have lauded SPEED, a mixed-method event data
aggregation project, one that has the highest likelihood of avoiding major pitfalls associated with
automation (Ulfelder 2015). Scholars still use mainstream news sources, many of which featured
automated parsing (Day, Pinckney, and Chenoweth 2015). This brief comparison can support, or
challenge, the practice. The results were startling. GDELT and SPEED both performed terribly.
This simple exercise indicates that both projects are completely inappropriate sources of
contentious politics event data.
Even before beginning the data gathering phase, GDELT appeared to be an unreliable
data source. In light of this data validation exercise, the decision was well justified. I compared
GDELT data against my updated Lankina and Voznaya data for the years 2007 to 2013. At first
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glance, the two sources differ dramatically. The automated coding program reports 10,000 more
events over the six-year period. One of the two has to be incorrect, and badly. Brief analysis
revealed major problems with GDELT’s Russian protest data.
A brief presentation elucidates the problems facing large scale web-scraping and coding
projects. False positives in the GDELT database immediately called to mind problems that arose
in the development of my Russian-language coding algorithm. An event dataset should include
one record for each event of interest. Newspapers, however, may include several mentions of
planned events, before the fact, articles describing the event itself, and often, a set of articles
discussing the event after the fact. Trimming articles surrounding the central event is an important
error correction technique. This represents a problem for the automated database. An article
describing a planned protest march in Moscow is recorded as the event itself (Sputnik News
2010). The Greenpeace protest aboard Artic Sunrise spawned several follow-up articles,
incorrectly appearing as protests (BBC 2013). The GDELT database even includes a protest
event tied to an interview with an Australian protester after he had returned home (Nelson Mail
2013) The incarceration and trial of Pussy Riot, the art collective responsible for several highprofile acts of civil disobedience, offers another example of erroneous article proliferation. Over
the course of the women’s time in prison, protest events were incorrectly generated by articles
discussing court proceedings, demands, and eventual amnesty (The Guardian 2012, Jobs&Hire
2013). Perhaps the most colorful example of failed coding algorithm came from an article titled
“Putin: On Top Of the World.” According to the author, an opinion piece writer for Dawn, a
Pakistani political weekly, Putin was enjoying the apogee of his powers, despite recent protests in
Moscow. The fact that this op-ed became a protest event after flowing through the coding pipeline
highlights the extent of GDELT’s problem.
Where GDELT’s failure was overreporting, SPEED’s failure was dramatic underreporting.
The SPEED team at the University of Illinois currently makes available only a small subset of
data. I was able to access Russian data for years 1998 and 1999. Unfortunately, corresponding
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years are not available from the updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset. Robertson’s ikd.ru
dataset thus offers basis for comparison. SPEED reports dramatically lower frequencies across
these two years. In 1999 the total frequency is 117 compared to Robertson’s value of 800. Even
more striking is the comparison for the last year of Putin’s first term, 1998. Robertson’s value,
over 1,300, dwarfs the ten events reported by SPEED. The source column reveals the source of
discrepancy. Each of the records appearing in the civil unrest database originated with an article
in the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal. These results are all the more striking because
the SPEED campaign includes a range of event-types, only a portion of which correspond with
the definition of protest used here. Border incidents, assassinations, public executions, and
kidnappings or hostage situations appear in the automated database. Even with an expanded
definition, SPEED’s reliance on mainstream, English-language news sources leads to extreme
selection bias.

Ideas for Further Study
This chapter echoes earlier claims regarding newspaper data reliability, while making
novel claims about automated data projects. Consensus holds that researchers should carefully
approach the biases inherent in newspaper data (Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005; Ulfelder
2013). Still, mainstream newspaper sources are widely used in the field (Almeida and Lichbach
2003; Day, Pinckney, and Chenoweth 2015). This chapter suggests that, at least in the Russian
case, scholars cannot use mainstream news sources to build representative contentious politics
event datasets. I have presented an argument for activist-generated event data sources as a
viable alternative. Furthermore, in my experience, hand-coding was more appealing than
automation, given a relatively small number of cases, and given a relatively large error rate. I thus
follow Lichbach and Almedia in urging scholars to approach activist-based data with hope and
caution. As recently as 10 years ago, before the advent of web archives, newspaper issues were
accessible to those enjoying a surplus of financial and temporal resources. Before the spread of
cheap, accessible web-domains, activist sources were available only to local actors, or dedicated
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communities like Tahrir Documents. Today, both mainstream and alternative media is readily
available. In today’s technological climate scholars must make use of all possible resources.
Comparison indicates that, for Russian protest events, activist sources are the most
reliable. I acknowledge that scholars will never be able to precisely evaluate the gap between
reality and observation. If incomplete activist-generated data represents the best hand available
to scholars, is there hope for improvement? There are ways forward. Programming savvy
scholars can continue to refine tagging algorithms, continue pushing towards 100% accuracy.
Hand-coders can improve reliability by pooling and vetting complementary datasets. Given time
and resources, I would merge ikd.ru and namarsh.ru data, hand-code each article, removing
duplicates and false positives. The result would be the best approximation of reality available to
Russian contentious politics scholars.
Activist-based datasets are the product of collaboration, explicit or not, between activists
and scholars. This chapter’s findings have important implications for both groups. The cumulative
weight of mainstream news biases, discussed in this chapter, matters for Russian scholars, and it
matters for Russian activists. In order to create reliable event data sources in contentious politics,
scholars must end the practice of bystander scholarship.
They must actively work with alternative news sources to improve research. Unless
activists themselves circumvent censorship, their message will remain unheard. It is only when
the “bystander public” receives accounts of protest that activists can hope to win public support
(Koopmans 2004). Whether trying to improve the human condition, or trying to improve
knowledge accumulation, scholars and activists must leverage alternatives to mainstream media.
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V - Structural Conditions of Russian Protest, 2007-2013
Introduction
The structural methodological position is an attempt to dramatically decrease the
complexity of the social world. Faced with a nearly limitless amount of data, the structural lens
creates broad, abstract concepts that explain events of interest. The position emerged over a
century ago alongside the academic discipline of sociology. Emile Durkheim founded the first
French department of sociology at the University of Bordeaux in 1895. Durkheim advocated
explanations that obscured entirely the motivations and desires of individuals. It was instead, for
the Frenchman, “social facts,” or the prevalent structures of norms, values and behavior, that
shaped outcomes (1895). In this context, the word structure signifies the patterns or milieus in
which individuals’ lives are embedded. Durkheim himself focused on ideational rather than
physical structures, a move that would exclude mountainous terrain, infrastructure networks or
weather patterns. The foundational work nevertheless serves as an exemplar of structuralist
epistemology, a particular approach to knowledge generation.
The reward of an analytical shift from individual to structure is parsimony. Examples of
the position span the history of social science, from the classical period to modern day. In his
influential book, The Spirit of Laws, French philosopher Montesquieu proposed that geography
and climate shape the nature of “men and societies” (1748). The theory emerged from his
observation that people living in warmer countries exhibited emotional, violent personalities,
whereas northerners appeared more staid.
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Montesquieu’s conclusions and logical reasoning processes appear misguided to the
modern student of social science. That slavery proliferated in unusually hot countries due to a
weakening of the body and subsequent “slothfulness of mind” appears as outdated as Ptolemy’s
geocentric universe, the phlogiston theory of combustion, phrenology, or the miasma theory of
disease. To the modern student, still, the analytical power of Montesquieu’s gamble is
remarkable. Instead of spending years’ worth of time and funding on field work, the social
scientist could turn to the thermometer for explanation. Contemporary scholars have continued to
test the analytical gamble. Examples of high-profile structural work include the correlates of war
project (Singer and Small 1968; Vasquez 1987); modernization theory (Lipset 1959, 1994);
political risk indicator creation (Gurr and Moore 1997); the quantitative study of civil war (Fearon
and Laitin 2003a; Hegre and Sambanis 2006) and political protest (Eisinger 1973; Walton and
Ragin 1990; Arce and Mangonnet 2013).
Correlation analysis is one method used to implement the broader structuralist
methodology. The methods employed by a social scientist serve to gather evidence, in support of
hypotheses, which derive from theory. For a structuralist theory, hypotheses take on the following
generic form: conditions X, Y and Z increase or decrease the likelihood of event A. The
structuralist begins the process of gathering evidence by quantifying important concepts. Once
both the independent and dependent variables are quantified, the scientist can evaluate whether
conditions do, indeed, shape the likelihood of events. Correlation is, of course, this characteristic
held by variables that occur or change together. As defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary,
correlation is “a relationship existing between phenomena or between mathematical or statistical
variables which tend to vary, or occur together in a way not expected on the basis of chance
alone.” This is the evidence needed to validate the structuralist gamble. It is not surprising, then,
that Durkheim pioneered the use of correlational statistics in the social sciences. The sociologist’s
early theory posited that suicides were more likely to occur under conditions of anomie, in which
social groups were poorly integrated. Durkheim’s evidence took the familiar form: suicide rates
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appeared higher in societies in which Protestants outnumbered Catholics and the Jewish, in
societies in which marriage rates were relatively low. These simple results provided support for
the analytically powerful structural position. Of course, additional research would explore causal
mechanisms and rule out spurious relationships.
The greedy structuralist wager, its potential for explanatory power, has drawn more and
more scholars to quantitative methods over recent decades. Gary King collected data on every
article published in the American Political Science Review from 1906 to 1988. From 1906 to
1960, 24.5% of the 2,500+ articles involved quantitative analysis. Then the 1960’s behavioral
revolution erupted, and the proportion of articles using quantitative data and methods increased
from under a quarter to over half. Behavioralists popularized the idea of quantification, and
applied it to many new substantive areas. For King, this methodological shift reflected a growing
appreciation of the benefits inherent in quantitative approaches, the fact that “they are abstract
representations of the political world and are, thus, much clearer” (1998, 43). More recently, in
2003, Andrew Bennet, Aharon Barth, and Kenneth Rutherford undertook a similar survey of the
top ten American political science journals. The authors tracked a stark continuation of the trend
identified by King decades previously. They reported that the number of quantitative studies has
continued to climb (2003).
Structuralist quantitative studies simultaneously evaluate two propositions. First, does
statistical evidence support specific, proposed hypotheses? Do indicators of group cohesion
covary with suicide rates? Secondly, and by extension, such studies evaluate the structuralist
gamble itself. Can scholars generate compelling explanatory accounts while working with abstract
categories? Across the broad field of contentious politics, scholars have published thousands of
quantitative studies, suggesting that the data-savvy analyst can, to some extent, gain explanatory
value from structural models. Stock-taking exercises have accumulated a set of insights derived
from studies of civil war and state failure (Robert Adcock and David Collier 2001; Hegre and
Sambanis 2006; Dixon 2009). In the field of social protest studies, the field in which this study
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appears, evidence of the structural gamble is less clear. Scholars working at the national level
(Maher and Peterson 2008) and sub-national level (Eisinger 1973; Arce and Mangonnet 2013)
have produced positive results. However, Ponticelli and Voth (2011) and more recently
Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015a) produced negative results, suggesting greater emphasis on
context specificity and agency over structure in explaining movement onset.
This chapter will apply the Idea of the State theory of protest onset, to the Russian case.
Through traditional correlational analysis, I will produce evidence of the sort common in the social
sciences since the behavioral revolution; I will attempt to “find significant statistical effects even in
the presence of noisy data” (Dixon, 2009: 713). This chapter will thus evaluate the general
structuralist position, as an alternative to agent-centered theories. More specifically, this chapter
will produce what I believe to be the only comprehensive test of social protest onset. Leading
theories of social mobilization capacity, grievance or political opportunity structure all offer
explanations. As Chapter 2 outlines, the Idea of the State is a promising alternative. Leveraging
my original sub-national Russian data, and the updated Lankina and Voznaya protest data-set,
this chapter will evaluate the promise of the full set of theories, in Russia, over the recent six year
period 2007-2013.
As the previous two chapters have argued, scholars often fail to adequately test
structuralist theories in contentious politics. While the structuralist position simplifies reality,
scholars have relied on simplistic quantifications of independent and dependent variables. Every
quantitative study must address problems associated with missing cases and model selection.
Chapter 3 demonstrated, however, that methodological nationalism represents an even more
serious, and more widespread, threat to valid inference. Chapter 4 highlighted the importance of
carefully selected dependent variable data, data that include refined location tags, data that are
not restricted to mainstream news sources. Only equipped with such sub-national datasets, which
are rarely easily accessible, can scholars evaluate the relationship between structural conditions
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and the onset of contentious political events. This chapter brings together the preceding
theoretical and quantitative work to test hypotheses.
The first section presents state capacity profiles for all eighty three Russian federal
subjects. The Idea of the State Theory expects correlations between protest onset frequency and
a triad of driving factors. Each descriptive profile thus includes operationalizations of state
coercion, cooptation, and cooperation, along with operationalizations of grievance, social
mobilization, and political opportunity theory. Profiles also include descriptive statistics of the
dependent variable, protest event frequency from 2007 to 2013. The second section briefly
restates theoretical expectations; it presents a set of hypotheses derived from the Idea of the
State and the big three from Social Movement Studies, as well as several rival explanations from
Russian area studies work. Employing a negative binomial regression model, the third section
evaluates the strength of correlations between state capacity and protest onset. A concluding
section discusses policy implications and directions for further research.

Descriptive Trends
As the Latin translation “something given” indicates, data are the foundation of any
inquiry into the social world. By recording the occurrence of events, and mapping trends over time
and space, scholars move beyond notional thinking, or intuition. As observations become data
points and data points become lines, invisible patterns of human events become visible. Doctor
th

John Snow, a 19 century British physician, produced a touchstone example of the value of
descriptive statistics. In the 1850s, a sudden and severe cholera outbreak baffled doctors in
London’s Soho district. At the time the transfer of cholera infections, and infectious disease in
general, were not well understood. Prevailing wisdom regarding cholera identified airborne
miasma as the method of transmission. Snow began investigating the problem by mapping
incidence locations, marking each case on a Soho street plan. Gradually, the collection of marks
presented a clear picture. Hash marks clustered around a central hub, the Broad Street water
pump. Snow subsequently determined that a nearby sewage line had contaminated the water
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source. The traditional story often involves colorful accounts of Snow puzzling over the immunity
of local brewery workers, who consumed treated water, and then, in a flash of understanding,
demanding authorities remove the well’s pump handle. Modern commentary has removed some
of the luster from the romanticized descriptive statistics legend. Edward Tufte, statistician, political
scientist, and author of several data visualization guides, argued that Snow’s map failed to control
for the number of people living in the Broad Street region. John Snow’s captivating study
nevertheless illustrates the power of empirical observation in the social sciences.
An exploration into the structural causes of Russian protest events naturally begins with
data. While the Idea of the State theory operates at the abstract conceptual level, effective testing
requires precise data gathering. National-level operationalizations of state capacity and protest
frequency are easily accessible, but they are not useful. The exploration requires, first, a
quantification of protest onset frequency, reported at the level of federal subject. And secondly,
given the Idea of the State theory of protest onset, the exploration requires quantification of
coercion, cooptation, and cooperation. This section will first explore trends in protest onset across
Russia at the national level and at the federal district level to offer a high-level overview. Next, the
lens will focus on the federal subject level. A state capacity profile will describe the structural
conditions in each of the eighty three subjects.
By quantifying state-society relations at the local level, I follow the example of perhaps
the forefather of Russian descriptive statistics, Peter the Great. Tsar Peter Alexeyevich earned
his superlative sobriquet for a set of modernizing reforms in the economic and military spheres.
Peter’s reforms began with empirical observations, in the form of census application. An effective
population count was necessary to plan military conscription, plan tax programs, and gather
forced laborers for factory work during war time. The Tsar utilized census figures to solve
problems facing the country. Protest and state capacity profiles of the Russian federal subjects
similarly begin my inquiry. The dataset underlying the profiles, however, could serve as a
foundation for any number of inquiries into the forward and backward linkages of state capacity.
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Figure 3: Annual Russian Protest Events, 2007-2013
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Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i)

The national level provides a general impression of protest-onset trends. Figure 1 plots
event frequency data from the updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset. As discussed in Chapter 4
this collection represents the only modern event dataset of Russian protest. I have extended the
coverage to include 2013, using source articles from the internet-journalist community operating
Namarsh.ru. The chart indicates that protest events are relatively common. Even the lowest
annual value, 475 protests in 2013, is a high enough frequency to satisfy two important criteria for
structural inquiries into the social world. Charles Ragin’s (2008) exhortation to study phenomenon
that are common clearly holds—see Chapter 1. More practically, the number of observations, in
total and per year, is high enough to warrant the use of statistical methods.
The national level aggregation of protest events shown in Figure 3 renders the object of
study visible, but in a crude focus. Describing protests as having occurred in Russia can be a
useful heuristic when comparing frequencies across countries, or looking for a snapshot of
longitudinal trends. For any effort to understand where and why protests occur, the national-level
aggregation is not useful; for the purposes of evaluating the relationship between state capacity
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and protest onset, it is not useful. The structural conditions that shape the likelihood of these
events—according to the Idea of the State theory—do not exist in Russia. They exist in local
municipal bodies of Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Magadan, or Altai Krai. Durkheim
theorized a structure of inclusive relationships driving the onset of suicide. Montesquieu theorized
a climatic structure driving the development of personality traits and institutional development. In
order to test the theories, the Frenchmen each quantified structural variables. Quantifying the
Idea of the State, the structure of the social contract, requires federal subject statistics, along the
dimensions of coercion, cooptation, and cooperation.
The following section disaggregates Figure 3, showing the onset of protest events by
federal districts. Vladimir Putin created these divisions (федерaльные округa) in 2000 by
presidential decree. Putin hoped to bring federal authority to the subjects, and streamline
economic planning and enforcement of Russian federal law. So far the goal remains unattained.
Russian legal scholar Gordon Hahn notes that ”federal authorities' effort to reintegrate Russia's
legal space suggest that a mix of administrative and judicial means is being used and that the
results to date are likewise mixed” (2002:501). Here, the seven districts serve to disaggregate
protest frequencies in a step-wise manner. Moving in steps from macro to micro gradually reveals
regional variation driving major national trends, as contentious political scholars have
demonstrated across contexts, for example from Mexico to Argentina (Arce and Mangonnet
2013).
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Figure 4: Protests by Federal District
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Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i)

Figure 4 begins to reveal the “rich spatial-temporal palette” (Lankina and Voznaya 2015:
15) of protest activism across Russia. Disaggregating dependent variable data adds nuance to
national trends. It is immediately clear that the dramatic spike in protest, in 2009—as displayed in
Figure 3—is the product of events in the high frequency Central region. This region includes
Moscow, and not surprisingly accounts for a large portion of total events reported each year in the
updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset. In the Ural and Volga districts the peak is less distinct,
matched by a similarly high value in 2008, before declining over the next several years in
accordance with the national pattern. The remaining six federal districts—the Far East, North
Caucasus, Siberia, and Southern—exhibit no noticeable conformity with the national trend. These
districts, which report between 10 and 100 events each year, hold relatively constant over the
2007-2013 time horizon. The federal district level of analysis reveals uneven geographic
distribution of protest frequency. This lack of uniformity is not surprising given the Idea of the
State theory. The theory expects sub-national municipal units to reflect underlying differences in
structural characteristics associated with coercion, cooptation, and cooperation. What Figure 3
suggests, then, is that the federal districts exhibit variation along independent variable indicators.
Even if a common exogenous factor influences all regions simultaneously—say the global
financial crisis—the theory expects local drivers to shape the linkage to protest. Of course,
protest events do not occur at the district level either. In order to describe the structural drivers of
Russian protest, only the federal subject level will suffice. This second refinement in analytical
scope will increase the number of regions by a factor of ten, from eight to eighty three.
Abandoning national and even federal district levels of aggregation comes with a cost:
complexity. The loss of parsimony is apparent in the moves from one to eight to eighty three
cases. Increased complexity is a requirement for answering the research question at hand. The
goal of this project is to evaluate a structural relationship between Russian protest event onset
and a three-dimensional conception state capacity. Coercive, cooptation, and cooperative
capacity only exist at the immediate location in which protestors take to the streets, organize sit153

ins or otherwise demonstrate civil disobedience. In order to test the theory, I will conduct
correlational analysis of the variables that shape the relative protest frequencies across federal
5

subjects from 2007 to 2013. Subject level disaggregation represents the smallest geographical
unit featuring the financial and political characteristics necessary to test the full set of structural
theories. This is the first such test. Even Lankina and Voznaya themselves, creators of the
original dependent variable data-set, restricted their analysis to trends in onset and anecdotal
observation. Before moving to statistical testing the following section presents state capacity
profiles for each region. In order to preserve clarity of presentation, the section will display profiles
of each federal subject, grouped by federal district. The following demonstration is necessarily
lengthy. It is necessary as a lead-in to hypothesis testing. It is further necessary, because—as
Chapter 3 argues—developing local-level measures of state capacity is an inherently meaningful
academic exercise.

5

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Russian Federal subjects encompass numerous designations. Despite varying
nomenclature, legal and practical differences are minor. Russian federal scholars treat the subjects as
generalizable, choosing to rely on financial and political indicators to capture autonomy (Stepan 2000). The
two most common types, krais and oblasts, were formed as primary districts during the early years of the
USSR. Originally, krais were territorially larger than oblasts, and located on the edges of Federation Land—
the word Край means edge or frontier. Republics were originally created as homelands for non-Russian
ethnic groups. As such, the regions maintain the right to establish their own official language. Some,
Tatarstan for example, continue to feature a large titular ethnic population. Others have become nothing
more than historical relics. This is especially true of the farcical Jewish Autonomous Oblast, created by
Stalin as a homeland, which never attracted many residents and today features a Jewish population of less
than 1%. Upon their creation, republics were also given autonomy not found in other federal subjects.
Agreements limited federal oversight on taxation, judicial system, police force, citizenship, and diplomatic
connections. During Vladimir Putin’s reign, all agreements have expired.
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Central
Figure 5: Protest Events, Central District
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Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i)

The Central federal district contains 16 federal subjects, situated in the European section
of Russia, bordering Ukraine and Belarus to the west. The title “Central” is more historical than
geographical. The region made up the core of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, the medieval
predecessor to the Russian Federation. As Figure 4 indicated, the district reports significantly
more protests each year than any other. Much of the discrepancy emerges from the inclusion of
Moscow City, which averages over 220 events across the modified Lankina and Voznaya
dataset. The capital city is geographically embedded within an oblast of the same name, Moscow
Oblast, but remains a separate political entity. Figure 5 presents the values of yearly protest
onset for each federal subject. For purposes of scaling and readability Moscow City values do not
appear on the plot. The capital city’s values dwarf all other regions, with over 1,200 reported
events. Voronezh and Moscow Oblast each report over 130 events over the time horizon. In a
second tier, Tambov, Orel, and Ryazan report more than fifty events over the time horizon. The
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remaining regions—Belgorod, Bryansk, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Kursk, Lipetsk, Smolensk,
Tula, Vladimir, and Yaroslavsk—each report fewer than twenty five protest events.
With the dependent variable captured and visualized the next step is to explore state
capacity structures present in each region. Using a number of data sources—primarily the
Russian national statistical office—I have created operationalizations for the tri-part structure
described by the Idea of the State theory, as well as major strains of Social Movement Theory.
The following table displays values for each indicator, for each federal subject in the Central
region. The dataset includes entries for each year from 2007 to 2013, corresponding with the
dependent variable data. For ease of interpretation and spacing Table 1 contains mean values
across the seven years, with the exception of electoral support for United Russia in the 2008
presidential election, located in the final column.
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Table 2: Central District

Federal
Subject
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Belgorod
Bryansk
Ivanovo
Kaluga
Kostroma
Kursk
Lipetsk
Moscow City
Moscow
Oblast
Orel
Ryazan
Smolensk
Tambov
Tula
Tver
Vladimir
Voronezh
Yaroslavsk

4.3
7.0
6.6
5.3
5.4
6.3
4.3
1.4

Social
Spending Per
Capita
22323
17013
18103
23307
19800
19273
20845
52794

United
Russia
Vote
65.3
61.7
60.7
61.6
56.3
62.7
62.3
54.1

Carnegie
Openness
Index
25
26
29
36
30
36
29
30

3.2
6.9
6.2
6.7
7.3
4.6
5.4
5.9
6.2
5.4

30078
19643
20289
19692
17423
19818
23168
18910
18334
25433

60.2
59.9
57.1
53.9
59.7
61.7
81.0
56.7
57.4
53.1

35
32
27
40
27
34
39
34
33
39

Population

Urban
Population

Secondary
Education

Crimes Per
Capita

Unemployment

1532
1275
1062
1010
669
1132
1172
11589

66%
69%
81%
76%
70%
65%
64%
100%

9.1
7.9
5.3
4.8
3.5
6.5
6.2
.

1148
1791
1768
1811
1490
1691
1418
1755

7060
788
1155
987
1092
1554
3797
1441
2337
1278

80%
66%
71%
73%
59%
79%
75%
78%
64%
82%

32.1
4.3
6.0
4.4
5.9
7.7
6.4
6.7
12.5
5.6

1695
1852
964
2061
1369
1039
1679
1785
1356
1803

Recall, the Idea of the State framework theorizes state capacity as the product of three
dimensions, coercion, cooptation, and cooperation—which must be considered alongside the
dominant three positions from Social Movement Studies. Coercion represents the government’s
ability to restrict the behavior of its population. Coercive tools are water cannons, batons,
barricades, jail time, and fines. This dimension represents the state as police officer. Table 2
contains Central district values for an indicator of coercive capacity, crime prevalence, as well as
three measures of social mobilization capacity, total population, urban population percentage,
and number of secondary education graduates, those passing the Unified Governmental Exam
(Единый Государственный Экзамен, or ЕГЭ). A set of benchmarks frame the table values.
Percentiles facilitate quick data comparison by displaying relative standings within a group of
observations. A percentile reports the percentage of scores in a dataset that fall below a
th

particular score. For example, an SAT score in the 90 percentile is higher than 90% of all
scores. Each state capacity profile table will highlight relatively high and low values when they
appear. Red shading indicates a score in the bottom quintile, that is, at or below the 20

th

percentile. Green shading indicates a score in the top quintile. The Idea of the State theory
dictates the valence for each indicator. Red(green) scores represent particularly low(high) levels
of state capacity, not necessarily low(high) numerical values.
Coercive capacity and social mobilization capacity vary within the Central District. Most of
the subjects hold populations close to the national mean. The populations are remarkable,
however, in their urban clustering. Of the fifteen central subjects, only three fall in the first quartile,
and a full seven fall in the third quartile. The crime measure is the number of reported crimes per
10,000 people in the region. On this second indicator Moscow city loses its usual position as an
outlier. The subjects exhibit a range of values from 964 in Ryazan, to over 2000 yearly,
populated-weighting crimes reported in Smolensk. Education profile results hint at significance:
Moscow and Voronezh, sites of far and away the highest protest frequencies, both exhibit high
graduation figures.
158

The second dimension of the Idea of the State framework, cooptation, similarly varies
among federal subjects in the Central District. Recall, that state capacity to coopt signifies the
ability to “buy-off” potential dissidents. Cooptation in practice takes the form of government
subsidies, pension payments, and government spending targeted towards public education and
health systems. This dimension describes the state as provider. Like coercion, the state’s ability
to coopt is shaped by society. Table 2 includes an operationalization of cooptation capacity, a
measure of government spending directed towards socio-cultural projects, expressed in per
capita terms. For grievances, the table displays the unemployment rate of each subject.
Table 2 suggests that, across the region, federal subjects possess high cooptation
capacity and low levels of grievance. None of the subjects in the region possess high levels of
unemployment, relative to national percentiles. In fact, nine of the federal subjects are among the
highest performers Russia-wide on unemployment. On the final indicator, social spending per
capita, members of the region are decidedly middle of the pack. Only two fall into the extreme
quartiles. Bryansk’s leadership spends relatively less on socio-cultural projects, and Moscow’s
leaders spend relatively more.
The third and final element of the Idea of the State is cooperation. Cooperation is the
internalized acceptance of the social contract on the part of citizens. Table 2 includes a single
measure of cooperation: the percentage of the vote won by the governing United Russia party in
2008, the party of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev. The Carnegie Center’s Openness Index
operationalizes political opportunity structure, the final theoretical position from Social Movement
Studies.
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The final two columns suggest that Central District local governments do not enjoy high
cooperation capacity, and face relatively open political opportunity structures. Seven of the
st

thirteen federal subjects reported voting totals that appear in the 1 quartile of all subjects. None
of the remaining subjects report totals that place them among the most supportive of United
Russia. On the Carnegie Index, subjects fall close to the mean, or in the relatively open category,
with the exception of Belgorod, Bryansk, Ryazan and, Tambov.
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Far East
Figure 6: Protest Events, Far East District
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Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i)

The Far East Federal District, located near the American, Chinese, Japanese, and North
Korean borders, reports an uneven frequency of protests over 2007-2013. As a whole, the region
accounts for 200 of all 1700 Russian events, or just over 11%. Within the region Primorsky
dominates the picture, with over 100 reported events. Meaning maritime in Russia, the Primorsky
Krai includes Vladivostok, a trading hub connected to Asia countries and the largest city in the
Russia east. Conversely, three Far Eastern subjects failed to report a single event over the seven
year time span. Chukotka, Magadan, and a peculiar historical relic, the Jewish Autonomous
Okrug, appear quiescent in the updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset.
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Table 3: Far East District

Federal
Subject
Amur
Chukotka
Jewish AO
Kamchatka
Khabarovsk
Magadan
Primorsky
Sakha
Sakhalin
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Population

Urban
Population

Secondary
Education

829
51
176
324
1348
157
1959
956
500

67%
65%
68%
77%
82%
96%
76%
64%
80%

2.3
1.7
2.3
1.8
2.8
2.4
2.8
1.7
2.4

Crimes Per
Capita
2325
1716
2374
1802
2849
2400
2864
1764
2413

Unemployment
6%
4%
9%
7%
7%
5%
8%
8%
7%

Social
Spending
Per Capita
34240
136778
32143
66296
35186
70314
22603
65647
61649

United
Russia Vote
69%
78%
66%
63%
60%
55%
54%
63%
62%

Carnegie
Openness
Index
29
18
22
32
26
25
35
36
37

Table 3 shows the state capacity profiles of Far Eastern District member regions. The table reveals a fairly uniform weakness along
the coercion dimension and strength along the cooptation dimension. Six of the nine regions appear in the top quintile of urban population
percentage—though all nine feature very low education graduation figures. Five of the nine regions similarly fill ranks among the most crimeridden Russian regions, with over 2300 reported crimes each year, per 10,000 inhabitants. Member regions exhibit greater variability along the
unemployment indicator. Average unemployment in the Jewish Autonomous Okrug, Primorsky Krai and Sakha are relatively high, and all other
regions except Magadan report mid-range values. However, regional governments enjoy natural resource wealth. Far Eastern subjects host
oil, gas, and precious metal mining operations, which catalyze government revenue and spending. The subjects all fall in the top quintile for
socio-cultural spending per capita. Chukotka province offers an example of regional state-society relations. The region exhibits the highest per
capita social spending of all regions, with a staggering 136778 rubles.

Oligarch Roman Abramovich served as governor of Chukotka, during which time he
instituted training programs and attracted investment in local oil, natural gas, coal, and tungsten
plants. As governor, Abromovich was named person of the year by the Russian business journal
Expert (Эксперт). Cooperation indicators, the percent of the vote garnered by United Russia, was
correspondingly high in Chukotka, as well as Amur and the Jewish Okrug. Of the remaining
regions Magadan and Primorsky Krai reported relatively low support for the ruling party. Political
opportunity structures appear closed, not conducive to protest, with the exception of Sakha and
Sakhalin.

North Caucasus
Figure 7: Protest Events, North Caucasus District
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Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i)

The North Caucasus federal district, bound between the Black Sea to the west, the
Caspian Sea to the east, Georgia and Azerbaijan to the south, and the Russian Southern District
to the north, is more often associated with war than protest. The region has a history of civil war,
and more recently, insurgent violence. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leaders in
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Chechnya declared independence. Deep-seated local resentment stemmed from the World War
II years. In 1944, Chechens were among the groups Stalin accused of collaborating with the
Nazis. Half a million Chechens were forcibly herded onto cattle cars and sent to western Siberia.
As Masha Gessen writes “the exiles were literally dumped into the open snowy fields and left to
fend for themselves” (2013). Boris Yeltsin led the Russian army to suppress independence
claims, starting a civil war that would last nearly two years. A tense ceasefire lasted only two
more years, before the second Chechen War erupted in response to the invasion of Dagestan by
the Islamic International Brigade. Today, tensions in the region remain. An active insurgency has
claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, KabardinoBalkaria, and North Ossetia. The members of this region feature a small portion of the protests
reported in Russia between 2007 and 2013. With the highest figures reported in Dagestan and
North Ossetia, the modified Lankina and Voznaya dataset features forty events in the North
Caucasus, or just over 2% of all protest events.
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Table 4: North Caucasus District

Federal
Subject
Chechnya
Dagestan
Ingushetia
KabardinoBalkaria
Karachai
North
Ossetia
Stavropol

Population

Urban
Secondary
Population Education

1275
2890
427

35%
45%
38%

861
471

54%
42%

709
2781

64%
57%

8.9
23.6
3.3
7.2
2.9
5.3
14.8

Crimes
Per
Unemployment
Capita
356
37%
460
13%
436
49%

Social
Spending Per
Capita
29409
13933
19432

1038
994

13%
12%

15495
18403

1034
1403

9%
6%

16485
17096

United
Carnegie
Russia
Openness
Vote
Index
16
99%
28
89%
19
98%
20
96%
27
92%
32
71%
62%
42
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Again, Table 3 displays the state capacity profile of each federal subject in the North Caucus District. A quick glance at the percentile
shading reveals a clear uniformity across subjects, from Chechnya to Stavropol. The legacy of civil war appears to have produced a set of
local governments possessing very high coercive capacity. Crime rates in each of the seven federal subjects are among the lowest in the
Russian Federation, a trend that is exemplified by very low rates in the most historically violent regions of Chechnya, Dagestan, and
Ingushetia. Social mobilization capacity influences the state’s ability to control protests. Each of the seven federal subjects fall among the least
urbanized, and Dagestan and Stavropol alone produce high secondary graduation figures. Ramzan Kadyrov embodies the iron fist of North
Caucasian states. After years of terrorist violence, including an attack that killed his father, the previous governor of Chechnya, Kadyrov
launched a hardline anti-insurgency program. In the early 2010’s the number of yearly causalities has steadily declined, while the number of
alleged human rights violations has risen (Amnesty International, 2015). For his commitment to harsh social order Kadyrov has received the
monikers “Putin’s Dragon,” (The New Yorker), “The Putin of Chechnya” (The New Yorker), and “Putin’s Willing Executioner” (The Atlantic).

Kadyrov’s Chechnya further reflects high cooptation capacity, with a very high level of
socio-cultural spending per capita. The remaining six regions, however, exhibit low or medium
scores on the spending indicator, and nearly all of the North Caucasian subjects report low
scores on the grievance operationalization, unemployment rates. Strong state capacity remerges
on the cooperation dimension. Each of the seven federal subjects, with the exception of
Stavropol, reported high levels of support for United Russia in the 2008 election. Political
opportunity structures are correspondingly open, with the exception of Stavropol.

Northwestern
Figure 8: Protest Events, Northwestern District
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Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i)

The Northwestern Federal District occupies the northern section of European Russian. The
district borders Finland, Norway, and the Baltic states to the west, the Central and Volga Federal
Districts to the south and east, and the Arctic Ocean to the north. This region contains a variety of
dissimilar federal subjects. Kaliningrad is the only non-contiguous land mass, situated between
Poland and Lithuania. Saint Petersburg, or Peter in slang, the second capital, a cosmopolitan
hub, accounts for 550 protests, second only to Moscow City. Arkhangelsk is the home of Arctic
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Circle research centers and remote fishing villages. Inhabitants of the northern region live through
more than 160 days of snow each year on average, and spend winter months in complete
darkness. Bolstered by Saint Petersburg, the Northwestern District accounts for 850 protest
events over 2007-2013, or just around 50% of all events. The remaining eleven federal subjects
report a variety of protest frequencies. Kaliningrad and Murmansk report high frequencies of 102
and 70. Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Novgorod do not report a single event. And Arkhangelsk,
Karelia, the Republic of Karelia, Komi, Leningrad, Pskov, and Vologda report between seventeen
and thirty events.
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Table 5: Northwestern District

Federal
Subject

168

Arkhangelsk
Kaliningrad
Karelia(Rep)
Komi
Leningrad
Murmansk
Nenets AO
Novgorod
Pskov
St.
Petersburg
Vologda

Urban
Population

Secondary
Education

Crimes Per
Capita

Unemployment

Social Spending
Per Capita

1225
947
646
902
1726
796
42
636
676

76%
78%
78%
77%
66%
93%
67%
71%
70%

6.8
4.9
12.9
5.6
6.7
4.3
.25
3.11
3.66
.

2156
1850
2082
2327
1651
2046
1859
2046
1832

6.3
7.9
8.2
8.7
4.9
7.6
7.6
5.1
7.9

30518
23040
32165
37546
23390
41176
143178
23575
22096

4927
1205

100%
71%

1486
2239

2.2
6.4

36194
26958

Population

5.5

United
Carnegie
Russia
Openness
Vote
Index
35
56.7
36
57.3
57.2
27
62.0
29
59.2
29
55.1
38
48.7
39
63.1
26
56.7
31
50.3
29
60.4

Table 5 shows the state capacity profile for the twelve Northwestern federal subjects. The quartile shading reveals a fairly consistent
pattern across indicators. Urban population percentage and population-weighted crime statistics suggest low to medium coercive capacity.
Five of the twelve subjects contain over 77% urbanization, placing them in the top quintile. Of the remaining regions, only Leningrad and
Nenets Autonomous Okrug fail to cross the median urbanization value of 70%. Social mobilization capacity scores are uniformly middle-of-thepack, with the exception of Saint Petersburg’s relatively low value, and with the exception of education outliers Karelia and Nenets. Trends in
the following indicators are similarly uniform, but high rather than low. Five of the regions report average unemployment of under 6%, the
th

value corresponding with the 80 percentile.

Cooptation capacity produces a set of values near the mean, with the expectation of
Saint Petersburg, and Nenets, which reports a dramatically high value of socio-cultural spending
per capita. Located within the Arctic region of Archangelsk, Nenets’ local economy is dominated
by oil and gas. According to Rossstat, over 95% of economic output in the region is tied to oil and
gas production. Government rubles flow to local spending projects, particularly infrastructure
development projects. The third dimension of state capacity, cooperation, is uniformly low
throughout the region. The Northwestern federal subjects do not identify with political
leadership—as proxied by support for United Russia in the 2008 election. Outside of Komi and
Pskov, closed political opportunity structures characterize the area.

Siberia
Figure 9: Protest Events, Siberian District
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Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i)

The Siberian Federal District occupies a land mass in Asian Russia, covering over
5,000,000 square kilometers, or roughly half the size of the United States. The district borders the
Ural District to the west, and the Far East District to the east. The northern border is the Arctic
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ocean, and the southern border includes Mongolia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Despite holding
a reputation for desolation and emptiness, the Siberian district accounts for 400 protests
according to the revised Lankina and Voznaya dataset, or roughly a quarter of total events. The
twelve member subjects report protest frequencies ranging from over 100 to zero. The high mark
appears in Novosibirsk Oblast, home to a metropolitan hub of the same name, which features a
large international airport and a lively international scientific enclave in Akademgorodok. The low
mark, on the other hand, appears in Altai Republic, a sparsely populated mountain region known
for seismic activity and eco-tourism. Three other member regions, Buryatia, Khakassia and,
Zabaikalsky Krai reported fewer than five events between 2007 and 2013. And Altai Krai, Irkutsk,
Kemerovo, Krasnoyarsk, Omsk, Tomsk, and Tuva all reported between twenty and sixty events.
All of these federal subjects are closely nestled in the southern edge of the district. The Siberia of
Cold War and literary fame, of forced labor camps and endless taiga expanse, can be found in
the northern section of Krasnoyarsk.
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Table 6: Siberian District

Federal
Subject

171

Urban
Population

Secondary
Education

Crimes Per
Capita

Unemployment

Social Spending
Per Capita

2424

55%

14.8
1.5

2131

8.4

18614

207
971
2436
2761
533
2843
2683
1983
1051
1354
1104

28%
58%
80%
85%
67%
76%
77%
71%
70%
75%
66%

2594
2921
2925
2371
2429
2525
2569
1810
2558
2238
2843

11.9
10.6
9.0
7.5
7.6
6.8
7.2
7.7
8.1
5.7
11.4

35796
27384
26478
25008
23884
35476
24879
22372
25080
22426
33475

Population

Altai Krai
Altai
Republic
Buryatia
Irkutsk
Kemerovo
Khakassia
Krasnoyarsk
Novosibirsk
Omsk
Tomsk
Tuva
Zabaikalsky

6.5
13.2
13.6
3.1
18.0
14.1
11.3
6.3
6.4
6.8

United
Carnegie
Russia
Openness
Vote
Index
35
54.6
31
69.4
31
65.6
42
58.5
30
76.8
32
59.5
23
60.0
28
59.0
28
60.1
30
58.4
23
59.7
29

Keeping with the sequence, Table 6 displays the state capacity profiles for each member of the Siberian federal district. Coercive state
capacity for the twelve federal subjects appears to be uniformly weak. Strong social mobilization capacity increases the difficulty of controlling
protest. Seven of the subjects exhibit relatively high or mid-level concentrations of urban population. The exceptions are Altai Krai, Altai
Republic, and Buryatia, each of which exhibit urban population concentrations of less than 60%. Indeed, the mountainous Altai Republic holds
the lowest value of urbanization in all of Russia at 28%, along with one of the lowest graduation figures. State coercive capacity is even more
clear-cut. All but two of the regions, Altai Krai and Omsk, score in the top quintile for reported crimes. State capacity improves somewhat along
the cooptation dimension.

Grievance measures, unemployment scores, fall in the bottom quintile for six of the
subjects. However, the state component of cooptation is less remarkable, with three regions
exhibiting relatively high levels of socio-cultural spending. Greater variation emerges along the
cooperation dimension of state capacity. Two of the Siberian regions supported United Russia
relatively strongly. Three regions supported the party weakly. Political opportunity structures are
more homogenous, middle-of -the-pack with, Krasnoyarsk and Tuva exceptions on the open end,
and Irkutsk on the closed end.

Southern
Figure 10:Protest Events, Southern District

Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i)

The Southern Federal District lies between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, to the
west and east, between the Volga district and the Northern Caucasus district to the north and
south. The Southern district has served as a meeting place between cultures for hundreds of
years. Since the 4th century, empires have fought to control trade routes along the numerous of
rivers that snake through the six Southern member subjects. Scythians, ancient Greeks,
Genoese, and Ottoman Turks each held outposts in what is today Rostov and Astrakhan. The
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Volga river delta area was the site of the Golden Horde’s Russian capital, witnessed a siege from
Tamerlane’s army, and hosted battles in the Russo-Turkish war of the 16th century. The
Southern district’s natural environment continues to drive cultural and economic life. The resort
town of Sochi, located in Krasnodar Krai on the Black Sea, hosted athletes from around the world
for the 2014 Winter Olympics. The Volgograd Hydroelectric Power Station is the largest
hydroelectric dam in Europe. According to the updated Lankina and Voznaya database, federal
subjects in the district exhibit high frequencies of protest between 2007 and 2013. Astrakhan,
Krasnodar, Rostov and Volgograd each report 49 or more protest events. The sparsely populated
enclaves of Adygea and Kalmykia each report fewer than ten. In total the district, account for 200
events, or roughly 12% of the total.
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Table 7: Southern District

Federal
Subject

Population

Urban
Population

Secondary
Education

Crimes Per
Capita

Unemployment

Adygea
Astrakhan
Kalmykia
Krasnodar
Rostov
Volgograd

442
1011
288
5259
4275
2602

51%
67%
44%
53%
67%
76%

2.3
5.1
2.6
24.1
21.3
14.4

1034
2554
1529
1326
1575
1746

8.5
8.4
14.5
6.1
7.0
7.5

Social
Spending Per
Capita
17850
20337
20194
20642
18631
18381

Carnegie
Openness
Index
25
70.9
30
58.0
22
72.4
40
62.0
30
71.8
36
57.7

United
Russia Vote

Table 7, once again, presents the state capacity profile for each of the Southern District member subjects. Across the coercion,
cooptation, and cooperation dimensions two types of profile seem to emerge. Adygea and Kalmykia exhibit relatively strong coercive and
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cooperation capacity, coupled with relatively weak cooptation capacity. The regions produce few secondary school graduates and hold small
populations that are not concentrated in urban areas. Both regions exhibit crime statistics at or below the median value. On unemployment
and social spending per capita, however, both regions fail to provide jobs or amelioratory spending. Despite the weakness on cooptation,
support for United Russian was strong in the 2008 election, and political opportunities are scant. The remaining four subjects are much more
highly and densely populated, and produce more graduates. With the exception of Astrakhan, each exhibits average to low crime rates.
Cooptation capacity varies among Astrakhan, Krasnodar, Rostov, and Volgograd. Along cooperation, Rostov joins the two small enclaves in
support for United Russia, while Astrakhan, Krasnodar, and Volgograd voiced low support. Political opportunities are correspondingly more
abundant among this second group. .

Ural
Figure 11: Protest Events, Ural District

Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i)
The Ural District spans the eponymous mountain range, stretching from the Arctic Sea to
Kazakhstan, bound from west to east by the Volga and Siberian Federal Districts. Forming the
border between Europe and Asia, the Urals hold dozens of ore and mineral species, from nickel,
gold, and platinum, to coal, bauxite and talc. The six subjects that make up the mountainous
district provide the center of industrial production for the Russian Federation. Across history the
forges have hosted serfs, forced laborers, and free men and women. The Bolsheviks found
support among the region’s workers and established their first headquarters in Yekaterinburg and
Perm during the October Revolution. As Hitler pushed the eastern front across Poland and onto
Russian soil, Stalin relocated industrial plants to the Ural region to protect supply lines. Today,
Magnetegorsk embodies the industrial history of the district. The factory-city is located in
Chelyabinsk Province, on the Magnitnaya Mountain, a construct of almost pure iron, the only
geological formulation of its type in the world. The factory at Magnetegorsk continues to produce
output today, although at a much lower rate than during the war years. Modern day protests in the
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Ural District are concentrated in the Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk regions, which report sixty three
and 121 events over 2007-2013. Khanty Mansi and Kurgan report between twenty and forty
events over the time horizon. And the small enclave of Yamalo-Nenets reported a single event.
With a total of 230 events the Ural District accounts for roughly 13% of total protest events.
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Table 8: Ural District

Federal
Subject
Chelyabinsk
Khanty Mansi
Kurgan
Sverdlovsk
Tyumen
YamaloNenets AO

Population

Urban
Secondary
Population Education

Crimes Per
Capita

Unemployment

Social Spending
Per Capita

16.4
10.1
4.8
21.0
22.8
4.2

2348
2251
2639
2271
2451

5.9
6.6
9.9
6.5
6.0

20548
73981
21120
26508
17155

1854

3.9

106461

3487
1544
908
4315
3429

82%
91%
60%
84%
78%

530

85%

United
Carnegie
Russia
Openness
Vote
Index
36
61.1
31
65.9
21
64.4
28
62.0
30
73.5
28
78.3

Table 7 further continues the trend by presenting the Idea of the State profile for Ural federal subjects. The six regions score nearly
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uniformly poorly on coercive capacity and average or strongly on cooptation and cooperation. Kurgan and Yamalo-Nenets are the only two
subjects that hold relatively small populations, with only 60% of Kurgan’s population living in urban centers. They are also the only two
subjects with low secondary education figures. Governments of Chelyabinsk, Khanty Mansi, Sverdlovsk, and Tyumen all face a difficult
societal context vis-à-vis efforts to curtain protest activities. By the measure of yearly crime reporting, these governments do not display the
ability to shape the behavior of their subjects. Of the Ural districts, only Yamalo-Nenets reported a score outside of the top 20th percentile of
crime-ridden regions. Despite a recent decline in Russian industrial production, only Kurgan exhibits a particularly high unemployment value,
however. Khanty Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets even exhibit very high levels of cooptation capacity as measured by socio-cultural spending per
capita—generosity tied to fossil fuel production. Khanty Mansi accounts for over 50% of all Russian oil production (Rossstat).

And even more striking, Yamalo-Nenets accounts for over 90% of all Russian natural
gas. Scores along the cooptation dimension cluster around the median value, with the exception
of Yamalo-Nenets and Tyumen, the oil production center of Russia during the Soviet era. Other
than the relatively open Chelyabinsk and relatively closed Kurgan, political opportunity structures
also cluster around the mean.

Volga
Figure 12: Protest Events, Volga District

Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i)

The Volga District occupies the southeastern section of European Russia. The district
borders, moving clockwise around the compass rose, the Southern, Central, Northwestern, and
Ural Federal Districts, and Kazakhstan to the south. The fourteen federal Volga subjects span the
ethnically diverse, fertile region along the largest river in Europe, referred to as Mother Volga
(Волга-матушка). In addition to providing land and soil for crop-based agriculture, the region is
heavily forested—over 70% of Perm Krai’s land area is covered in coniferous forest, for example.
Ports throughout the district, in Kirov, Nizhegorodskaia, Samara, connect food products, beer,
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timber, printing, and biochemical industries to consumers abroad and throughout Russia.
Economic production is not limited to primary and secondary products. Local facilities export
tertiary products, including automobiles, computer processors, and space exploration hardware.
The Bashkir, Chuvash, Mari, Mordavian, Tatar and Udmurt groups all enjoy federal republic
status in this region. In each ethnic republic the titular group rivals Russians for majority
demographic and linguistic prevalence. Local resources and infrastructure, land and water
transportation routes, generate wealth for inhabitants of the Volga District. The verdant climate
fostered by Mother Volga allows biologists to study a range of rare flora and fauna. Protest
frequencies in the Volga district range from fewer than five, in three of the republics, to nearly
250, in Samara. The remaining ten federal subjects reported between forty and 110 events in the
updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset. In total, the district’s 750 events accounts for nearly 30%
of all recorded protests from 2007 to 2013.
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Table 9: Volga District
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Federal Subject

Population

Urban
Population

Secondary
Education

Crimes Per
Capita

Unemployment

Bashkorostan
Chuvashia
Kirov
Mari El
Mordovia
Nizhegorodskaia
Orenburg
Penza
Perm
Samara
Saratov
Tatarstan
Udmurtia
Ulyanovsk

60%
59%
74%
63%
60%
79%
60%
67%
75%
80%
75%
53%
69%
73%

4068
1253
1344
696
833
3318
2036
1384
2648
3216
2524
308
1523
1292

26.5
8.9
6.5
4.5
4.8
17.1
11.3
8.3
12.0
15.9
14.4
3.8
8.4
7.8

1762
1581
1712
2120
1147
2283
1749
1340
2965
2282
1483
2082
2358
1508

7.1
8.2
7.7
8.9
4.5
6.0
6.7
6.1
7.7
4.6
6.8
19.2
7.5
6.8

Social
Spending Per
Capita
19562
18303
20632
17845
22964
21864
22189
19576
25214
23148
18604
35571
21671
18724

United
Carnegie
Russia
Openness
Vote
Index
24
83.1
31
62.2
34
55.3
18
67.5
30
93.4
22
60.6
27
60.3
43
70.3
32
62.0
30
56.0
26
64.8
37
89.2
31
60.5
30
66.2

For one final time, Table 9 displays the multi-dimensional state capacity profile for members of the Volga Federal District. Along the
three dimensions of coercion, cooptation, and cooperation the fourteen federal subjects exhibit variation. Few patterns emerge from the
quintile visualization impression. Between Tatarstan at the low end, and Nizhegorodskaia and Samara at the high end, the subjects exhibit
population sizes across the entire percentile distribution. Urbanization and education figures are similarly variable throughout the Volga
District. Cooptation strength ranges between mid and low across the subjects, with several exceptions. The unemployment rate in Tatarstan is
remarkably high.

Tatar-inform, a local news agency, opined that “the rate of unemployment in Tatarstan
has grown in spite of receiving massive anti-crisis subsidies over the last decade” (2016). The
effort, while not reducing unemployment, may have won a measure of cooperation capacity.
Bashkortostan, Mari El, Nizhegorodskaia, and Orenburg join Saratov in reporting closed political
opportunity structures. Indicators in Penza and Tatarstan point the opposite direction. Political
opportunity structures are similarly closed, with the exception of the two outlier subjects.

Hypothesis Formulation
The preceding section rendered the Idea of the State visible for all eighty three Russian
federal subjects. The lengthy presentation demonstrates the variation along the three state
capacity dimensions. At the same time, the tables demonstrate levels of social mobilization
capacity, grievance, and political opportunity structure. With variation in coercive capacity,
cooptation capacity, and cooperative capacity, the regions exhibit a range of state-society
relations. For example, across the North Caucasus District the state rules with an iron fist; in the
polar climes of the Northwestern District and the Far East District, the state coopts loyalty with
social spending tied to natural resource wealth. The state capacity profiles presented in tables 1-8
facilitate hypothesis testing. With the independent variables operationalized for federal regions
statistical testing can finally answer the question: is there a relationship between state capacity
and protest onset? The state capacity profiles would facilitate similar investigations, into similar
research questions that explore the causes, or the effects, of state capacity along the three
dimensions.

State Capacity
The Idea of the State produces numerous hypotheses. The theoretical framework posits
that state capacity, through three dimensions, holds explanatory power vis-à-vis protest onset.
This structuralist wager would provide analytical efficiency of the sort hoped for my Montesquieu’s
climate theory, or Durkheim’s suicide theory. The Idea of the State posits that local governments
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have the ability to check social unrest in their territory, by fostering coercive, cooptation, and
cooperative capacity.
As a proxy for the state component of coercion, crime rates are expected to increase
along with protest frequency. In general, the theory expects subjects characterized by weak
coercive capacity to exhibit high frequencies of protest onset. As a proxy for cooptational power,
socio-cultural spending should win loyalty among the population. In general, the theory expects
higher likelihood of protest onset among subjects possessing weak cooptation capacity. As the
population identifies with national leadership, and internalizes an affinity for the Russian state, an
environment of cooperation will dampen protest onset stemming from all causes. This ideational
effect reduces the likelihood of protest onset, regardless of other prevailing structural conditions.
Support for the ruling United Russia party serves as the proxy for cooperational capacity. The
Idea of the State framework expects a higher likelihood of protest onset among subjects
possessing weak cooperative capacity.
H1: Coercive state capacity is negatively related to protest onset
H1a: Crime rates per capita are negatively related to protest onset
H2: Cooptational state capacity is negatively related to protest onset
H2a: Social spending per capita is negatively related to protest onset
H3: Cooperational state capacity is negatively related to protest onset
H3a: United Russia vote share is negatively related to protest onset

Social Movement Theory
Social Mobilization Capacity
H4: Social mobilization capacity is positively related to protest onset
H4a: Urban population % is positively correlated with protest onset
H4b: Total population size is positively correlated with protest onset
H4c: Secondary education graduation rates are positively correlated with protest onset
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As the population increases, and as the population clusters around urban centers, social
mobilization capacity grows. Large student populations are expected to serve as a particularly
rich pool of potential activists. Regardless of the state’s resources or abilities, high population,
high density, student heavy federal subjects will prove more difficult to regulate.
Grievance
H5: Grievances are positively related to protest onset
H5a: Unemployment is positively correlated with protest onset
As the unemployment rate rises, as more and more people lose their jobs, grievance will
drive them to the streets. The theory assumes that grievance arising from unemployment will
engender a broad distain for government performance. Regardless of the state’s resources or
abilities, aggrieved populations will threaten to gather more frequently.
Political Opportunity Structure
H6: Political opportunity structure openness is negative correlated with protest onset
H6a: The Carnegie Institute Openness Index is positively correlated with protest onset
As independent relationships thrive, in economic, political, and civil activities,
opportunities for protest will proliferate. According to the theory, opening of political opportunity
structure, broadly defined, spurs protest onset through the demonstration effect, and hope.

Alternative Explanations: Russian Studies
Security studies and area studies scholars focused on Russia provide several alternative
hypothesis that do not neatly fall under the Idea of the State framework, nor under the big three
theoretical traditions of Social Movement Studies.
The relationship between regime stability and natural resource wealth has long occupied
security studies scholars. Lucrative extractive industries have been shown to strengthen regime
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durability and reduce the likelihood of political protests (e.g., Smith 2004). In the Russian context
natural resource production shapes federal subjects’ financial relationships with the center;
Putin’s regime recycles tax revenue from oil, mineral, and natural gas to relatively poor regions.
The cycle turns heavy production regions into net exporters of federal transfers. By this logic, low
or even negative transfer flows should correlate with low levels of protest activity.
On the other hand, Russia scholars argue that federal funding itself represents a channel
of political control. The federal government may be able to buy loyalty through fiscal transfers
(Robertson 2011). Where transfers make up a significant portion of subject financial resources
local leaders should be loyal to Putin’s regime. As mentioned in the previous section, this is one
explanation of Chechnya’s relative quiescence in modern times.
H7: Natural resource wealth buffers federal subjects from social unrest
H7a: Federal transfers are positively correlated with protest onset
H8: Generous federal support creates loyal subjects
H8a: Federal transfers are negatively correlated with protest onset
Additionally, Lankina and Voznaya (2015) posited a theoretical relationship between
regional economic profile and protest onset frequency. Share of privately-owned industry drives
the hypothesized relationship. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union privatization has proceeded
unevenly across Russian federal subjects. State control remains in spheres of agriculture and
heavy industry. Where agricultural and industrial jobs make up the majority of labor markets,
Lankina and Voznaya see populations dependent on the government, loyally abstaining from
protest activities. These workers are “likely to have a generally low incidence of and turnout at
protest, largely due to these regions’ heavy dependence on state salaries or subsidies from the
federal government” (331).
H9: Government-owned businesses engender loyal among local populations
H9a: Share of publically owned businesses is negatively correlated with protest onset
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The comprehensive nature of the seven hypothesis presented above allows for a test of
the general structuralist position, as well as sub-theories from Social Movement Studies. Testing
the influence of, say, grievance or social mobilization capacity alone on protest onset generates a
model with possible omitted variable bias. Theoretical tools generated over the past five decades
posit that all elements of the Idea of the State must be tested in addition to the main strains of
social movement theory. Any single source of social unrest can be deemed unimportant or less
important than others only after a comprehensive test. Jeffery Dixon argues that incomplete
theoretical models produce incomplete statistical models, or models suffering from omitted
variable bias (2009). The following test avoids this pitfall. The nine hypotheses attempt to
operationalize all major theorized structural drivers of protest onset. Thus, empirical tests will
evaluate the more fundamental question: do any structural factors shape the likelihood of protest?
As an alternative hypothesis then, H* expects at least one of the nine drivers to be significantly
correlated with protest onset.
H*: Structural conditions systematically shape the frequency of protest onset
H*a: Variables other than population size are significantly correlated with protest onset

Modeling Unrest
An effective test of the Idea of the State hypotheses requires systematic exploration of
variance in structural conditions and onset frequency. The only existing test of sub-national
Russian protest onset is restricted to anecdotal analysis. Lankina and Voznaya claim that
protests are most frequent in “sophisticated and more developed urban metropolises,” and where
grievances arise from “socioeconomic issues, such as those related to large Soviet-era factory
closures, labor market restructuring, or wage arrears” (2015: 445). The authors do not conduct a
systematic test of their claims. Indeed, they do not even elaborate on terms like “sophisticated” or
“deprivation.” For each of the four hypotheses an interested observer can find an example of the
expected relationship among the eighty three state capacity profiles. But this is not the sort of
evidence used to evaluate a structural theory. The Idea of the State is a probabilistic theory, and
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as such must be evaluated using statistical methods– as Lass Fridstrom and Siv Ingebrigsten put
it: “use of a statistically formulated conceptual framework seems virtually unavoidable” (1999:43)
when evaluating probabilistic theories.
In the 1960s and 1970s several scholars articulated the ontological position underlying a
probabilistic theory of causality. Scholars working in the philosophy of social science addressed
the concern in Patrick Suppes’ A Probabilistic Theory of Causality (1970) and I. J. Good’s A
Causal Calculus (1961). The phrase “probabilistic causality” appears, at first glance, to be an
oxymoron, or at least conceptually confusing. However, humans operate under the assumption of
probabilistic causally in scientific research, and in more mundane contexts. Wesley Salmon, in his
review of the concept, presents several examples. Salmon examines the idea of cause in cancer
research. Laboratory studies determine that various substances cause cancer in test animals,
even when every animal exposed to the substance does not developed malignancy. Similarly,
drivers say that a skid on a patch of ice was the cause of an automobile accident, even when
many cars pass over the slick spot, some of them skidding upon it without mishap. Cause is
established when two conditions occur together frequently. The Idea of the State theory assumes
that such patterns will be visible between state capacity and protest onset. This project evaluates
the presence of the correlation in the Russian case.
Statistical methods capture and generalize the relationship between dependent and
independent variables, offering a test of probabilistic causality. Regression analysis is a
particularly common tool. The anachronistic title emerged from Sir Frances Galton’s pioneering
social statistical work. Galton studied data on relative sizes of parents and their offspring in
species of plants and animals. He observed that a larger-than-average parent tends to produce a
larger-than-average child, but the child is likely to be less large than the parent in terms of its
relative position within its own generation. Galton termed this phenomenon a regression towards
mediocrity. The scientist captured the relationship between family members by describing his
dependent variable, child size, in terms of his independent variable, parent size. The connecting
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relationship took the form of a simple line. Today, regression models express the relationship
between independent and dependent variables in terms of various functional forms, from straight
lines, to exponential curves, to probability distributions.
Functional forms describe either a deterministic or statistical relationship between
variables of interest. A deterministic relationship is an exact relationship between an independent
variable, x, and the dependent variable, y. Consider, for instance, the conversion relationship
between temperature in degrees Celsius (C) and temperature in degrees Fahrenheit (F). The
linking relationship between the two takes the form of a steep line, expressed mathematically as
(

)

. The formula produces an exact relationship between two temperature

measurement systems. Statistical relationships, on the other hand, are not exact. Instead, they
capture a trend existing between independent and dependent variables. Galton’s linear
regression computed the line that best fit his observed weight data. This linear trend produced
expected values of offspring weight for any given parent weight, or the expected change in y for a
one unit change in x. Expected values are the best fit without fitting the data exactly, differing by
an error or scatter term. Thus, without being deterministic, statistical relationships quantify the
strength of relationships between quantities of interest. In order to quantify relationships tied to a
complex theory like Idea of the State, multiple predictors are required. Multiple regression moves
away from simple lines to planes and hyper planes to describe the relationship between multiple
independent variables and the dependent variable. Predictors or independent variables are, in
this case, structural measures of state capacity. The predicted value is the count of protest events
per Russian federal subject, over the time horizon 2007-2013.
For event count data, probability functions define the statistical relationship between
independent and dependent variables. Random events, by definition, are unpredictable in a
deterministic sense. However, mathematicians have demonstrated that frequencies of random
outcomes over a large number of events are often predictable. For example, when casting
two dice, the outcome of any individual roll is unpredictable, but a sum of seven will occur twice
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as often as four. The result of a single coin flip is unpredictable. Sports officials and indecisive
individuals leverage the random process to facilitate decision making. Empirical studies have
established the probability function of coin flipping. John Edmund Kerrich tossed a coin 10,000
times while serving a prison sentence during World War II. Kerrich employed the results of his
tedious data gathering exercise to prove that, as the number of tosses approaches infinity, the
proportion of heads or tails approaches .5. Social scientists are able to rely on probability
distributions to establish statistical relationships between count data variables, such as protest
onset counts, and independent variables. A probability curve replaces Galton’s line as a
quantification of relationship strength.
For protest event counts the Poisson probability distribution becomes the relevant tool.
Simon-Denis Poisson discovered the distribution while studying the behavior of juries and artillery
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strikes in the 19 century. Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz independently published evidence of the
distribution in his 1898 book The Law of Small Numbers (Das Gesetz der kleinen Zahlen). Von
Bortkiewicz built his probability distribution from more sensational events than Kerrich’s prison
study. He gathered data on the number of deaths from horse kicks in the Prussian army, as well
as suicide frequencies among children. Returning to regression analysis, independent variables
condition the shape of the estimated Poisson distribution; the set of predictors shapes the
probability distribution through the parameter lambda (λ). A parameter is simply a constant or
variable term that determines a function’s specific but not general form—e.g., the slope
parameter of a linear function determines the direction and tilt of the line. In general, regression
parameters define the direction and strength of the relationship between dependent and
independent variables.
The Poisson distribution for a random variable Y has the following probability mass
function for a given value of Y = y:

( )
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Here Y denotes the number of discrete, Poisson distributed events occurring within an interval of
time, and λ is a parameter that defines both the mean and the variance of Y. In Poisson
regression the independent variables shape the distribution by shaping the parameter λ. The
mathematical expression relating the set of independent variables and the Poisson parameter is:
where X is the set of independent variables, or predictors, and β is the set of
coefficients. Values of β are calculated to maximize the likelihood that the computed Poisson
distribution approximates the data. An estimation of the probability function demonstrates that as
values of the predictor variables change, so too change the expected likelihood of higher or lower
counts occurring.
Poisson regression rests on two assumptions. First, the response variable Y must follow
a Poisson distribution. And secondly, the mean and variance of the response variable Y must be
equal. A histogram plot offers a plausibility test of the first assumption. The plot does not include
Moscow City or Saint Petersburg.
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Figure 13: Onset Distribution

The histogram indicates that data are skewed right, and thus non-normally distributed.
This visual test suggests that the Poisson regression method may be appropriate. However, the
second assumption does not hold. The dependent variable variance is not equal to the dependent
variable mean. The mean value of protest (M=36.85) is much smaller than the variance (s =
1750). This outcome indicates the presence of over-dispersion, which renders the Poisson model
inappropriate. A related probability function, the negative binomial distribution, allows the mean
and variance of count data to diverge. A Poisson distribution is, in fact, a particular form of
negative binomial distribution. Instead of lambda, the negative binomial function includes two
parameters, the mean and alpha. Alpha measures the extent of over-dispersion. Numerous
political science scholars have recently employed negative binomial models to model overdispersed event count data (e.g., Bremer 1993; Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003; Hendrix
and Young 2014).
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Russian protest data includes multiple observations for each federal subjects, measured
yearly over the time horizon. In other words, function parameters contain numerous values: in the
expression

X and β would each be arrays of values. Such datasets, known as panel

or cross sectional time series, necessitate additional testing and a set of specialized analysis
techniques. Panel models estimate a set of standard errors that control for the fact that cases are
not independent of each other—each federal subject includes five temporally separated
observations, controlling for autocorrelation.
Before moving on to model specification and evaluation, two checks are in order. First, is
non-stationarity an issue: is time itself causing a problematic trend? A non-stationary series can
produce spurious regression coefficients, as well as spurious significance determinations. The
data are a strongly balanced panel, according to Stata. According to a Harris-Tzavalis unit-root
test, the protest dataset features stationary panels (p = 0.000). (The Levin-Li-Chu test, an
alternative, is ill-suited for the dataset, as it includes many panels and relatively few time periods.)
Autocorrelation is a second potential problem. It arises when values of the same variable are
themselves correlated, reflected in non-normally distributed error terms, a condition known as
heteroscedasticity. Correlation of this sort violates model assumptions of observation
independence and randomness, leading to bias in test statistics and confidence intervals. A
Breusch-Pagan test reports the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data. Time-series
transformations, with random or fixed effects, are a common solution. I generate models with both
specifications below.
Testing for multicollinearity among independent variables is a third important diagnostic.
This problematic condition results from linear relationships between independent variables. At an
intuitive level, when independent variables exhibit high levels of multicollinearity, the model
cannot determine which predictor should be credited with explaining variation in the dependent
variable. Multicollinearity can cause serious problems for inference, as the estimated regression
coefficients and significance levels become sensitive to minor changes in model specification.
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The only potentially problematic correlation occurs between population and total socio-cultural
spending. To remedy the problem, I substitute spending on socio-cultural projects for a per capita
expression of the variable, which is depicted in the state capacity profiles in the previous section.
The correlation between population and the new per capita spending measure is low.

Results
This section presents the empirical findings. Model 1, displayed below, presents results
of a negative binomial regression conducted in the Stata statistical package. The regression
model captures all elements of the Idea of the State framework: three dimensions of state
capacity, as well as the three major strains of Social Movement Studies. The time horizon is
2007-2013. The dependent variable is protest events per year for each Russian federal subject,
in the updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset. The model includes random effects error
transformations, to address heteroscedasticity. A Hausman Test identified random effects as
most suitable choice. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, I run the model with fixed effects
specifications—displayed below.
Following hypotheses 4a and 4b, social mobilization capacity shapes the likelihood of
protest onset at the sub-national level. Both population-based operationalizations report a
significant relationship with protest onset frequency. And both variable coefficients possess the
hypothesized positive sign: an increase in population or urbanization is associated with an
increase in protest frequency. Almost all of the population effect is absorbed by changes in urban
concentration. Because log-likelihood coefficients can be difficult to understand, I compute
incidence rate ratios (IRR) for each variable. With all other drivers held constant, a 1% increase in
urban population leads to a 1% increase in expected onset rate. On the other hand, neither the
education operationalization nor the coercive state capacity variables were significant. The
correlation coefficient generated for crime is very small, and not close to significance.
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Turning to the second set of hypothesized drivers, results provide stronger validation of
the overall structural position, and for the Idea of the State position. Here, both state capacity to
coopt and grievances are significant. Model 1 demonstrates a strong negative relationship
between the social spending variable and the level of sub-national protest, suggesting that the
more funds local governments dedicate to socio-cultural projects, the lower the levels of protest
activity. Holding all other variables constant, a one unit increase in per capita spending,
measured in millions of rubles, reduces the expected rate of protests by over 3%. Supporting
hypothesis 5a, a one unit increase in federal subject unemployment rates increases expected
protest onset rate by around 1%.
The final two variables do not produce significant results. The final dimension of state
capacity, cooperation, fails to register an expected, significant relationship. The percent of the
regional population voting for United Russia in the 2008 legislative elections does not exhibit the
sign expected according to hypothesis 3a. The Carnegie Openness Index—the political
opportunity structure operationalization—similarly fails to produce a significant coefficient.
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Figure 14: Models 1-4
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Significant relationships between population, urban population, social spending, and
unemployment all support hypothesis *a. In order for model results to provide reliable evidence
for the broader structural position, however, the theoretical model must offer more explanatory
power than an empty model. A Likelihood Ratio Test offers an appropriate metric. For linear
regressions employing least squares estimation, an F-test determines superiority of fit between
models. The Likelihood Ratio Test accomplishes this task for generalized linear models like the
Poisson and negative binomial (Meier 2011). Stata output includes a significance test for the
model as a whole. The predictor model using independent variable data was indeed an
improvement over a model in which all predictors were set to zero (p = 0.0).
The core findings hold under several robustness checks. Displayed above, Models 2 and
3 feature alternative operationalizations of social mobilization capacity and grievance. Model 2
replaces university student population with the number of local rail passengers. Any model
omitting urban population would clearly suffer from omitted variable bias, so the new variable
accompanies the original specification. Like the education variant, the rail passenger coefficient is
not significantly related to expected protest onset. Model 3 replaces unemployment with a
morbidity indicator, a measure of disease prevalence. Unlike unemployment, morbidity rates are
not significantly related to expected onset. Model 4, also displayed above, is a replication of the
original under fixed effects specifications. The results underscore the importance of socioeconomic public spending and unemployment, as they remain significant even as population and
urban population do not.

Appendix ii displays results for alternative explanations concerning natural resource
wealth and economic ownership. Model 1 contains the full set of drivers from the Idea of the State
framework. Models 2 and 3 add fiscal transfers from the federal center and percentage of jobs
provided by private companies. Neither produced significant relationships with protests.
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In summary, federal subjects with small, dispersed populations experienced relatively low
levels of protest onset. Where unemployment is low and the populace benefits from social
economic spending, low levels are similarly expected. Empirical testing provided supportive
evidence for only four of the nine hypotheses presented above: 4a (population), 4b (urban
population), 5a (unemployment), and 2a (social spending). Student population, crime rates, ruling
party voting share, and the openness index all failed to reach significance levels. Alternative
hypotheses concerning natural resource wealth, government transfers, and economic ownership
similarly failed to produce significant results. These results produce supportive evidence for the
general structuralist position, expressed in hypothesis *. The next section discusses political
implications and directions for case study analysis.

Implications
These results begin to explain why subject regions located within the same authoritarian
federation exhibit differing levels of social unrest. To date, the majority of studies on the onset of
contentious political events have restricted analysis to the national level—as discussed in
Chapter 3. This strain of literature fails to adequately test any of the theories developed across
civil war studies, social movement studies and the foregoing study of revolutions. By considering
sub-national variation in patterns of protest and structural conditions, the Idea of the State avoids
this pitfall. Empirical results suggest that cooptational state capacity, measured at the subnational level, does indeed condition the frequency of protest in Russia from 2007-2013.
Population measures and unemployment also shaped protest frequency. Only cooptational
capacity, however, is completely within leaders’ control.
As local governments allocate more funds to socio-cultural projects—to public health and
education, to unemployment assistance, or to public park maintenance—the frequency of protest
declines. It appears, then, that targeted public spending serves as a tool with which the state can
coopt public obedience; Russian local governments can employ revenues as a tool to maintain
social order. These findings begin to outline the shape of the social contract across the Russian
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Federation. Moreover, these findings bring to light implications of international politics, particularly
implications of commodity prices fluctuation and the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Syria.
The empirical findings sketch an indirect connection between primary commodity prices
and social unrest. Russia’s national revenue is heavily dependent on natural resources. In 2015,
the country derived nearly half of all government revenue from oil and natural gas. The year’s
budget was planned around oil averaging $50 a barrel. A drop in prices has subsequently led to a
sharp increase in deficit spending. In October of 2015, finance minister Anton Siluanov addressed
the threat of continued low prices. Siluanov announced that, should prices remain under the 50$
a barrel mark, the country’s Reserve Fund, a sovereign wealth fund designed to shield
government finance during commodity busts, could be entirely exhausted within two years
(Andrianova and Khrennikova 2016). The current predicament reflects a failure to diversify the
national economy. Vladimir Putin, speaking at a parliamentary address in 2001, described
diversification as a matter of national security. At the time, oil and gas generated around 30% of
federal budget revenues. In 2015, the figure reached 44%, according to the finance ministry
(Ibid.).
Oil and gas shocks would affect state revenue at both the central and local levels. Natural
resource wealth in the Russian Federation translates to revenue through two channels. First,
export duties accrue to the central federal government. Tax revenue on extraction and
refinement, on the other hand, accrues partially to the central government and partial to local
government. Until 2002, the split was 60% local and 40% central. Boom conditions in oil and gas
markets in the 1990s saw budgetary revenues of oil- and gas-producing regions greatly outpace
non-producing regions. Since 2002, budget laws have steadily decreased tax share accruing to
local governments, to 20% in 2003, 15% in 2004, and less than 5% since 2005. Galina
Kurlyandskaya argues that the change in revenue split arose from increasing expenditure needs
across federal subjects lacking oil or natural gas reserves (2007). The boost in central revenue
cycled back to these “have-not” subjects in the form of central-subject budget transfers.
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According to data from Rossstat, twenty six of the regions rely on central transfers for over 40%
of state revenue, across 2007-2013. Indeed, only ten of the eight three federal subjects receive
less than 20% of their state revenue from central transfers over the time horizon. The more selfsufficient subjects include Bashkortostan, Kemerovo, Khanty-Mansi, Komi, Leningrad, Nenets
Autonomous Okrug, Nizhegorodskaia, Perm, and Sverdlovsk, all of which are rich in oil or natural
gas reserves, or both. International commodity markets thus feed forward to state budgets in all
Russian regions, oil and gas producers and non-producers alike. As prices remain low the funds
available for socio-cultural spending projects will shrink, forcing spending cuts in the short term,
and potentially limiting local governments’ ability to coopt the population into civil obedience.
International sanctions represent another potential threat to Russian central and local
revenue streams. Sanctions threaten revenue by jeopardizing the country’s general economic
outlook. Financial analysts at Credit Suisse (2014) recently identified several sources of potential
deterioration in the Russian economy. The two key risks were ballooning of the external debt-toGDP ratio and the stability of Russia’s banking sector. International sanctions hold the potential to
trigger both risk areas. First, sanctions have already damaged Russia’s external debt position. In
2014 and 2015 foreign direct investment has declined along with the industrial production index.
Capital flight is a major concern. Measures of the national economy report annual growth of just
over 1% since sanctions took effect. These trends are accompanied by a corresponding increase
in subjects’ cumulative debt. Sanctions provide a direct threat to the Russian banking system as
well. Under current sanctions, borrowing is not an option. By traditional metrics Russia is creditworthy—public debt is only 10% of GDP (Ibid.). However, as the Credit Suisse report put it, “if you
don’t have access to financial markets, then it doesn’t matter how credit-worthy you are” (Ibid.).
Since the onset of sanctions the federal government has injected money into the banking system.
For example, the government purchased 307 billion rubles ($5.15 billion) of VTB bank shares to
prevent a mass sell-off (Zaslavskiy, 2015). If the sanctions continue to hurt the banking system,
and the sovereign continues to intervene, a negative feedback loop between sovereign debt and
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bank solvency could emerge, as seen in the European debt crisis. A prolonged recession, or an
economic crisis, would threaten revenues throughout federal subjects. International actors would
do well to bear in mind the relationship between Russian economy performance and social
unrest.
Aside from sanctions, Putin’s costly wars in Ukraine and Syria could limit local
governments’ capacity to coopt. After annexing the Crimean peninsula central federal revenue
funds were used to establish the region’s governmental structures, issue Russian passports, pay
pensions, raise public sector employees’ salaries to Russian standards, and solidify local
transport networks (Fischer and Rogoza 2014). The official budget for 2015-2017 estimates that
the cost associated with new federal subjects will exceed $2.5 billion per year (Ibid.). These funds
reduce the total available for redistribution through transfers to other regions. Putin’s ongoing
Syrian engagement puts a similar strain on federal and subject budgets. Russian air strikes in
Syria are currently costing up to $4 million per day, according to data collected by a defense think
tank and reported in the Moscow Times (Hobson 2015). British military intelligence provider
Jane’s Information Group reported that bombing raids, supply runs, infrastructure and ground
personnel — along with cruise missiles fired into the conflict zone — have cost Russia over $100
million since strikes began (Ibid.). If economic conditions in Russia worsen, if commodities prices
remain low and sanctions continue to restrict investor sentiment and credit availability, Putin may
have to choose between pursing adventurous foreign policy and limiting protest onset at home.
The results of this study elucidate the domestic implications of international politics.
Local-level government spending patterns condition the frequency of protest events. But this
spending does not occur in a vacuum. Local government revenues are inextricably tied to
international politics and to the international economy. Russian scholars must recognize the
connection between the international and the sub-national. International actors, as well, in the
United States, Europe, and elsewhere, must recognize the potential knock-on effects of
commodity prices, sanctions, and international conflict.
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Further Research
Thus far, this project has simply identified correlations between independent variables
and protest frequency. Statistical results provide supportive evidence for several hypotheses,
along with the general structural position. The results do not validate casual mechanisms. In
order to gain an understanding of how and why relationships hold, the following chapter will
conduct a process tracing exercise. Such a qualitative exercise will further serve to evaluate
whether or not findings are spurious; qualitative case study analysis evaluates evidence produced
by the statistical testing presented here. Case studies will additionally serve to refine the Idea of
the State theoretical framework. Several hypotheses derived from the Idea of the State did not
hold under empirical testing. Coercive capacity, measured by crime rates, was not significantly
related to protest onset; cooperative capacity, measured by United Russia vote share, was not
significantly related; nor was political opportunity structure, measured by the Carnegie Institute’s
Openness Index. Are the relationships truly insignificant, or were the operationalizations faulty?
The following chapter will begin to answer these questions.
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VI - Protest in Siberia
Introduction
In Zakhar Prilepin’s novel Monastery prisoners watch in amazement as guards escort two
Chinese men into a labor camp. The new arrivals have been charged with espionage in
Leningrad, where they were living. The would-be spies, an entry search reveals, do not speak
more than a word of Russian. One prisoner turns to another and jokes, “how did these two plan to
gather intelligence, by counting the number of people, cows and trolley cars?” (2015, 278) This
fictional episode provides a caricature of quantitative social science work. Statisticians attempt to
generate explanations from a similarly detached perspective. Restricted to a superficial level of
information, relying on sophisticated forms of counting, is it possible to generate useful
explanations of sociopolitical phenomena? The structuralist methodological wager posits an
affirmative answer. Regression analysis sets up an equation or sets of equations that describe
phenomena of interest. Results present solutions that best predict the dependent variable from
one or many independent variables, based on observations. This is the Humean search for
constant conjunction, the attempt to “make no longer any scruple of foretelling one the
appearance of another” (Hume 1748, IV), that has become embedded in positivist epistemology,
dominant in social science (Kurki 2008, 24).
This dissertation project evaluates constant conjunction surrounding a class of important
sociopolitical events: protests in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It attempts to develop a structural
understanding of when and where protests occur.
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Since the Bolotnaya Square gatherings of 2011, Russian protests have become a
pressing international political concern, and as such, a potential target for social inquiry. Alexei
Navalny, in a recent interview with Echo of Moscow, described Putin’s aggressive foreign policy
as a ploy to ensure domestic tranquility. The anti-corruption crusader and political aspirant
accused Putin of displaying military superiority to distract his citizens from gross inferiority in
basic living condition provision (Navalny 2016). Successful anti-regime movements in Kyrgyzstan
and Ukraine demonstrate the catalytic power of even small-scale protests, occasionally starting in
or supported from provincial regions (Wolchik 2012). Tracing the contours of dissent and
repression in Putin’s Russia has thus become the duty of regime defenders and dissident
politicians alike. Events of 2016 have propelled Russian politics to the very top of the international
security agenda. A brief tour of headlines paints a grim picture.Alarming actions range from
meddling in the American presidential election campaign and abrogating nuclear weapon
containment treaties, to delivering missile defense systems to Aleppo and even to central Europe,
to Kaliningrad. These recent events have focused the attention of Putin’s regime and the
international community, as well as academic audiences working in the contentious politics
tradition. Attention is not likely to wane in the near future. Russian presidential elections in 2018
loom on the horizon. A repeat of the Bolotnaya Square movement, or a larger wave of protest,
could hold serious implications for citizens of Russia, Syria, the United States, and all of Europe.
The previous chapter empirically tested the Idea of the State theoretical framework. The
preceding four chapters laid groundwork by developing theory and building independent and
dependent variable databases. The goal was to create a novel, valuable explanation. Returning
to the words of Fearon and Laitin, as quoted in the opening chapter: “the goal of the structural
approach is the identification of stable conditions that systematically determine where an event is
likely to occur” (2003b). In executing the structural test, this project twice contributes to
contentious politics research. First, it evaluates a set of theories, developed over the last half
century, at the correct, sub-national level. Secondly, the test evaluates the general structural
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position, the hope that analytical tools can indeed drive understanding of important political
events.
A negative binomial regression model provided positive results. Statistical analysis
suggests that structural factors can facilitate understanding protest onset in contemporary Russia.
The quantitative test produced answers to several hypotheses derived from the Idea of the State.
In particular, federal subjects characterized by small populations, generous social spending
programs, and low unemployment feature relatively lower frequencies of protest over the years
2007-2013.
This chapter subjects findings to close scrutiny through a structured, focused
comparison. A quantitative skeptic might consider such methods no better than misguided
fumbling behind a language barrier. Like a deaf, mute spy, the statistician gathers and employs
data without even an elementary understanding of context. Thorough social science researchers,
then, must take a closer look at the data to make sure their conclusions are not the result of
miscommunication or a basic failure of understanding. Researchers can move beyond correlation
to avoid the real threat behind such playful rebukes. The task of this chapter is to guard against
specious quantitative findings through case study analysis.

Case Study Analysis
This chapter will present case study analysis of contemporary Russian protest events.
Regression analysis displays correlations between structural factors and protest outcomes. The
Idea of the State theoretical framework provides an explanation for the patterns; the framework
argues why the reader should believe that the patterns are neither mere coincidence nor the
product of external factors. In their entry in the Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology,
Fearon and Laitin describe this set of steps amounting to “a sort of story the researcher tells
about the associations observed in regression results”(2008). Under this interpretation the body
of academic work becomes an agglomeration of compelling stories about sociopolitical events.
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But these stories must be fact checked in so far as possible. The academic audience provides an
initial test by sounding theoretical logic and examining statistical methods for flaws. Case study
analysis, and other forms of qualitative research, subject hypotheses to further testing. Qualitative
analysis allows researchers a closer look at the constant conjunction captured in quantitative
models. In order to move beyond correlation, to provide a second test, case study analysis will
evaluate the Idea of the State explanation.
Case study analysis will accomplish three tasks. First, a close examination of cases will
evaluate causal links presented in the previous chapter. Statistical analysis functioned at the level
of sub-national statistics, of population figures, oblast-level budget outlays, and transit
infrastructure connections. The case study will look at life on the ground in the Russian regions.
Secondly, case study analysis will eliminate the threat of spurious correlation and omitted variable
bias. The Idea of the State and Social Movement Studies include numerous structural protest
drivers. Still, it is important to eliminate the possibility that decades of contentious politics
research failed to consider a critical element. And thirdly this phase of analysis will evaluate
operational choices made in chapter 4. Each independent variable was operationalized as
optimally as possible given data constraints. An in-depth look at state-society dynamics will reveal
which operationalizations were satisfactory, and which were not. Conclusions will inform possible
next generations of the regression model.
This dissertation project in particular benefits from the qualitative approach. The Idea of
the State posits a complex causal logic that traditional statistical models can only partially capture
(Braumoeller 2003). Bennet and George (2005) identify several types of causal complexity.
Causal relationships in the social sphere may be characterized by equifinality and complex
interaction effects. Russian protest events are characterized by both forms of complexity. The
Idea of the State framework posits three paths to high onset potential. Low levels of coercive,
cooptational, or cooperative state capacity may lead to high levels of onset. The framework does
not, a priori, predict the superiority of any path in a given context.
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, concerns surrounding dependent variable data
further heighten the need for qualitative validation. I chose to work with activist data sources
because mainstream alternatives are irreparably flawed. Mass-scale aggregators were either
dramatically under-representative (SPEED) or characterized by staggering numbers of false
positives (GDELT). Two available alternatives are not free from problems. A brief comparison
exercise revealed a partial lack of overlap between namarsh.ru and the collective action institute
(ikd.com). Taken alone, neither data source appears to completely reflect the reality of modern
protest in the Russian federation. Experts in the field have argued that, despite incompleteness,
namarsh.ru provides a representative protest dataset; while the total number of events may not
reflect reality, the relative positions of sub-regional onset frequencies do (Lankina and Voznaya
2015). By tracing the causal processes in Russian sub-regions this chapter’s case study analysis
will address potentially spurious correlation generated by incomplete—though likely
representative—data.
So, a qualitative exercise is needed to increase the credibility of the story provided in
chapter five. With methodological motivation established, the task turns to selection. Many
different types of case study analysis are available, designed for different purposes and for
different research phases. Bennet and George describe two “very different” approaches to case
study analysis (2005). Process induction appears in the early phases of research. Researchers
thoroughly explore several cases in an attempt to identify causal mechanisms as a baseline for
theory crafting and future hypothesis testing. Process verification, the second approach, is a
means to evaluate correlational relationships. In the study of the resource curse and intra-state
war, a researcher would evaluate established findings in, say, an oil-rich, conflict-ridden country.
Process verification serves to eliminate spurious correlation, and facilitates investigation into
variable operationalization.
To further test the causal story presented in the previous chapter, I will conduct a process
verification exercise while employing the method of difference. John Stuart Mill’s logical
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framework, developed over 150 years ago, remains popular within the academic community
(Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004). The method of difference, or most similar system design,
identifies a structure of drivers in which all elements but one correspond and the outcome
variable differs. Mill’s method of correspondence, most different system design, reverses the
configuration. Here, all elements but one differ, and the dependent variable outcome is consistent
between cases. Both approaches logically “control” for comparable elements, offering a rough
analogue of experimental logic. The refined lens of qualitative research first evaluates logical
conditions: are the two cases, in fact, most similar or most different systems? The approach then
moves on to evaluate the causal role of each independent variable. Such “structured, focused
comparisons” facilitate hypothesis testing (George and Bennett 2005).
I consider the following combination of George and Bennett’s and Mill’s conceptions a
type of theory guided process tracing (TGPT). Sociologist Ronald Aminzade (1993) provides a
definition of TGPT. According to Aminzade, the researcher has to provide “theoretically explicit
narratives that carefully trace and compare the sequences of events constituting the process”
(1993, 108) of interest. By making the theoretical framework explicit, explanatory logic is not lost
amid the chronicle of events. My case study analysis is focused and analytically driven. Purely
historical accounts paint a rich picture while engaging audience attention. Case study analysis
takes history and casts it into an explanation, couched in theoretical variables developed
previously.

Analytical Narrative: Idea of the State
A most similar systems design process tracing exercise will test hypotheses derived from
the Idea of the State framework for a second time. It will trace the occurrence of protest events in
two Russian sub-regions. In each case, I will focus attention on three factors: the cause driving
protest actions, government response, and the actors responsible for organization. I will further
look for ways to improve the structural model. Before moving into case studies, this section will
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briefly reiterate each of the hypotheses. Here I also reiterate quantitative findings and variable
operationalization.
The first dimension of state capacity, coercive capacity, casts the government as
enforcer. This is Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. Coercive capacity is high when the state effectively
shapes subjects’ behavior through force or the threat of force. Coercion is represented by police
officers standing on corners, prison facilities looming outside city limits, and video surveillance
cameras hanging on eaves. As the state’s ability to repress increases, frequency of protest
should decrease. Regression analysis did not support the hypothesized positive relationship
between crime rates and protest onset.
The second dimension of state capacity casts the government as provider, provider of the
social safety net and predictable rules of the game. The Idea of the State describes cooptation
capacity as the ability buy off citizens, to win loyalty, through the provision of public goods.
Protest frequency should decline as government education, health and, employment programs
grow. Regression analysis supported the hypothesized negative relationship between social
spending and protest onset.
The third and final dimension of state capacity shifts to the realm of ideas. Again the
state’s aspect morphs, this time to government as embodiment of national sentiment. By
appealing to emotions of trust and duty, the government creates an atmosphere of cooperation
between rulers and the ruled. In the Russian case red-clad mother Rodina, brandishing war
recruitment orders, vividly offers a symbol of cooperative capacity. This side of capacity is the
most difficult to get an empirical handle on, here operationalized as percent of the vote won by
the dominant United Russia party. Regression results did not support the hypothesized negative
relationship between vote share and protest onset.
Moving to the triad of theories from Social Movement Studies, grievance theory captures
socioeconomic contexts in which would-be activists live. As living conditions deteriorate, more
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and more protest events should occur as anger and frustration find outlet. The primary
operationalization, unemployment rates, was positively and significantly related to protest onset.
Social mobilization capacity theory ties protest onset to catalyzing networks and
resources. Symbols become active civil society organizations and social entrepreneurs,
individuals, like Alexei Navalny or Gary Kasparov, dedicated to organizing dissident opinion. And
as society’s ability to organize resistance increases, frequency of protest should increase.
Negative binomial regression analysis revealed a positive correlation between population size
and urbanization, and onset. A more focused operationalization, student population, was not
significantly linked to onset frequency. Alternatives based on public transit infrastructure similarly
failed to produce significant results.
Political opportunity structure places explanatory power with electoral system
accessibility and responsiveness. As locals direct demands and hopes for change into traditional
political channels, impetus for civil disobedience should dissipate. The operationalization, the
Carnegie Institute’s Openness Index, was not significantly related to protest onset frequency.
The statistical results dictate the form of the following narratives. Explanations of protest
frequency, couched in the complex analytical framework, test the casual story provided in the
previous chapter. The exercise will evaluate reliability of quantitative results, while also identifying
possible improvements to the model.
I will utilize the analytical power of the paired comparison to thoroughly test the proposed
relationship between public spending and protest frequency. As mentioned in Chapter 1, insights
from state capacity theory, and particular state capacity to coopt, are absent from much Social
Movement Studies work. Published attempts to explain protest frequency across Russian subregions, few and incomplete (Voznaya and Lankina 2015), all fail to consider cooptational
capacity. Moreover, cooptational capacity, especially as operationalized as public spending is a
short-term tool, directly under leadership control.
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Paired Comparison: Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk
Any case study must begin with a definition. Depending on the research question at
hand, a case can take the form of a military intervention, a government project, a country, an
individual, a decade, a year, or a century. Here, the phenomenon of interest is protest frequency
in the recent past. I thus define a case as the complete chronicle of protest of events occurring in
a federal subject over the years 2007-2010. Due to length constraints I exclude three years
included in statistical analysis, 2011, 2012, and 2013. To constitute a process verification
exercise, suitable federal subjects must exhibit the hypothesized outcome, at least some level of
protest. Furthermore, in order to set up Mill’s logical test, the subjects must differ in outcome
magnitude, and differ across all hypothesized drivers minus one. As mentioned above, I
thoroughly test the hypothesis concerning state cooptational capacity: the more generously local
government provides for citizens, the less likely citizens will protest. A pair of federal subjects
should exhibit differing levels of social spending. Scanning the eighty four federal subjects
Novosibirsk Oblast and Krasnoyarsk Krai are the most suitable pair. The subjects’ profiles are
similar with the exception of social spending and protest frequency. As an additional control for
variation, Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk are located in Siberia and share a border.
Constructing the narratives, I supplement original activist reports with activist and
mainstream sources. The additional support will address two threats to inference. Triangulation
between sources reduces the threat of activist fabrication. And increasing the number of sources
addresses the threat raised by incomplete data. Source materials include articles from the
Collective Action Institute’s ikd.ru, the Communist Party’s kprf.ru, and local newspapers Soviet
Siberia, Evening Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk Newspaper, and Our Krasnoyarsk among others. As a
secondary reason, in addition to length concerns, data availability drives my choice to focus on
years 2007-2010: the collective action institute curtailed reporting activities significantly
beginning in 2011.
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Each case contains numerous protest actions. Concretely, over thirty individual protest
actions occurred in Krasnoyarsk, and nearly sixty in neighboring Novosibirsk. Each case thus
contains numerous actors, numerous grievances and numerous government responses. An
organizational technique is required to effectively, and clearly, trace protest developments over
the four-year time period. Proceeding year by year, I will first introduce the types of events
occurring. An initial overview of source material revealed two broad categories: quality of life
protests, and ideologically-driven protests. Under each heading I will work through three
questions: Who are the protestors? What are they protesting? Was there a response from the
government? Using the Idea of the State as an analytical lens, I will discuss the drivers of each
broad category, paying particular attention to catalysts and mitigating factors.

2007
Novosibirsk
2007 provides an initial look at Siberian protest dynamics. Perhaps the most striking
takeaway from the first year is the sheer diversity of events. The analytical framework offered by
the Idea of the State helps bring order to the description, but the range of drivers, actors, and
responses remains vast. Any ability to draw conclusions without descending to the contextual
level would be analytically powerful for precisely this reason. The section will describe events in
Novosibirsk, before moving on to Krasnoyarsk.
In Novosibirsk, over the course of the year, particular events and a general deterioration
in living conditions drove protestors to the streets. Price increases in information and
communication technology, specifically telephone network services, triggered several marches.
Activists wryly warned locals of an impending New Year’s present: a new system of phone
payment (Novaya Gazyeta 2007, Kasparov.ru 2007a).The local telecom giant, Sibertelecom,
chose to raise per-minute costs for landline usage throughout the oblast. Those most affected
were multi-child families, pensioners, and the handicapped, according to reports. As the year
proceeded, breadth of protestor grievances expanded. The local Communist Party organized
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against a rise in cost of living. Protestor slogans specifically focused attention on housing-related
expenses and Sibertelecom’s decision(Kasparov.ru 2007c). Concern over quality of life drove
pensioners to take part in several protest actions over the course of the year. Participants
demanded “a right to life and a right to suitable pension,” suitable to keep up with high apartment
maintenance costs (Kotenkov 2007). Aside from housing cost, housing investment schemes
spread discontent across Russia in 2007. In many cities defrauded investors took to the streets in
response to a widespread pyramid scheme (Kasparov.ru 2007d; Petrenko 2007). Those
responsible were arrested, but protestors demanded government compensation. The national
attention inspired local victims of real estate fraud to speak up. Novosibirsk residents, defrauded
in the same way, by a different company, connected themselves to the movement with a hunger
strike (Ikd.ru 2007a). Three additional groups took a focused approach to improving their quality
of life. Bread deliverers (Ikd.ru 2007b) and grain producers (Vasiliva 2007) separately struck for
pay increases. Automobile owners protests rising gas prices and poorly maintained roads
(Kasparov.ru 2007k). And in Akademgorodok, a small university enclave outside of the capital
city, students resisted a pay implementation for web access(Kasparov.ru 2007e).
Who organized these events? The main organizer of quality of life protests was the
Communist Party. The Communists demonstrated the ability to serve as an umbrella for activist
groups. Actions against the Siberian telecommunications company were organized by the party’s
so-called committee of solidarity action, which included two related movements. The Avant Guard
of Red Youth (AKM) is a social offshoot of the party dedicated to politicizing fights for pay,
adequate housing, access to health and educational services—or in short “battle against any form
of exploitation” (AKM Novosibirsk 2017). Working Russia is a similar offshoot dedicated to
publicizing social injustice. The group was formed after the fall of the USSR as a Moscow-based
organization and spread throughout the oblasts. In addition to party affiliates a local women’s
collective, Kindness, and the union of retired army officers participated. Pensioners organized
several events themselves, under the name “The Social Council for Pensioners in Novosibirsk,”
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or just the Social Council (Hamraeva 2011). More narrowly defined groups also played an
organizational role. Investors held their hunger strike indoors, connecting to the national
movement through media attention. Bread drivers organized thanks to the group’s unions. Grain
producers self-organized and marched with support from locals near the factory. The automobile
owners used the internet to found a social action group. And students rallied without additional
support in the forest enclave.
What kind of response did the events evoke from local leadership? The initial push from
protests won government attention. Officials voiced empathy and publicly discussed increasing
payouts for benefits tied to phone lines. Hope quickly dissipated. The telecommunications
contract was approved by the government, and is now in force in the area. State responses to
Communist and pensioner gatherings took the form of soft repression. Protests were sanctioned,
but limited to thirty participants. Across protests police presence observed the events, but no
arrests were reported. Events were, furthermore, subject to a local law banning sound
amplification of any sort at public demonstrations. Local leadership also demonstrated state
capacity to coopt. The bread transporters were able win a positive outcome. The company
agreed to negotiations with the drivers’ union, and after a series of talks, offered a wage increase
as well as inflation-indexed pay. Novosibirsk politicians arbitrated the negotiations.
A second set of protests arose from ideological concerns, rather than living conditions.
Movement entrepreneurs made their voices heard in several incidents. Members of the coalition
“The Other Russia” tried to spread awareness. Along with leading marches, activists distributed
pamphlets informing readers of developments related to the national movement “March of the
Dissidents” (Kasparov.ru 2007g). Participants quizzed passers-by on their knowledge of local
oppositional politics and were subsequently granted an interview on the largest local radio station.
The group further established a presence in the area with weekly discussions in a jazz café under
the name “the pipe” (Kasparov.ru 2007h). In Akademgorodok a string of protests arose against
planned construction and deforestation (Solovyova 2007). Group organizers rallied local support
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for green space and ecological conservation through signature gathering. Participants specifically
voiced their displeasure with the un-inclusive nature of construction plans, informed exclusively
by local government officials and construction firms.
Social movement entrepreneurs were members of several activist organizations. The
Other Russia is an umbrella term used to describe followers of founding members, Gary
Kasparov, the politician Mikhail Kasyanov, and the writer Eduard Limonov. The organization,
often represented in logos as a grenade, formed in 2006 as a vehicle to unite dissident political
groups, particularly liberals, economic reformers, and nationalists, roughly represented by the
three founding members. Limonov attempted to establish the group as an official political party in
2010, before impending elections. The attempt did not succeed, and The Other Russia has since
been banned as an extremist group (Lenta 2012). The ecological protests were organized by the
Novosibirsk Housing Initiative, a group dedicated to preserving green space across the region.
After the initial protest two local groups added their support to the cause: Protest City-Forest
Akademgorodok and the small group Academ-garden are two narrowly-focused groups centered
in the university enclave.
Reported government response was minor. March of the Dissidents literature distribution
continued without repressive response. The Novosibirsk state did however challenge The Other
Russia’s support structures with attacks on the media and the internet. The oblast attorney
ordered local providers to block access to several sites deemed extremist in his opinion
(Kasparov.ru 2007g). The move was reversed by local courts shortly after its introduction. In a
more effective move, a television host was fired and his show cancelled after discussing protests
and protestor demands in the oblast (Kasparov.ru 2007h). The forest protests ended
disappointingly for protestors. Groups supporting the action were invited to a meeting but
reportedly ignored entirely (Solovyova 2007).
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Krasnoyarsk
Events in Krasnoyarsk in 2007 continue to demonstrate the interaction between state and
society. Driving factors were roughly similar across the two regions, and several of the
Novosibirsk protests saw a reflection in the neighboring region. Krasnoyarsk’s leadership,
however, appeared more willing to respond to protests, both with batons and with offers of
appeasement.
Quality of life concerns drove a variety of groups to the streets over the course of 2007.
The telephone pricing change evoked protest in the northern region. Again the local Communist
Party organized resistance to the impending decision from Sibertelecom (Kasparov.ru 2007b).
And again financial and employment concerns catalyzed several protests. Unlike in Novosibirsk
though, reported events were all focused on narrowly-defined grievances. A group gathered to
voice opposition to a planned increase in public transportation fees (Kasparov.ru 2007l). A
nationwide ban on gambling halls evoked a similar reaction. Those picketing were not gamblers,
but employees. Among placards outside of casinos appeared slogans, “give us the right to work,”
and “we need to pay for housing” (Kasparov.ru 2007j). Construction workers initiated a march and
hunger strike to demand back pay after their employer’s bankruptcy (Kasparov.ru 2007n), as did
workers at a heavy machinery factory (Kasparov.ru 2007f). Housing concerns again spurred a
string of protests. In a small village, inhabitants protested a forced relocation by the government.
Korkino was a labor town outside of an aluminum refinement factory. When the factory closed
and was demolished, the town was declared unfit for inhabitants. Those with deeds to homes
were awarded housing elsewhere. Those without deeds received nothing other than an order to
vacate (Ikd.ru 2007d). In another case military families kicked off a hunger strike after a zoning
law change reduced the number of apartments designated for veterans (Kasparov.ru 2007m).
Echoing Novosibirsk, defrauded investors “sat in” at an unfinished construction site and invited
journalists to witness their occupation (Ikd.ru 2007c).
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Reactions from Krasnoyarsk government, when reported, offer a clear look at
cooptational capacity in action. The telecom gatherings did not elicit any response according to
sources. During the price hike protest, participants were allowed to carry on in peace. Police
stood by but did not intervene—despite the fact that events were unsanctioned (Kasparov.ru
2007b). Two of the professional groups won concessions. Workers at the Krasnoyarsk heavy
machinery factory reportedly went without pay for eight months. Through their union the workers
called attention to the fact that they had kept production lines open throughout this lengthy period.
Under threat of impending strike, the group directly asked for government intervention. Mayor Lev
Kuznetzov acquiesced, initiating payment transfers almost immediately (Kasparov.ru 2007f).
Workers for the state-owned construction company also received concessions. Government
officials offered a deal: rather than receiving money, the aggrieved workers would have their back
pay deducted from personal debts and credited towards future housing bills. Some workers
accepted the deal and others carried out a fruitless hunger strike. One of the three housing
complaints won a conciliatory response from local government. The former aluminum factory
workers were awarded housing ownership certificates and paid transfer to an inhabitable region
(KPRF News 2007).
Ideological protests in Krasnoyarsk arose in response to perceived government
illegitimacy, often connecting with nation-wide movements. In 2007 March of the Dissidents held
a large anti-Putin rally in Moscow. In many oblasts around the country displays of solidarity arose,
including in Krasnoyarsk (Kasparov.ru 2007i). Six months after the first action, and in the face of
increasing opposition, organizers once again took their message to the streets (Skovorodnikov
2007). Protestors voiced outrage against the ruling regime, and particularly against restriction of
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly in public places. Local supports of the March
organized another show of solidarity against Duma election results. Protestors refused to
acknowledge results carried out under conditions of “complete falsification and government terror”
(Kasparov.ru 2007o). Towards the end of the year The Other Russia and the Krasnoyarsk
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Communist youth movement organized a so-called “Wake for the Constitution.” Organizers
picketed outside of the local parliament, where participants performed a dramatic reading of
constitutional articles guaranteeing freedom of expression and movement in the Russian
Federation (Kasparov.ru 2007i).
Unlike in Novosibirsk, the Krasnoyarsk local government reacted to protests with
repressive force. Initially the Krasnoyarsk manifestation of March of the Dissidents was prohibited
based on a fictional conflict of interest. Government representatives claimed that an ecological
protest was already approved for the same date and time. No such event occurred. The
discontents gathered in the free square, where they met an overwhelming police presence.
Reports described around 100 protestors observed closely by around 1000 armed police officers.
No arrests were reported (Kasparov.ru 2007i). Repressive response was not absent. Repression
simply began before the event, or took place well afterwards. Two days before the march, two
high-profile activists were arrested while handing out fliers. Two of the participants, The Other
Russia Duma candidate Rim Shaigalimov, and organizer Catherine Fatyahova, were arrested in
their homes. Police charged the pair with distributing extremist literature and thoroughly searched
the premises. Several days later another activist was detained and questioned while handing out
Other Russia stickers (Skovorodnikov 2007). Undeterred, the protestors provoked the latent
threat looming over the first meeting. A coalition of police and special forces tactfully dispersed
the second March of the Dissidents solidary action. Supporters walking towards the central
square met road blocks and law enforcement encouraging them to avoid the center of town. Party
leaders awoke to cordons preventing them from leaving their homes (Skovorodnikov 2007). One
amusing example underscores the atmosphere in the oblast in 2007. The dramatic reading, a
response to increasing regional tension, again brought threat without action. A bus full of police
watched the entire performance (Kasparov.ru 2007i).
Again, who organized the events? The organizer profile resembles that of Novosibirsk.
The Communist Party played primary role in telecommunications protest, with support from the
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Krasnoyarsk chapters of The Other Russia and the Avant-Garde of Communist Youth. The
principle organizers of the transportation picket were again the Communist Party, with assistance
this time from the local pensioners. The worker-led events, on the other hand, were not supported
by local political parties. The blackjack dealers and their colleagues, construction workers, and
factory workers organized without assistance. Of the three groups, the factory workers alone
organized with the help of a union. The various groups protesting housing travails similarly
operated within a narrow circle of participants and organizers. The Other Russia clearly drove the
ideological protests, with no reported support from the main branch of the Communist Party.
Additional supporters of the cause were the Revolutionary-Patriotic Union of Krasnoyarsk (РПСК)
a group consisting of Working Krasnoyarsk, a group of Communist activists not officially linked to
the party, and a women’s rights group.
Summary
Applying the Idea of the State analytical framework, several takeaways emerge through
the swirl of events. Many protests went ignored by local government, at least according to
material from activist and mainstream news media. Other protests received a promise for
cooperation that proved empty, as in the cases of Sibertelecom’s price plan change and AcademGarden’s deforestation movement in Novosibirsk. Reported responses reveal a potential pattern.
Grievance-driven protests were addressed with cooptational responses, whereas repressive
responses appeared in response to ideologically-driven, social-entrepreneur-organized events.
Furthermore, efforts to discourage or limit gathering in both sub-regions demonstrate the softer
side of repression. Caps on attendance and bans on amplification check protestor actions without
offering direct resistance, as do claims of occupied public spaces, and public festival
cancellations.
Furthermore, leadership in the northern-most Siberian subject appears more willing to
employ cooptation and coercion. Krasnoyarsk responded to demands of construction workers,
heavy machinery factory workers, displaced veterans, and displaced workers. Novosibirsk
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responded similarly to demands of grain producers. In each instance, aggrieved segments of the
population received monetary or in-kind compensation, in exchange for which they ceased
protest activity. At this point, evidence does not clearly indicate that Krasnoyarsk is more prone to
buying-off dissidents. Novosibirsk did not experience housing displacement of particularly the
same type. The bread delivery workers did go unrewarded, however, unlike all such workerinitiated events in the northern region. Krasnoyarsk leadership also seems to have employed
harsher tactics. Repressive state capacity was visible in response to Other Russia’s planned
gathering a march. In Novosibirsk, the group limited behavior to educational pamphlet
distribution, and went unmolested, with the exception of censorship.

2008
Novosibirsk
In 2008, the majority of protest events centered on inflation, satisfactory employment, and
calls to replace the ruling United Russia party. Housing disputes, ecological concerns, animal
cruelty, and freedom of expression likewise drove people to the streets. Despite exhibiting fewer
events, Krasnoyarsk again reported more examples of effective cooptational state capacity. The
second year also produces a crosscutting comparison of the two regions, thanks to a common
grievance and differing responses.
Quality of life protests continued in Novosibirsk. A series of protest marches erupted
throughout the oblast in response to price increases. Over the course of 2007 the oblast’s
statistical service reported increases to consumer goods, public transportation, housing costs,
and child care services (HGS Novosti 2008). Participants marched with posters, crying out
against “Communal Robbery,” and “Medvedev’s key project—price increases” (Kasparov.ru
2008b). Various groups voiced a need to cope with the changing, challenging socioeconomic
environment. The Communist party and unions demanded increases in wages and increases in
housing assistance (KPRF News 2008b). Inhabitants working in the auto-transport industry
organized a set of disruptive actions. Heavy freight drivers parked trucks around a main square,
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adorned with slogans protesting gas price increases (Kasparov.ru 2008g). The difficult economic
climate cut across organizational boundaries. After Communist Party groups organized a followup meeting, pensioners and auto driver unions gathered nearby to echo displeasure with inflation
(Kasparov.ru 2008i). Aside from the joint event groups waged their own campaigns. Auto-workers
faced sources of grievance not directly related to price changes. A group of municipal bus drivers
refused to work until wage arrears were paid (Ikd.ru 2008a). Another protest targeted a monopoly
on service driving jobs, leading to a hunger strike. A local competition for government
transportation contracts was opened only to groups owning a large number of vehicles, blocking
participation of small-scale groups (KPRF News 2008d). Pensioners too held their own set of
protests, demanding a dignified life and a right to affordable housing. In a particularly alarming
example, at one of the protests, an elderly pensioner immolated himself to call attention to
injustice (PolitSibr 2008, Kasparov.ru 2008j). After the immolation gatherings continued, at which
calls for better living conditions intertwined with memorials for the dead man (Ikd.ru 2008g, Ikd.ru
2008h).
The majority of protests passed without response from the government, positive or
negative, according to media sources. None of the price increase protests sparked a response.
Neither concerns over the driving job monopoly nor concerns over fuel availability were
addressed. Interestingly, the auto-transport protests explicitly called to emulate Krasnoyarsk’s
approach. Protestors called governor Victor Tolokonski to create a working group dedicated to
mitigating fuel market fluctuations (KPRF News 2008c). No response was forthcoming. State
reactions in 2008 included one example of repression and one example of cooptation. Pensioner
protests brought a harsh government response. After the self-immolation incident, Novosibirsk
leadership began to employ repressive tactics. Participants in follow-up protests were themselves
arrested, when turning the dead man’s portrait into a rallying symbol. The official cause for arrest
was leading an “unsanctioned gathering” (Ikd.ru 2008g). Municipal bus drivers, on the other hand,
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won a positive response from the government. After a weeklong hunger strike workers received
unpaid wages (Ikd.ru 2008a).
Ideological protests in 2008 centered on local issues, while also connecting to nationwide
events. In many cities across Russia activists gathered to take part in the Communist Party’s “All
Russian” protest event. In Novosibirsk the event took the form of several anti-Putin, pro-Gennady
Zyuganov demonstrations. Rallying cries included “Putin Raises Prices, Zyuganov lowers them!”
and “no lousy teddy bear, we choose Zyuganov” (KPRF News 2008a). Organizers looked to
garner support for a future presidential campaign, while drawing on a well of dissatisfaction. Calls
for social justice united a broad swath of concerns, focused against the ruling United Russian
party. Ecological activists and labor organizers voiced their rejection of the dominant political
milieu (Ikd.ru 2008b). The ecologist sub-contingent spread their message at several events
throughout the year (Kasparov.ru 2008d). The new round of actions took place in the city center
as well as in Akademgorodok, as activists pushed to declare the micro-region a center of culture
heritage, a place free of new construction (Kasparov.ru 2008h). At protests dedicated to
preventing deforestation ecological activists attempted to rely on in anti-corruption sentiment
present in the area. Activists attempted to join forces with children’s rights activists protesting
against corrupt orphanage management (Kasparov.ru 2008d).
Responses to ideological protests continue to demonstrate hard and soft forms of
coercive state capacity. As in the case of material protests, no responses were reported to the
Communist-led events, nor were arrests. The green space protests brought a crackdown, of
particularly disingenuous design. One of the organizers was sent to solitary confinement for
overdue book fees. Others were arrested, under charges of assaulting a public representative
during what was deemed an unsanctioned gathering. Activists reported that this cynical charge
was the result of police assaulting a protestor, perhaps receiving scratches in the process (Ikd.ru
2008f). The activists’ trial lasted over a year, with the court eventually assigning eighteen months
of provisional arrest and six months of community service (NGS Novosti 2009).
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Again the local Communist Party took the lead, organizing many quality of life as well as
ideological protests. A number of leftist youth groups loosely tied to the party took part in actions.
The smaller groups, in contrast to the official party, took part in ecological protests as well. The
offshoots include, Working Russia, АКМ, and РКСМ, an Other Russian youth movement (KPRF
News 2008a). The green space protests were primarily organized by a movement known as
“Protectors of City-Forest Akademgorodok,” formed after construction reduced the square footage
of forest by 600 hectares from 2006 to 2009. The group is informal with a stable core, comprised
of two chemists, a local politician, and an artist. Activists rely on public demonstrations and
petition signature gathering (Ikd.ru 2008f). The corruption protests were organized by those
working in a condemned orphanage, as well as the local chapter of women’s group Russia’s
Hope (Kasparov.ru 2008d).
Krasnoyarsk
In Krasnoyarsk, in 2008, strands of grievance continue from the previous year, and new
grievances arose. Quality of life protests echoed those reported previously, while ideological
protests seem to have been connected to a single event: Duma elections held in December of
2007.
Like in the preceding year, the northern Siberian province saw narrowly-focused quality
of life protests and housing conflicts. Workers at an aluminum refinement plant marched and
threatened to strike, demanding unpaid wages(Ikd.ru 2008c). A hunger strike at a mine erupted
as a machinist group, Octoberists, refused to vacate the professional committee building (Ikd.ru
2008e). Airline workers were fired and demanded pay from the government. They marched in
response and threatened to organize their own hunger strike (Ikd.ru 2008i). Automobile owners’
actions in the two federal subjects offer a clear parallel. While protests in Novosibirsk opposed
fuel price hikes, activists in Krasnoyarsk convened a show of support for ongoing discussions
between politicians and activists, hoping to find a cooperative solution(Kasparov.ru 2008e).
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Ideologically-driven protests centered on legitimacy complaints targeting the ruling party.
th

Disputed elections played the catalyzing role. The Other Russia broadly declared the 5 duma
gathering illegitimate. The political coalition penned an open letter to Krai leadership, in which
they outlined violations of the Russian constitution as well as norms of international human rights.
To spread their message, leaders organized a so-called Bread Revolt in the central town square.
Participants revolted against price increases, living services and gasoline, in addition to bread.
However, the demands were couched in a broader attack on an illegitimate political system.
Organizers distributed political literature, arguing that a political system in which the people do not
choose their leaders breeds social ills (Kasparov.ru 2008c). Later in the year The Other Russia
tried to unite the local opposition. At an anti-United Russia event organizers announced the
formation of the Revolutionary Patriotic Union of Krasnoyarsk, a group including Communist
youth groups and members of the Communist Party, in addition to the core members of Other
Russia (Ikd.ru 2008d). The remaining reported ideological protests were not related to politics,
local or national. Members of Krasnoyarsk’s gothic sub-culture marched in response to school
rules prohibiting visible tattoos and piercing during school hours (Kasparov.ru 2008f).
Organizers of protest activities in Krasnoyarsk include primarily groups identified in the
previous year. Industry-specific payment grievances spurred workers to organize, with the help of
professional unions. The housing protest saw occupants themselves joined by a subset of the
Other Russia coalition, Working Krasnoyarsk and the Communist youth group AKM. As reported
in 2007, Other Russia was responsible for organizing the bulk of ideological protests. The
clearest difference from the previous year is the absence of reported Communist Party
organizational pressure in either quality of life or ideological protests. While the official branch
was absent, unofficial offshoots took part.
Government responses towards material and ideological protests expose a sharp
dissimilarity. On the quality of life side, Krasnoyarsk leadership produced two powerful examples
of non-repressive state capacity. The society of auto-owners refused to take part in a larger wave
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of protests because they agreed to cooperate with leadership. Representatives of the local
department of economic planning and industry participated in a roundtable discussion with activist
leader Ivan Smolin. The discussants announced that Krai officials would pressure representatives
of RosNeft, the oil company, to increase delivery to the local market. As a second prong of the
strategy, the transport activists worked with local government to send a bill to the federal level
that would allow more local control over fuel taxes (Kasparov.ru 2008a). The local government
showed cooptation power in the case of airline workers, as well as at the aluminum plant. Local
transport minister called a meeting with airline company KrasAir and the union leader. The three
parties came to an elegant solution. Fired workers changed their status to voluntary retirement, in
exchange for guaranteed severance packages. Faced with the mere threat of protest activity, the
power plant owners agreed to bargain. An agreement produced a schedule of back pay
fulfillment. In an interesting turn, the concern’s representative refused to name the source of new
funds, claiming he was able to attract “strategic investors.” Source indicate that Krai government
was the mysterious savior (Ikd.ru 2008i). Negotiations between the union and factory leadership,
produced a raise in average pay and a promise to renovate worker quarters (SoyuzSevodnya
2008).
The participants in ideological protests experienced the iron fist aspect of state capacity.
As reported in 2007, several leaders of Other Russia were arrested during or after attending
events. One of the leaders even received a yearlong sentence. Charges under which activists
were tried include “public calls to social extremism” (Kasparov.ru 2008k). Krasnoyarsk authorities
continued to challenge freedom of speech. One member of Other Russia was arrested and
detained for two weeks for publishing obscene language to an internet message board
(Kasparov.ru 2008l).
Summary
The pattern of responses evident in 2007 once again appears. Many events received no
response. Quality of life protests received cooptational responses. And ideological protests
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received repressive responses. Both regions demonstrated the willingness to coopt disaffected
professional groups. Novosibirsk leadership gave in to municipal drivers demands for higher
wages. Krasnoyarsk leadership orchestrated negotiations and an eventual conclusion between
an airline company and employees. In Krasnoyarsk aluminum workers also won concessions
from factory owners. In the south ecological activists experienced arrests and physical abuse
from law enforcement. In the north Other Russia remained a target of such actions, as well as
censorship. As an exception, pensioners began to face arrest after merging their push for decent
living conditions with memorials for the immolated man. Again it is difficult to judge the
inclinations of the two local governments. In Novosibirsk, in Krasnoyarsk, government responded
to some events, not to others, and catalysts vary in the two regions.
This year, however, in 2008, a cross-cutting grievance offers a telling comparison. Over
the course of the year, in Novosibirsk, Communists, auto-owners, and pensioners held events in
protest of price increases, together and in smaller groups. Sources did not report a state
response. In Krasnoyarsk, the state successfully preempted auto-owner protests by engaging in
cooperative negotiations. Auto-owners’ explicit call to emulate the cooperative process
strengthens the contrast. Other than the auto-enthusiasts Krasnoyarsk did not witness inflation
protests. Of course it is possible that price levels were not comparable across the regions.
According to the RossStat, though, official levels of commercial goods and services inflation
deviating by less than one percentage point in every month of the year (GKS, 2016).

2009
Novosibirsk
With a third year of analysis, clearer patterns in protest dynamics begin to appear.
Novosibirsk continued to see unrest driven by high cost of living and worker demands for higher
pay or liquidation of back pay. Quality of life protests continued to be occasionally coopted.
Ideological protests continue to be occasionally repressed.
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Problems of the previous years continued to emerge in Novosibirsk in 2009. Several
protests explicitly targeted housing prices. A group of dissatisfied tenants demanded rezoning of
their apartment building to win city subsidies (Kasparov.ru 2009e), and a pensioner-led protest
called attention to unsustainable rent and maintenance costs (Ikd.ru 2009a). Automobile owners
played a role in the battle against untenable living conditions. Activists organized a march against
housing and housing services prices, gas prices and gas taxes (Lebentsev 2009). The autoowners then organized a set of separate protests narrowly focused on gas prices (Aksenova
2009). For the third straight year a number of professional groups also convened protest actions.
Teachers struck and threatened a hunger strike, demanding greater compensation (Kasparov.ru
2009d). Those working for an American-themed restaurant chain, New York Pizza, hit the streets
together in order to demand back pay from their employer (Kasparov.ru 2009a). The service
industry workers threatened mass walk-outs and threatened to sue the owners. In separate
incidents security guards (Ikd.ru 2009b) and local national guard members threatened hunger
strikes in the face of impending layoffs (Kasparov.ru 2009c). In two final examples of workplace
unrest, workers at the Altai Tractor Factory (Krapotkina 2009), and the Linevski Construction
company (Ikd.ru 2009d), picketed outside their company headquarters, demanding compensation
for unpaid wages. Novosibirsk mothers focused a new source of grievances into a set of actions.
The local March on Wheels saw a group of mothers strolling out their strollers to demand child
care. Protestors’ primary demand was an increase in available spots in child care centers. More
generally, however, the group protested budgetary relations towards women and families.
According to the women’s slogans financial conditions effected the decision to have a second
child. Despite the fact that the Russian constitution guarantees free public child care, before
school age, thousands of children went without a spot in oblast classrooms (Vasiliva 2009c).
Novosibirsk leadership did not respond to the majority of quality of life protests in 2008.
And, ignored in previous years, auto-owners dissident actions were now met with repressive
force. Despite the fact that auto-owners’ protest against price levels were approved by the
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government, two of the group’s leaders, Alexei Umerenko and Sergei Kononov were arrested, for
“failure to pay fines on time” (Aksenova 2009). After his release Kononov was again jailed. On the
eve of a planned march he was placed in solitary confinement for “violating the peace” at a
previous event. No conciliatory measures were forthcoming, and the Novosibirsk transportation
department even decided to reduce spending on infrastructure maintenance (Vasiliva 2009a). Not
all was bleak, however. The striking teachers canceled their action after winning a promise to sit
down with lawmakers. The striking tractor assemblers saw their demands met in full. In their
demands, the protestors cleverly leveraged the impending visit of then Prime Minister Putin.
Failure to pay wages would incite a railroad blockade on the scheduled arrival day. Immediately
before Putin’s arrival funds were dispersed to workers’ accounts. This instance lays the logic of
cooptation bare. The signed agreement even includes legal language tying the repayment to
cessation of further protest actions (KPRF News 2009). Striking workers at the construction
company were not as fortunate, and the company filed for bankruptcy a year late. The pizza
restaurant staff also failed to sway leadership.
Ideologically-driven dissent continued in Novosibirsk across 2009. A nation-wide day of
protest against United Russia included a local march in Novosibirsk (Druzhinin 2009). A march in
remembrance of a murdered journalist, shot in Moscow, turned into a brawl when a group of
nationalists engaged protestors (Ikd.ru 2009a). This year, however, the main flash point became
tension between law enforcement and local residents. Activists gathered several times to call for
wide-ranging reforms to police behavior in the region. Participants hoped to spread their message
to politicians, residents, and members of law enforcement organizations. The local outrage
appeared only after several cases of alleged brutality by members of the military and the police
(Vasiliva 2009b). Later in the year a high-profile case brought Novosibirsk citizen-security
organization relations to the fore. A youth organizer, Artyem Loskutov, was arrested preparing to
take part in the city’s annual “Monstration,” an apolitical demonstration of youth and creativity. He
was only freed after protests in his defense in Saint Petersburg and Moscow. Support also came
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from high-profile anti-Putin deputy Ilya Ponamarev. Oblast courts refused to admit to wrongdoing,
and upon his release Loskutov immediately organized a rally for police reform (Ikd.ru 2009f).
Official responses were yet again largely absent. The anti-police brutality events saw a
police presence accompany the marchers without intervention. Inaction turned to a form of
repression in the nationalist attack. Sources report that police did nothing to discourage the
violent attack against activists mourning the slain journalist (Ikd.ru 2009a). When a response did
appear, in the Monstration case, repression appears to have been misguided. Artyem Loskutov
was jailed under charges of possession of narcotic substances in large quantities. Official
charges appeared several days after the arrest, and the young man claimed a bag of marijuana
was planted on him. Loskutov himself interpreted his arrested as a preemptive attempt to
discourage participation in social mobilization. He was not discouraged (Ikd.ru 2009f).
Dissident acts in the southern Siberian oblast were organized by a rich array of groups,
from well-established movements, to rising activist entrepreneurs, to single issue area groups.
The auto-owners branded their organization TIGR and rallied members to protest gas prices. This
year, however, they began offering support to causes well outside of their foundational area of
concern. Solidarity sponsored the law enforcement reform protest, with support from “For Human
Rights” and the Communist Youth Group AKM, as well as Communist party and Just Russia party
members. Solidarity is a citizens’ rights movement founded by the slain politician Boris Nemtsov.
The auto-owners’ movement pledged their support as well. TIGR even took part in rallies for
accessible child health care. The March on Wheels was organized by a local movement under
the name “Give Russian Children Access to Education.” As the name indicates, the group was
formed in response to the issue at hand. Finally, the new, rising star in the activist community
grabbed headlines even thousands of miles from Novosibirsk. The name Artyem Loskutov rang
out in Moscow and Saint Petersburg over the course of the year as the activist attained the level
of symbolic hero. As usual, professional pickets and hunger strikes were organized by workers
themselves.
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Krasnoyarsk
Events in Krasnoyarsk in 2009 clearly demonstrate the power of protester demands. A
promise to fulfill wage arrears brought an end to airline and factory dissent in 2008. Both workers
were effectively coopted. As soon as the promises began to waver, protesters once again
mobilized their threats. Cooptational state capacity, as would be expected, appears effective only
when carried through to its conclusion. On the ideological side, protestors interpreted the
mysterious death of a colleague as reason to fight, not succumb to repressive force.
Two workplace conflicts led to protests in the region. In both cases local government
initiated cooptational response in the previous year, in 2008. Once the promised aid began to
disappear aggrieved citizens restarted their campaigns. The ongoing airline bankruptcy became
the major source of contention in the region, and even across the country. Unemployed
stewardesses, baggage handlers, and ticket sellers returned to the streets after delays arose in
the payment schedule negotiated the previous year. The group decided to gather symbolically on
a local holiday, the birthday of Krasnoyarsk’s aviation industry. Workers targeted local
government to intervene with signs claiming “without a kopeck in our pockets,” and “we will fight
to the end.” Without assistance, future actions were promised (Hadyezhdin 2009). A month after
the initial action, gatherings moved to the nation’s capital. Workers repeated their claims in a
central square in Moscow, paying particular attention to the fact that, “the government is the
primary stock holder in KrasAir” (Kasparov.ru 2009b). The battle continued in the oblast with a
concurrent picket to support the capital campaign, and a hunger strike. Shortly thereafter
electronic transfers began and actions ceased (Kasparov.ru 2009g). In a parallel case, workers at
the Krasnoyarsk heavy machinery factory threatened to return to the streets after concessions
ceased (Ikd.ru 2009c).
The fluidity of government responses to the airline bankruptcy outlines a process of
interaction between state and society. Several initial protests failed to elicit a response. The
government only responded after a group of aggrieved workers enacted a hunger strike.
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According to reports, at least several individuals reached critical condition, requiring
hospitalization, before negotiations resumed (Kasparov.ru 2009g). Minister of Industry and
Energy for the Krai met with representatives and agreed to initiate a transfer of funds. When the
promised funds failed to appear immediately, the hunger strike continued. When the threat of
death materialized, when more stewardesses were hospitalized, the funds materialized as well.
Two months after the agreement the company filed for bankruptcy (Lenta Novosti 2009). As
before, Krasnoyarsk leadership intervened in the factory protest. The mayor ordered the company
to declare bankruptcy, and organized partial compensation of worker debts (Ikd.ru 2009c).
Ideologically-driven protests emerged in response to a specific incident occurring in
Krasnoyarsk. On June 30 Rim Shaigalimov was pronounced dead in a Krasnoyarsk correctional
facility(Kasparov.ru 2009f). Shaigalimov was an Other Russia activist, who died jumping out of a
window, according to official reports. Members of his family reacted in shock. They rejected any
insinuation of frail health or suicidal tendencies. Shaigalimov was transferred to solitary
confinement after an unlikely suicide attempt. Police report that the 55 year old activists slipped
free of handcuffs during transfer between facilities and used “sharp edges” of a nearby car to
gash his wrists. After the incident his associates organized a series of protests in the area. Within
a month of the incident Shaigalimov’s death threated to become a national rallying cry for the
opposition. A show of solidarity took place in Moscow (Komsomolskaya Pravda 2009). Unrelated
to the headline-grabbing story, members of Other Russia organized a march in protest of United
Russia and in favor of a “worthy life.” Participants echoed the nationwide chant of “Russia without
Putin” (Ikd.ru 2009e).
The Krasnoyarsk state responded with denial and seemingly clumsy attempts at
obfuscation. As protests against the mysterious death began the government failed to provide
explanations for two perplexing factors. The solitary confinement cell featured a window, but one
fortified by metal bars. And secondly, the prison claimed that footage from a round-the-clock
surveillance camera had disappeared. The prison administrators further refused to acknowledge
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the protestors’ primary demand: an independent investigation into cause of death. As protests
continued, spreading to the capital in the west, official response turned darker. According to
official reports Shaigalimov’s passport was lost during his incarceration, along with Xeroxed
copies of his relatives passports. Without proof of identity the coroner threated to bury the activist
as an unknown foreign national. More than in insult, the procedure would prevent anyone from
examining the body before the burial (Radio Svoboda 2009). Additional responses were not
reported. A similarly threatening response met the organizers of the “worthy life” protest. While
handing out pamphlets the local leader of the Left Front was jailed. The individual was detained
for less than 24 hours, according to reports, but in the mist of the Shaigalimov affair, even a short
stay was cause for alarm (Ikd.ru 2009e).
The aggrieved airline and factory workers each organized with the help of their unions.
Shaigalimov’s colleagues at Other Russia organized protests in his defense. Leader of the
National Bolshevik strand, Andrei Skovorodnikov, played the initial role in spreading the story.
Once protests in the deceased’s honor began, the Revolutionary-Patriotic Union of Krasnoyarsk
joined in. Additional groups joined once the movement spread to Moscow. The Communist youth
groups and Solidarity both took part. The “worthy life” was organized by Other Russia alone.
Summary
State responses in 2009 offer the clearest indication yet that Krasnoyarsk may, in fact, be
more inclined towards cooptational solutions. According to source data, Novosibirsk ignored
demands of restaurant workers, builders, security guards, pensioners, mothers with young
children, and automobile-owners. Krasnoyarsk leadership only faced two groups of aggrieved
citizens, and reinvigorated faltering cooptation deals in both cases. The persistent nature of
unresolved demands is another takeaway from this year’s events. In Novosibirsk inflation
protests, especially those organized by TIGR, stretched into 2009. Both sources of quality of life
protest in Krasnoyarsk were direct continuations of previous state-society negotiations. As
witnessed in 2007 and 2008, some ideologically-driven protests were ignored, others were met
230

with repression. Interestingly, in both Siberian regions attempts to repress seem to have
encouraged social mobilization. Activists argue that Loskutov was arrested as a method of
deterrence. Activists argue that Shaigalimov was killed as a warning to Other Russia leadership.
In both cases the repressive actions became rallying cries for local organizers. Even more
disconcerting from the perspective of government officials, in both cases cries for retribution
spread to Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

2010
Novosibirsk
In Novosibirsk, in 2010, two unaddressed quality of life concerns generated protest
waves. Demands for accessible childhood education and subsidized transportation spurred
numerous actions throughout the year. The waves demonstrate the contagion potential of such
movements, as each attracted followers critical of local leadership. Ideologically-driven protests
continued, although with a wider range of driving factors.
Quality of life protests raged over the entire year. In particular two concerns dominated
the headlines and the local political landscape. In the oblast available spaces in pre-school
classrooms dwindled. A group of parents gathered to protest what they considered a violation of
their constitutional rights. The parents announced clearly-organized, specific demands. They
petitioned the government for monetary compensation, exactly equal to the amount of budgetary
funds required to support a preschool student for a year (Mikitik 2010a). Follow-up marches
further expressed a well of outrage from citizens raising young children (Mikitik 2010b). After
failing to receive attention, organizers ratcheted up their efforts, with a hunger strike and an
initiative to boycott voting for United Russia (Krapotkina 2010b). Nearly six months after the initial
wave of protests, the movement continued. Protest leaders began articulating their action as a
defense of government education guarantees (Kasparov.ru 2010b). A combination of hunger
strikes, gatherings, and marches spread across the region. On the traditional first day of school,
Day of Knowledge as it is known, students present their teachers with flowers. The displaced
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children’s’ parents marked the day with a theatrical event. Local leaders repurposed a
kindergarten into a tax inspection facility. The parents blocked the entrance and handed out
flowers to all passers-by, under placards warning that “knowledge is not for everyone” (Ivanovna
2010).
A proposed increase in transport fees for pensioners and government assistance
recipients spurred the second wave of public dissent. Pensioners, handicapped, and the poorest
citizens would have the number of subsidized rides per month capped at 30, according to a
proposed bill. Outraged activists occupied the mayor’s office building until escorted away by
police. Thereafter protests became a common occurrence (Mikitik 2010f). Once the bill began law
demands shifted from prevention to annulling the transportation policy. Actions continued and
received political backing from the Communist Party. Protestors began taking on additional
causes, including housing prices, eventually exhibiting familiar slogans of “pensioners for a
worthy life,” and “protection of veterans.” Disconcerting for leadership, the final wave morphed
into a condemnation of United Russia in general. The meetings continued for over a year, into
2012 (KPRF News 2011b).
Novosibirsk leadership responded with stubborn refusal to employ cooptational capacity.
Dissatisfied parents managed to get their concern to the first threshold of political action. By
protesting directly outside a Novosibirsk legislative meeting, their demand for compensation
received a vote of consideration. Deputies voted down the measure. In a disingenuous move
politicians declared the demands against the law. However, in Permsk Krai parents in the same
position receive state funds (Mikitik 2010b). Several arrests for “distribution of extremist literature”
are the only other reported responses. The initial response to transportation activists was
analogous dismissal. Despite continued protests and solid political support from the Communist
Party, officials did not budge. At a televised open forum the governor explained to those gathered
that complaining about thirty trips is misguided, because the original plan called for twelve (KPRF
News 2011a). After United Russia itself became the target, responses turned dark. Non-political
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organizers were assaulted near their homes, or detained on unrelated charges. Several incidents
of police brutality were reported (Ikd.ru 2010a). Finally, after around six months of protest a sign
of cooptation appeared: leadership introduced the “social discount” card. Pensioners were
allowed sixty rides at half price (KPRF News 2011c). From this point on protesters faced arrest
and fines. It was only at this moment that local state forces chose to employ the “illegal gathering”
law infringement that had been in effect since the initial event. The stubborn protesters were fully
coopted by state power after fourteen months of constant agitation. In January of 2012, the
mayor, announcing that the budget was now able to handle the strain, awarded unlimited
transport to all subsidy categories (Ikd.ru 2012).
In Novosibirsk activists cast themselves as defenders of the constitution. A group
organized a meeting of solidary for Strategy 31, a national movement dedicated to protecting the
st

31 article of the Russian constitution, freedom of assembly. Participants were arrested
(Kasparov.ru 2010a). A second event took the form of public educational exercise. Organizers
gave a set of public talks, discussing the erosion of participation in the modern Russian political
system. Comparing the current system to the 1990’s, passers-by were offered to vote on their
preferred choice (Mikitik 2010a). Politically motivated protests then continued, drawing support
from the city’s tradition of public assembly. The yearly expression of paradoxical slogans and
colorful costumes took place; the Monstration proceeded through the city center and treated
onlookers to “Earth: For Earthlings,” and other strange claims (Kasparov.ru 2010c). Organizers
consistently insisted that the event was non-political in nature. The line between political and nonpolitical blurred on Halloween however. Organizers of the Monstration held a similar Demonst

stration. The date, the 31 , saw some Strategy 31 supporters attend with political slogans
(Kasparov.ru 2010f). Citizens’ fight against police brutality continued through 2010. Two separate
events saw people gathered outside of local courthouses in support of prisoners jailed for
endangering police, while they themselves were receiving beatings (Mikitik 2010c; Kasparov.ru
2010e). Violent behavior of off-duty officers also became reason for protest, and even a hunger
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strike intended to trigger a lawsuit (Mikitik 2010e). As the events continued organizers began
uniting under the banner “little people and the system” (Mikitik 2010e). And finally, the area’s
ecological activists failed to dissipate. Students and professors in Akademgorodok organized
several marches and attempted to disrupt ongoing deforestation efforts (Ikd.ru 2012, Ikd.ru
2010b).
State responses to ideological protests in 2011 were narrowly-focused and minor. Police
arrested several participants in the Strategy 31 protest. Other participants were allowed to march
without hassle. Others never made it to the site. On the way to the protests Solidarity activists
were reportedly detained by police (Kasparov.ru 2010a). Response to the Monstration event
changed over time. This year, organizers lodged an official sanction request, which included the
proposed march route. In the previous year Artyem Loskutov was arrested and fined for taking
part in an unsanctioned event. At first mayoral deputies refused the request. After an exchange
with activist leadership, after organizers threatened to take the administration to court, the
decision was reversed. Repressive actions again Loskutov himself appear to have continued.
After the march the artist was attacked by unknown assailants while sitting on a park bench in the
middle of the city (Kasparov.ru 2010f). After the Halloween march was deemed political, Loskutov
was once again escorted to a police station. Police detain him for a day, and levy a fine for,
ostensibly, unrelated unpaid parking violations—a charge later changed to insulting police. The
green defenders in the university enclave were not hassled until they approached machinery.
Then several were arrested (Ikd.ru 2010c).
Demands for early education compensation were organized by Novosibirsk’s Russian
Children- for Accessible Preschool Education (also known by the unwieldy acronym (РДДДО). As
time passed the group expanded their areas of concern beyond education, even taking part in the
transport subsidy protests. Additional participants included a small citizens group, Citizens Tired
of Waiting, and the local TIGR. As the cause gained momentum, the Communist Party got
involved and played a role in publicizing grievances. Several members of the Novosibirsk
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assembly gave speeches and directly addressed leadership, in an appeal to citizens not eligible
for subsidized rides. Budget cuts at the expense of the elderly were simply not fair, according to
the speakers. Attendance continued to grow, along with the breadth of participants. As the
movement continued into 2011 organizers were able to gather 15,000 signatures on a petition to
the governor. Anti-police brutality protests likewise demonstrate a ratcheting up of organizational
support. Friends and acquaintances of the victims called together early events, before attracting
support from TIGR and eventually Solidarity. The year’s ideologically motivated protests likewise
demonstrate a merging of actors and goals. Solidarity played the primary organizational role in
Strategy 31. Artyem Loskutov used his Monstration network to contribute to event organization.
Krasnoyarsk
Compared to its southern neighbor, Krasnoyarsk appeared tranquil in 2010. Very few
quality of life protests were reported, and the state responded quickly and effectively in each
case. Protestors did organize several ideologically-driven events, however. Like in Novosibirsk,
the national Strategy 31 found local support.
Two cases of living conditions grievance arose over the course of 2010 in Krasnoyarsk,
one of which did not lead to any protests. Workers at a local combine factory organized a strike in
response to accumulating back pay. The men and women constructing agricultural and industrial
machinery reportedly worked without pay for several months. As the debt accumulated, work
continued uninterrupted thanks to leadership’s promises of imminent compensation (Ikd.ru 2012).
When patience expired, the workers, en masse, stopped reporting to their stations. A second set
of laborers suffered from a lack of housing.
State responses demonstrate the effectiveness of both cooptation and coercion. Merely a
week after combine workers began their strike, Krasnoyarsk news outlets reported a complete
fulfillment of back pay. The region’s anti-crisis working group convened with representatives from
the governor’s office to discuss a solution. After the meeting, which occurred behind closed
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doors, workers reportedly received electronic transfers. Reports very clearly reveal the direct
financial involvement of local government. The payment was pushed through only after
employers received a government-guaranteed line of credit (NewsLab.ru 2010). The injection of
funds turned out to be a temporary reprieve. Three years later, in 2013, the factory declared
bankruptcy and shuttered for good (SibNovosti 2013). Coercive measures also seem to have
deterred protesters. Workers at an aluminum plant saw their attempt to picket outside of company
headquarters thwarted. The mayor informed the group that their plans violated Krai law. Any
attempt to convene would result in mass arrests. As an extra layer of assurance the scheduled
site was occupied by fire trucks and heavy machinery. No subsequent action was ever reported
(Ikd.ru 2012).
The majority of protests reported in Krasnoyarsk were driven by ideology. Over the
course of the year, several gatherings convened as part of the national movement in favor of
freedom of assembly, in support of Strategy 31 (Krapotkina 2010a). The group maintained their
commitment to the cause and continued to convene, even after the government enacted a soft
repressive response (Mikitik 2010d). Strategy 31 protests continued throughout the year as
protestors formed an organizational committee dedicated to continuing the tradition (Kasparov.ru
2010d). Another national movement directed feelings of discontent in a slightly different direction.
The national Day of Anger focused on environmental and repressive concerns. Participants in
Moscow and numerous cities, including Krasnoyarsk, exclaimed “Destruction of Parks—It’s a
Crime,” and “enough killing journalists and activists” (Kasparov.ru 2010g).
In response, local leadership flexed their judicial strength. The first gathering in support
of Article 31 of the Russian constitution was sanctioned by the local Krasnoyarsk government.
The second and third meetings were allowed to proceed as well. Things changed after the July
31 gathering. Leadership refused to allow a Strategy 31 protest planned for the last day in
August, citing a scheduling conflict. In the fall the official response turned disingenuous. With the
st

31 of October on the horizon, a series of fences appeared around Krasnoyarsk’s central square.
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Because of this announced “renovation,” protestors were forced to gather on a narrow curbside
nearby (Kasparov.ru 2010d). Despite the crowding out of judicial and physical space, no arrests
were reported at any of the actions. Local leadership continued their pattern of censorship. A
television program on Krasnoyarsk’s channel “TV Center” allowed individuals to discuss their
interpretations of national politics. After one of the habitual participants officially joined Other
Russia, he was immediately banned from the air (Kasparov.ru 2010d).
Organizers once again make up a list of well-known movements, with a few new
additions. Strategy 31 is a major, national campaign that united various groups. The main thrust,
in Moscow each month, was the product of national and international efforts. Russian leadership
came from Nemtsov’s Solidarity. Amnesty international contributed petitions to allow the
meetings to proceed. The Siberian version of the event drew support from Other Russia as well
as an even more radical League Against Illegal Immigration, a group subsequently declared a
domestic terrorist organization. As time passed, as more and more protests occurred, the group
attracted a broader group of supporters. The Communist Party reported participation beginning
with the third event. The Day of Anger gathered the same group, with participants from the
Communists, Solidarity, and Other Russia. Again this is a national movement that even received
international support.
Summary
2010 again strengthens patterns emerging over the previous three years of analysis. A
difference in willingness to react to quality of life protests is perhaps most clearly on display in this
year. Novosibirsk’s refusal to engage protestor demands emboldened two waves of protests.
Both child health care and transportation subsidy protests turned into movements, even
transforming into broad attacks on the governing party. The only quality of life protests in
Krasnoyarsk centered on professional group demands. In both cases local government acted
swiftly to intervene, once with financial assistance, once with repressive force. As in the
preceding years ideologically-driven protests were met with varying levels of repression in both
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federal regions. Local social mobilization structures do seem to have influenced the manifestation
of events in cases. In Novosibirsk the peculiarity of the Monstration tradition merged with more
political protests. And the presence of Other Russia appears to have been stronger in
Krasnoyarsk, as reflected by Strategy 31 protests.

Conclusion
Case study evidence echoes, and thus supports, major quantitative findings. It appears
that the Krasnoyarsk state was more inclined to employ cooptational capacity than its counterpart
in Novosibirsk. It appears that grievances, particularly those associated with wages and bills,
created a consistent catalyst for protest. Even in such a tense environment, cooptational actions
did, in fact, dissuade protestors from organizing. This is not to say that Novosibirsk’s government
completely refused to employ cooptation. Rather, in all four years under analysis the northernmost region reported more incidents of “buying-off” protesters, despite reporting fewer protests,
fewer opportunities for such a response. In 2007, out of eight quality of life movements,
Krasnoyarsk demonstrated cooptational tactics in response to four of them. Novosibirsk, faced
with eight movements, responded with cooptation only in response to striking grain workers. In
2008, Krasnoyarsk used a mix of cooptational and cooperational state capacity to “buy off” autoowners, alumni factory workers, and displaced airline workers, or three of five protest
movements. In the same year, Novosibirsk reached an agreement with just one group, striking
municipal bus drivers, when faced with eight quality of life movements. In 2009 and 2010,
Krasnoyarsk’s protest environment was tranquil. Only four groups organized quality of life
demands. The local state responded each time, three times with cooptation, and once with
effective repression. Over the two years, twelve separate movements demanded assistance in
Novosibirsk. Government responded twice, once to pay tractor factory workers threatening an
official visit from Putin, and once to reverse a cut to subsidized transportation. The difference in
cooptational capacity does appear to drive differing protest outcomes in the two regions.
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The fate of the automobile-owner movement offers a clear comparison of regional
tendencies. In 2008, with inflation levels engendering grievances, Krasnoyarsk government met
with protestors to plan a response. From this moment onwards gas prices did not catalyze any
reported events in the Krai. In 2008, Novosibirsk’s chapter of TIGR explicitly requested to emulate
the northern neighbor’s strategy. The request was denied. Protests continued for years.
To further explore this incident, and cooptational capacity more generally, it would be
interesting to investigate the real effects of the 2008 agreement. Did objective conditions facing
drivers markedly improve, or was the state’s gesture enough to diffuse dissent? Immediate
responses are only part of the story, of course. It appears that Krasnoyarsk’s government
effectively “bought off” groups on the receiving-end of wage transfers and housing improvements.
Satisfied would-be protestors ceased to organize, reducing the carryover in protests from one
year to the next. But what explains the fact that more new quality of life grievances appeared in
Novosibirsk in each year? The answer to this question lies in the interplay between general living
conditions and state assistance programs. A logical line of inquiry would trace the laws and
policies passed by sub-regional government in scheduled legislative sessions, not in response to
social pressure.
Moving to model improvement, I am now convinced that repressive state capacity vis-àvis protest cannot be easily operationalized in a quantitative model. Case analysis reveals that
coercion occasionally took the form of arrests and violence. Repression often failed to discourage
organization, producing the opposite effect in some cases, even when prominent figures like
Shaigalimov were killed. In contemporary Russia, however, coercion also takes a softer form: law
enforcement detained activists temporarily for seemingly benign reasons—overdue library book
fees, unpaid parking fines, and other trivialities just serious enough to hinder a planned speech.
City officials prevented activists from gathering thanks to suspicious scheduling conflicts and city
construction. Organizers in Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk also faced censorship, on the internet
and on local television stations. It is difficult to envision a quantitative indicator that would capture
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this creative set of coercive state tactics. But even an operationalization that included the softer
side of coercive is unlikely to produce a significant relationship with onset frequency. Attempts to
thwart organization through censorship and lengthy legal processes were often unsuccessful, as
in the Loskutov case.
The case study exercise offers insight into social mobilization capacity operationalization
as well. My initial choices were total population, urban population percentage, and local graduate
population. Such a large number of protests were driven by unskilled laborers that education
appears an insufficient driver of relative onset frequency—as indicated by statistical results.
Would an alternative operationalization perform better? The presence of activist movements
represents one potential alternative, some measure of the size of groups like Other Russia and
TIGR. Still, protests driven by regional idiosyncrasies, from deforestation, to police negligence, to
the Monstration tradition all organized without the help of dedicated organizations. And particular
workplace grievances were numerous, often occurring even without the help of unions. Ad hoc
groups spring up in response to both ideological and quality of life motivation.
The case study offered little improvement for cooperational capacity and political
opportunity structure operationalizations. The exercise supports negative findings regarding these
final two independent variables. Support for the government, particularly for the ruling party, do
not seem to have influenced protest trends in Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk. Anti-regime protests
often emerged as offshoots of less political demonstrations, as quality of life concerns grew and
evolved over time. Protestors do not appear to direct demands into the traditional political system.
Many events arose in response to proximate grievances, to which activists gathered and struck
as a first response. Moreover, the catalytic effect of political pluralism may be subsumed by civil
society groups. Process tracing identified Communist youth organizations as occasional
organizers. These groups continue to organize whether or not the Communist party holds local
legislative seats. Case study analysis suggests that neither United Russia support nor political
openness is sufficient to ensure a relatively quiescent protest environment in Russia.
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Finally, I am convinced that disaggregated statistical analysis represents the way
forward. I am convinced that the quality-of-life/ideology dichotomy presented here would improve
the search for structural drivers of protest. The next step in the dialectic that is social scientific
research—from hypothesis, to testing, and back again—would evaluate the notion that quality of
life protests are structurally predictable, while ideologically-driven protests are not. Case study
analysis presented in this chapter suggests that attempts to statistically model all protest events
in the contemporary Russian environment may be misguided. Including unpredictable ideological
protests may have diluted regression model utility. Even a more disaggregated approach would
face difficulties, however. This chapter’s in-depth look at protest in two Siberian provinces
revealed connections between quality of life protests and ideological protests. Categorical
boundaries collapsed as striking workers joined political activists, and the mundane became
political.
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Appendix i
2013 protest onset figures coded from namarsh.ru. I add to Lankina and Voznaya’s existing
dataset, which includes years 2007-2012 (Lankina 2015 and Lankina and Voznaya 2015).

Subject
Adygea
Altai Krai
Altai Republic
Amur
Arkhangelsk
Astrakhan

2013

Bashkortostan

Belgorod
Bryansk
Buryatia
Chechnya
Chelyabinsk
Chukotka
Chuvashia
Dagestan
Ingushetia
Irkutsk
Ivanovo
Jewish AO
Kabardino-Balkaria
Kaliningrad
Kalmykia
Kaluga
Kamchatka
KarachaiCherkessia
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1
3
0
0
2
4
1
0
1
0
0
16
0
0
5
1
8
1
0
0
4
1
0
0
0

Karelia
Kemerovo
Khabarovsk
Khakassia
Khanty Mansi
Kirov
Komi
Kostroma
Krasnodar
Krasnoyarsk
Kurgan
Kursk
Leningrad
Lipetsk
Magadan
Mari El
Mordovia
Moscow City
Moscow Oblast
Murmansk
Nenets AO
Nizhegorodskaia
North Ossetia
Novgorod
Novosibirsk
Omsk
Orel
Orenburg
Penza
Perm
Primorsky
Pskov
Rostov
Ryazan
Sakha
Sakhalin
Samara
Saratov
Smolensk
St. Petersburg
Stavropol
Sverdlovsk
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2
0
0
2
0
3
1
0
6
4
5
0
2
2
0
0
4
139
12
4
0
14
3
0
15
5
0
0
15
0
3
0
3
8
0
1
38
2
1
48
2
10

Tambov
Tatarstan
Tomsk
Tula
Tver
Tyumen
Tyva
Udmurtia
Ulyanovsk
Vladimir
Volgograd
Vologda
Voronezh
Yamalo-Nenets
AO
Yaroslavsk
Zabaikalsky
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10
5
3
1
3
1
0
2
2
1
15
1
17
0
2
0

Appendix ii

265

266

